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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE: CONSTRUCTING A NON- I DENT I TAR I AN
FEMINISM FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
FEBRUARY 1996

RENEE HEBERLE, B.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
Ph.D, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
In my dissertation

I

appropriate the insights of

Theodor Adorno to critique identity logic in feminist
theories of knowledge and representation.

I

do not argue we

can "escape" identity or that we should reject it as a

salient moment of cognition that shapes our political and

sentient life.

Rather,

I

question the privileged place of

dialectical
identity logic in feminism and elaborate a
Adorno'
theory of experience and interpretation using

theory of negative dialectics.
of identity
Adorno anticipates post-modern critiques
while sustaining a
logic and theories of representation
of experience in the
normative commitment to the quality
elaborates a method of
social world. Negative Dialectics
realizing new forms for
interpretation that contributes to
It is a resource
modernity.
self -other relations in
intervene in epistemological and
feminism can draw upon to
in
identity and representation
post-modern arguments about

modernity.

vi

In his philosophy, Adorno shows us that modes of

representation and historical social relations interact in

a

negative dialectic that never allows us to realize, much
less to tell, the final truth of experience.

The

relationship between form (representation) and substance
(experience)

world
is complexly mediated through the object

as are inter-subjective relations.

insights,

I

In light of his

critique the work of materialist feminists who

epistemological
assert that material experience offers
contradictory effects
I argue they obscure the
privilege.
left by efforts to
of representation and the remainders
(in material experience) in

conceptualize difference

feminists
also explore the work of post-modern
cannot be told we must
who argue that because the "truth"
I argue they
representation.
focus only on the politics of

modernity.

I

of experience that drive
defer attention to the qualities
Adorno' s philosophy of
oppositional political struggle.
guides me in these
experience and negative dialectics

contemporary feminisms.
readings and critiques of

vii
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CHAPTER

I

IDENTITY THEORY IN FEMINISM

The historical contests over the social and material

conditions of women's lives are often driven by disputes
about women's properly sexed and gendered identity (ies)

Conservative suspicions about how many genders are implied
in the UN Document that emerged from the Beijing Conference

on Women of 1995 illustrate only one of the more farcical

examples of the pressure brought to bear on women to make
final decisions about "just who (and what) they are going to
be."

A veritable moral panic was stirred up by how the term

"gender" is used in the document.

Conservative critics

charged that the document implies the possibility of five
modify
genders, and complained that "gender" is used to

demands like "education."

This was said to be anti-family

may learn they
because "gender education" implies that women
to be mothers and
are not naturally or divinely inspired
"gender" to be
These critics of the document want
female." Thus those
explicitly stated to equal "male and

wives.

are two natural,
who defend the notion that there
genders rallied as
essentially different, and supplementary
historical and widespread
they began to suspect the impact
feminism and among scholars of
debates about identity in

gender had on the document.

l

The conflicts over identity in feminism have generated

an extraordinary number of possibilities for who and what
'women'

are and can be.

The possibilities for the "meaning"

of woman and women's identities are wide open in the

feminist imagination, even if they remain profoundly limited
in most women's historical realities.

As feminists render

women's lives visible and demand subject status for women,
they make hugely divergent arguments about women's identity.
(Snitow,

1988)

Efforts to "create" the subject of feminism

in the identity of "women" have not led to any fundamental

agreements among women.

Even within feminism assertions

about identity tend to generate critique and resistance from

those who find themselves at the margins or outside of

various descriptive and theoretical limits.

The intensity

claims for
of conflicts show the significance of identity

feminist politics.

The calls for alternatives to

universalizing claims to identity in such historical
Statement of
manifestos as the Combahee River Collective
speech, "Coalition
1974 and Bernice Johnson Reagon's
shift feminist
Politics: Turning the Century" of 1981,

comfortable grounds for
discourse from the dicovery of
constructed around race,
sisterhood to asserting differences
Furthermore, arguments
ethnicity, class and sexuality.
about sexual politics and
within the lesbian community
relationships challenge a
whether woman-identified
deconstructive moves
heterosexist social order inspire

.

directed at "gender" as an organizing concept for feminist
discourse
These debates are
feminism.

However,

I

a critical aspect of the

dynamics of

think they slide toward a reliance on

static forms of identity politics, thereby precluding

feminist attention to the relationship between experience

and identity.
a

This dissertation is an attempt to revitalize

dialectical notion of experience for

a

feminist politics

of social transformation.
I

came to feminist theory out of a general interest in

the politics and the politicization of experience and

because feminism, as

political discourse, privileges

a

experiential knowledge.

However,

in debates about identity which
a

I

I

found myself caught up

have come to think reflect

specifically modern pressure to organize and conceptualize

experience.

There appears to be an unreconcilable tension

between feminist attention to gender as experience and
gender as identity.

I

turned to Theodor Adorno's

try
philosophical inquiries into identity and modernity to
to understand this tension.

Adorno never lapses into either

and identity
acceptance of the tension between experience
His work is driven
nor into theorizing a reconciled state.
the pressures brought
by a critical (self consciousness of
politics and knowledge to
to bear through modern forms of
name of conceptual order.
identify oneself and others in the
Adorno articulates a
Most importantly for my purposes,
)

dialectical theory of experience that can inform

a non-

identitarian feminism.
Gender as experience is rarely addressed as an issue in
itself for feminist politics, though it is clear that it

drives many of the conflicting claims about gender as
identity.

I

argue that "differences" among women are

constituted in and through experience and that identity-

based politics tend to obscure the significance of those
conflicts in favor of conceptual order.

Feminism must

persistently loosen the ties that bind experience and
identity within and outside of feminist discourse and
practice.

However, we should neither assume we can step

outside of the terms of identity nor abandon experience as a

moment in social critique.

Adorno's theory of non-identity

offers a resource for recapturing experience as

a

critical

the
force which persistently defies identity without denying

world.
relevance of identity to our ability to act in the

identity is a
He shows that taking positions for or against

false choice.
Adorno and
My notion of experience is informed by
in Dialectic of
Horkheimer's interpretation of the Odyssey
Adorno
Dialectics..
enlightenment and by Adorno's Ne gative
enlightenment imprisons nature in
and Horkheimer argue that
a moment in the dialectic.
history, denying its autonomy as
Horkhexmer's critique, Enlightenment
According to Adorno and
the imprint of nature on the
philosophy says experience is

mind and soul of man.

As man becomes self-conscious as a

modern individual, his desiring and active relation to
nature will become progressively controlled through rational
consciousness.

Adorno and Horkheimer argue that

Enlightenment succeeds as a colonizing, controlling myth

which produces an individual ideologically bound through the
repression of his own desiring impulses and of that which
threatens his perceived autonomy as patriarch.

Adorno

sustains this idea in Negative Dialectics where he

immanently critiques various forms of Enlightenment
knowledge.

He argues for the critical redemption of the

moment of non-identity in experience that is lost as

knowledge is rationalized into instrumental and conceptual
identity forms in modernity.
Adopting these insights of critical theory, my question
became:

"what happens to experience as it is projected into

the world as a collectivizing, justice-seeking moment of

reference?

Can feminism sustain experience as a critical

than
moment in the dialectical movement of history rather

rationalizing it through identitarian categories?"
dissertation,

I

In my

look at what materialist feminisms have made

of experience politically.

I

consider the relationship

I
frameworks.
between experience and identity in these
in Negative
argue Adorno' s theory, as articulated
feminist approach
Dialectics, could inform a materialist
disruptive qualities
which does not negate the potentially

of experience.

Adorno's Negative Dialectics offers me a

resource for thinking about how feminism might conceive of
this relationship as dialectical rather than allowing the

potentially disruptive quality of experience to be subdued
by identity politics.

Feminist theorists have staked cut various positions
for and against identity and identity politics.

For

example, Wendy Brown argues that identity-based claims do

not challenge the terms of representation within a liberal

state founded in a static differentiation between the
abstract, universalist

particularist

x

we'

(Brown,

and the demands of the
1993:390)

For Brown,

the

'choice' between minimalizing or maximalizing one's

difference in order to achieve political recognition by the
liberal state accepts the terms the state has always already
set up for appropriate forms of participation and

representation.

From a socialist-feminist perspective,

Jenny Bourne (1987) excoriates those who struggle about the

meaning of their identity in the world for diffusing
political struggle against structural dominance and material
forms of exploitation.

For Bourne identity politics

constitutes a peculiar form of subj ectivized narcissism

which ignores structural injustices.

Nanci Caraway (1991),

reclaim identity as
on the other hand, has attempted to
and will occur
necessary means of empowerment that must

a

structures of dominance.
prior to political engagement with

Caraway refers to the critical positioning of oneself as
subject,

a

drawing on Minnie Bruce Pratt, Bernice Johnson

Reagon and some post-structuralist feminisms to suggest that

identity politics is

a

form of strategic,

self-conscious

empowerment for those historically and structurally
disempowered.

These feminists stake out their positions

vis-a-vis historically particular forms that identity

politics take against particular forms of domination

practiced by the liberal state, capitalism, white
supremacist culture, etc.

No one of them offers a

comprehensive account of how identity works within the terms
of modernity.

Rather,

each account is based upon a

particular reading of how dominance works and each
illuminates particular kinds of "identity thinking".

I

do

not claim to have developed a comprehensive account in my

discussions, but
contexts,

I

try to elaborate how,

in all modern

the politics of experience exists in a dialectical

and sometimes productive tension with the social force of
identity.

I

critique the embrace of identity as a political

strategy, but argue that identity as a historical,

social

because that
force cannot be either transcended or rejected
ideological
transcendence or rejection would ultimately be

and dismissive, not material and historical.
To begin,

I

look at how standpoint feminists'

theorize

and women's
the material links between knowledge
Standpoint feminism lays critical
experiential life.

theoretical foundations for asserting the legitimacy and

political relevance of knowledge that emerges from
subordinate groups in social systems of domination and for

a

specifically feminist perspective on the relationship

between the subject and object of knowledge.

I

take up the

argument that subjective (sometimes read as experiential)

proximity to the object offers better knowledge than, for
example, distancing strategies which authorize empiricist

and positivist epistemologies

.

Standpoint feminists argue

that the removal of the self from knowledge creation is

ideological and obscures the situatedness of knowers in

historical social relations.

They simultaneously adopt a

normative commitment to subjugated knowledges and a
materialist analysis of why they offer a truer version of
reality.

According to Nancy Hartsock, for example, feminist

attention to women's relationship to the material world, to
her reproductive, nurturing and/or caring work offers

feminism a truer, potentially universalizable, perspective
on how social relations work.
I

begin my work by exploring feminist epistemology

as
because it takes a non-ontological stance toward women
locating women's position historically and moving

subjects,

from there.

I

think standpoint theory, as useful as it is

abstract from experience
in challenging knowledge forms that
the historically
and in shifting our attention from
knowledge, abandons
Eurocentric, masculine subject of

dialectical thinking in an effort to affirm women's subject

positions as epistemologically superior and therefore beyond
political challenge.

There is in standpoint feminism

a

tendency to affirm abstract principles that transcend

attention to the particular, or to differences within
diverse,

socially constructed, gendered experiences.

example,

the fact that women mother

(or do not mother)

For
in

significantly different ways and even for different reasons

may be more significant for critical feminist knowledge than
the commonalities Hartsock argues are potentially

universalizable

.

Univocal standpoints or strategic

positionings remove experience from political contest and
categorize it for politics rather than assuming that it may

provoke politics.

Feminist knowledge has been driven by an

ethical imperative to attend to women's experiences, which
is as it should be.

But this precludes feminism from

expressing a univocal truth.

Feminist modes of

representation will remain in

a

historical and dialectical

tension with difference as they are challenged by those who

remain beyond their terms of reference.

I

argue that in the

effort to change the terms on which knowledge is produced
challenge the
and valued, standpoint epistemologists do not

political primacy of the subject.

This leaves the mediating

as constitutive
forces of the object world little autonomy

agents of knowledge.

For feminist epistemologists, a

9

subject's experience exists in

a

confluence rather than in a

dialectical tension with the object world.
Adorno's theory of non-identity challenges the impulse
to organize experience into identity forms because, while he

sustains a modernist commitment to theorizing the mediated

quality of inter-subjective life, he shifts the debate away
from locating the 'subject of the creator' and argues that
truths may emerge through our interpretive relationship to
the particulars of the object world (experience)

.

Adorno

does not think it possible to finally render the moment of

experience transparent to the social world; but his theory
of interpretation sustains that moment as critically

disruptive of abstract knowledge forms.
the "whole is untrue."

represent the object.

In Adorno's view,

The concept will never fully

Critical theory therefore should not

pursue universalizing forms of knowledge.
of
My critique of standpoint feminism and my adoption
with
Adorno's theory of non-identity invites comparison

post-structuralist theories of representation and
interpretation.

Post-structuralist theorists have argued

common with Enlightenment
that what standpoint theory has in
may undermine rather
notions of the subject and identity

than further its critical claims.

They argue that

to 'creating the subject
standpoint feminists' commitments
and stable subject actually
of feminism' as a coherent

10

perpetuate the regulation and reification of those gender
relations they profess to be challenging.
Post -structuralist feminists associate ant i -ontological

approaches to politics with anti-identitarian approaches.

Judith Butler's work is quite clear on this point.

She

rejects identity politics as necessarily exclusionary --as

repeating the terms of representation feminism professes to
be challenging.

Butler says the self -stabilizing effects of

identity shut down political possibilities rather than
illuminate them

--

political project.

and are therefore always suspect as a
For Butler,

if we argue we are

'outside'

the terms of systems of domination we assume an ontology of

otherness rather than a performative positioning that is
always potentially reinventing otherness on subversive
terms.

Appeals to the realities of women's lives run the

risk of stabilizing the terms on which that reality is

constituted whereas parody and performative acts destabilize
the grounds of naturalized reality.

critique of identity,

I

While

I

agree with her

am critical of Butler's work because

of
in rejecting identity she precludes recognition

experience and its social effects.

She thinks of experience

historical and
as a text rather than recognizing its

material significance as

a

dialectical moment of resistance

critiques.
to the modes of representation she
be driven by
argue that feminist politics should
is a property of the
experience- -not the experience that
I

.

self,

but by the experience that is a sentient relationship

to the object

(social)

world.

I

argue for a notion of

experience which privileges it as signifying differences in
and among women as feminine subjects and as therefore always

potentially disruptive of the apparently seamless effects of
systems of identity.

The articulation of experience in the

public realm will always be a contested and political
project.

The tension immanent to the relationship between

experience and the representation of experience should be

acknowledged as political rather than denied in

a

gesture of

authorization or rationalization.
Adorno warns us to take note of the contradictions

embedded in the process of conceptualizing experience.

He

argues that the non- identical qualities of experience remain
a critical force in what he calls the

Against modern epistemologies

,

»

administered world'

he theorizes a non-

identitarian relationship between subject and object,

between self and other.

Against standpoint theory, Adorno

argues that distancing the self through contemplative and

deliberative interpretations of experience does not

necessarily lead to false abstractions.
self,

Distancing the

form of
in his view, means offering the object a

emerge outside
autonomy necessary to allow its qualities to
determinants.
of the control of subjective

In other words,

inter-subjective relationship of
it may point towards an
negate the unique
recognition which does not obscure or

qualities of what is other to the self in any given
historical moment.

Adorno thus remains well within the

materialist tradition of reconfiguring self -other relations
through attention to our interdependence in the object
world, even while he critiques the overly determinist

aspects of that tradition.
One of the central conflicts in contemporary feminist

debates is whether and what manner of coherence and

stability are necessary backdrops for political commitment
and effective change.

Post-structuralist feminists

criticize calls for stability- -of ten articulated through
assertions that there is in fact

a

'pre-discursive reality'

or a subject who can speak the truth about their reality- -as
a

depoliticizing move.

Gayatri Spivak responds with the

notion of strategic essentialism.

(Spivak,

1988)

She argues

that subjects are positioned through discourse, but that the

constructedness of those positions should not preclude
specific attention to the histories and knowledge of the
subaltern.

For Spivak, the politics of representation as

constituted through Western hegemony persistently defeat
putting
efforts of subalterns to speak in their own voices,

aside any question about the
Therefore,

*

authenticity

'

of those voices.

truth
it is not a question of epistemological

decision as to where
claims, but of an ethical and political
we look for critical knowledge forms.

Bat -Ami Bar On

(1993)

ethical imperative to
makes a similar argument about the

.

attend to voices marginalized by structures of dominance.
However, this argument does not fully respond to post-

structuralist critique, which challenges even the strategic

epistemological privileging of subjectivity as reflecting
the metaphysics of Western systems of knowledge that produce

subaltern figures in the first place.

Making political

claims on the basis of victimization or subaltern status may

participate in naturalizing, in the name of critiquing
systems of dominance, the prior positioning of marginal
others
I

argue for the privileging of experience as an object

of interpretation that renders feminist critique coherent

while recognizing the contingencies of time and place.

The

political project of interpreting experience allows us to
expose the dominative qualities of organized social life

without assuming their totalizing effects prior to
engagement.

This invites engagement with identity politics

but always resists naming the

l

who'

or using universalizing

once and
arguments about experience as a means to establish,

for all, the legitimacy of feminist critique.

politicizes
A non-identitarian feminist critique
relegated to the
aspects of social experience previously
need not agree on the
margins of political life. Feminists
out of a prior, given
political significance of experiences
through and within
Experiences take on a politics
interest.
through the
The public world is transformed
feminism.
14

-

politicization of sexuality, the

x

family,'

x

the community,'

the organization of everyday life, and other previously

privatized spheres of life.

Thus feminism works against the

grain of a social order determined to relegate particular
experiences to the margins.

This feminism advances within

the tension produced by attempts to politicize experiences

without creating new unjust structures of privilege.
In my final chapter,

I

consider the movement against

sexual violence as potentially illustrative of this theory
of feminist movement.

Feminist struggle has had to

overcome the historical tendency to understand sexuality and
sexual violence as pre-political- -or even anti-political-

questions.

But feminist success depends in part upon how it

takes up the challenge of creating alternative fields of

political representation for experience.

Some feminist

approaches to theorizing women's suffering reinscribe the
figure of woman or of the feminine as essentially defined

through and by her sexual vulnerability.
women,

If spoken by

stories of suffering are assumed to render

transparent the experience of suffering and to communicate
the truth about gender dominance generally.

I

argue that

representations of experience are never only innocent
reporters of facts or reality.

Otherwise,

for example,

in the public
Anita Hill could not have been reconstructed
from a dignified,
imagination within a matter of hours
insecure, sex-starved,
conservative law professor into an

.

.

sexually resentful Black female- -in other words, into the

very picture of black female sexuality as it has
historically taken form in the racist white male
imagination
I

argue that the movement against violence against

women should assume that representations of suffering, in
the various institutional settings in which women become

involved as they seek justice and support, are performative
and will change the construction of the feminine.

Representations of experience are slippery- -we take risks as
we speak as public figures.

Even if the sentient quality of

suffering drives us to speak, and even when (perhaps

particularly when) it is about the most raw and immediate
data of pain, our speech will not come across as uncontested
"reality" to others.

Representations of experience come to

life and are reorganized through the sphere of the social.

They will be conceptualized and organized on the terms of
identity even if driven by the sphere of the concrete and
material
In light of these observations,

I

suggest an approach

a
to sexual violence that focuses on women's differences as

means to demobilize male power rather focussing on the
power as
common qualities of suffering which affirm male

a

from a
monolithic entity to which women can only react
wary of the impulse
position of subordination. We should be
appeals to the
to render the movement coherent through
16

common qualities of women's suffering.

Appeals made on the

grounds of common suffering have not successfully inspired
an unencumbered sisterhood in the struggle against sexual

violence and may even collude with social narratives that
place women in the position of being undifferentiated
victims,

ignoring racism and class as structuring the terms

on which sexual violence does its damage.

1

Sexual violence is simultaneously at the center and at
the margins of masculinist dominance.

However, placing it

at the center of women's lives as a defining factor is to

collude with the goals of patriarchy in buttressing an

otherwise unstable edifice of masculinist power and to
obscure the significance of various strategies women have

used to comprehend and to resist sexual violence.

Sexual

violence is so prevalent and takes so many forms that we can
safely assume patriarchy depends upon it as a means of
social control over the terms of gender relations and as a

concrete means to affirm masculinist power.

But

simultaneously, it signifies the material limits of and
while
historical fissures in gendered relations of dominance
power.
sustaining the fiction of a seamless masculinist

Feminism should not understand the project of
as expressing
representing the experience of sexual violence
means to disrupt and transform
a settled reality but as a
violence thrives and does
the social terrain on which sexual

its damage.

feminism works
The political terrain on which

does not hold still.

A non-identitarian approach encourages

practices that demobilize masculinist power through exposing
its fictions.

It moves feminist struggles against sexual

violence forward through differences among women.

It

responds to the articulation of concrete experiences without

constraining feminism to the grounds of prior assumptions
about the sexual identity of women as vulnerable.

Teresa DeLauretis argues that feminist discourses, from

Sojourner Truth to Catharine MacKinnon, might be

conceptualized as signifying the excesses of
patriarchal/capitalist structures of dominance. (DeLauretis,
1990)

The figure of the feminine represents, for

DeLauretis, that which can never be fully represented within

masculinist discourse.
threat.

Therein lies the power of the

Feminism signifies patriarchy at its limits as a

representative system.
differently.

I

read feminism a little

DeLauretis' argument implies that differences

among feminisms are less significant than their common
situatedness at the limits of patriarchy.

I

think the

differences are far more significant than she implies.
which in
look at feminism as an interpretive practice,

dominative
exposing women's experiences of the diverse
scrutiny and
strategies of men also exposes to public
to uphold
contest, the specific strategies necessary
I've argued that, in representing
patriarchal systems.
settled reality but
experience, we are not expressing a
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I

participating in the reconstitution and transformation of
the social order.

Efforts to theorize the metanarrative of feminism are

insightful and helpful as historical and cultural markers.
However,

feminism will never succeed in constructing agreed

upon boundaries around itself.

I

have described feminism as

a series of contingent practices whose political terrain

never holds still.

For example, the terrain of the struggle

against sexual violence has been complicated by the

institutionalization of various aspects of its demands, from

policing strategies, to state funding for shelters, to the
dependence upon the welfare state for material support for

women escaping violence.

Feminism has the historical and

theoretical resources to move beyond the limits imposed by
the institutionalization of the movement.

However,

I

don't

think identity politics is the direction we should move.

My

final chapter addresses the specificity of suffering in the

context of sexual violence and the terms on which it does
its damage to women's bodies and to women's lives.

An

approach that encourages practices of demobilization of
masculinist power can take feminist struggles against sexual

violence forward through differences rather than
constraining us on the grounds of prior identities.
speech at the
Bernice Johnson Reagon's ground-breaking
to above) expresses
Women's Music Festival in 1981 (referred
in a feminist
the urgency but also the risks involved

project of specifying the differences of and among women and
makes explicit arguments for their political significance.
She tells her feminist audience they are going to fail if

they don't figure out a way to persevere in coalition

building "even when it feels like death" as they take apart
or open up the identitarian spaces they have carved out in

the world.

She makes clear there will be no comfort in the

process, that every move entails a risk, but that
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if you

don't feel like you are about to die, you aren't doing any
coalescing.'

She tells women to stop looking for safety in

sameness and to start looking for justice in and for
difference.

The antagonisms she alludes to in her speech,

the contests over the dominative qualities of relations

among women, and more generally, among the

personal/political relations among those who struggle on the
grounds of identity politics, will necessarily be a part of
feminist struggle because of the feminist respect for the
particular, for experience and the sentient qualities of

everyday life.

Conflicts about how the "personal" and the

"political" should be defined and the appropriate
politics
relationship between the two have driven feminist
and experiences count
as have conflicts about whose voices
In the
political world.
in feminist interpretations of the

politics of experience
course of this struggle, however, the
politics of identity in the
are too often subdued by the
'positive' collective
feminist search for affirmative or

knowledge and action.

This dissertation is an effort to

redeem a political notion of experience that contributes
to
reconfiguring the relationship between experience and
identity for critical social theory and action.
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CHAPTER II

FEMINIST KNOWLEDGES:

HOW CAN WE KNOW

WHO THE "WE" IS?

Standpoint epistemology has been an extremely-

influential area of feminist theorizing for the last fifteen
years.

The efforts of feminist standpoint theorists to

render specifically feminist knowledges have informed and
even inspired many of the arguments in feminism over

identity and politics.
theory,

In the tradition of Marxian critical

and attentive to critiques of identity as an ideal

form or substance that exists prior to historical
construction, standpoint feminists place claims about

feminist knowledge in the context of women's everyday life

and activity.

This undermines positivist and empiricist

epistemological claims about neutrality, objectivity and
truth-seeking.

Standpoint theorists' attention to

particularity and the partiality of knowledge claims have
sustained the materialist tradition within feminist theory
with postbut also have invited comparisons and dialogue

structuralist theory.
standpoint
The differences in the positions taken by
theorists are
theorists and post-structuralist feminist

significant, but not totally polarized.

Standpoint

while steadfastly
theorists situate knowledge claims
the project of
resisting the final step of abandoning
relationship to politics
theorizing knowledge and the
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through appealing to identity. (Haraway 1991)

Post-

structuralist feminists are aware of the need to argue the

political significance of their positions in light of their
critique of identity theory. (Butler and Scott, et.al. 1993)

Exploring the fault lines between standpoint feminists and
post - structuralist feminists profiles the state of the

feminist subject and highlights questions about the politics
of interpretation and representation in feminism.

I

suggest

that an examination of the political fault lines between

standpoint theorists and post-structuralists regarding

identity and identity politics, affirms the need to

reconsider the dialectics of experience and representation
in feminist theory.

Standpoint feminism offers valuable insights into

differences among women and the value of subjugated

knowledges to creating

a

more adequate and critical map of

social relations of domination.

Standpoint feminists are

socialist
most closely associated with the tradition of
oppression,
In arguing the specificity of women's
feminism.

relationship
socialist feminists theorize the historical

between class and gender systems.

In the 1970' s,

as

identifiable movement and
socialist feminists developed an
themselves from
theoretical framework, they differentiated
located women's oppression in
radical feminists because they
between patriarchy and
the historical intersections
theory around the
Radical feminists structured
capitalism.

discovery of generalizable facts and effects of patriarchal
power.

They argued that patriarchal domination is

independent of capitalism and, in fact may shape its terms
of existence.

Socialist feminists theorized the

relationship between the two systems of capitalism and

patriarchy as determining the possibilities of women's
lives.

(Sargeant,

ed.1982; Philipson and Hanson,

1990)

They

did not wish to 'add' or substitute women in an otherwise

Marxist analysis of exploitation and production but to

identify how differing historical roles in production and

reproduction (work and sex) affect male and female power in
the public/political world.

The common thread still running through socialist

feminist work is the materialist correspondence of human

activity to knowledge and power.

They refer to the commonly

experienced realities of womens' lives as source material
for theory.

Thus,

for socialist feminisms, material and

experiential markers of identity are placed in a causal

relationship to political knowledge and perspective.

In the

epistemological traditions of Marxian and critical theory,
constructedness of
the analysis of the material and social
theory.
identity remains central to creating emancipatory
will emerge
Women's political knowledges and perspectives
quality of gendered experience but consolidate

out of the

collective struggles
into feminist politics only through
knowledges emerge from
over consciousness. Thus, feminist

women's historically constructed, gendered roles and it is
said to be an ethical and political imperative to privilege

these perspectives for theory.

2

Socialist feminists argue for the sustained value of a

sense of self and location in the world which will encourage

moments of critical reflexivity as one enters into political
struggle.

For socialist feminists, coming to consciousness

means learning to express an identity which is no less
foundational politically for being historically constructed.
This learning empowers subjects to move politically.

This

work reflects the epistemological arguments developed in
standpoint theory.

Socialist feminists developed theory

about a huge range of issues relating to the oppression of

women including sexual oppression and exploitation,
reproductive rights, and the complex relationship between

capitalism and patriarchy as mutually constitutive systems.
The work assumes that women's activity in the world will
forge her political perspectives.

I

am interested in this

area of feminist theory because it has, over time, tried to
take

differences among women into account at the start of

theory,

rather than layering

*

differences

'

on as

have been
afterthoughts once the foundations for analysis
Socialist feminism
laid in the cement of gender difference.
and radical feminist
is founded in a critique of Marxist
relationships and
theories that ignore the historical
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tensions between class and gender systems in favor of

collapsing one into the other.
Standpoint feminisms have subsequently argued for

privileging the complex knowledges immanent in women's
material lives in order to advance that multi-layered
approach.

Standpoint feminist theory reflects explicitly on

the relationship between being in the world and knowledge,

between subject and object and between experience and
feminist identity.

This work argues it is imperative for

feminism to create epistemological models that challenge the
colonizing or exclusionary effects of idealist and
positivist epistemologies
Feminist standpoint theory, through the different forms
it has taken,

constitutes a link among the various arguments

in feminism about identity.

It is the terrain on which

feminist social critique attempts to authorize itself in the

context of

a

fragmented, uncertain world.

Socialist

feminisms grounded in standpoint theory argue that the

consciousness of commonalities in concrete experience is a
radical counter to the otherwise abstracted ideals that

motivate modern political involvement and commitment.

The

authenticity and radical quality of political commitment is
thus connected to social identity.

Political struggle will

subjects
be for and about particularly identified, concrete

rather than for abstract, formal, political ideals.

Thus

and commitment in
identity is linked to political knowledge

socialist feminism.

With reference to power in the context

of oppression identity becomes like a substance,

a thing to

be searched for and developed in order to sustain the

solidarity necessary to act effectively.

between identity and politics is
'authentic'

a

This connection

way of sorting out

forms of feminist commitment founded in common

experiences from liberal commitments based on abstractions

which are distanced from material life.
Standpoint feminism continues the task Lukacs set out
for philosophy, that of "creating the subject of the

creator" who will be positioned to overcome relations of

domination (Lukacs, 1967).
y

Lukacs theorized the

standpoint' of the proletariat as a way of conceptualizing

their emergence as historical actors who expose and ccontest
the terms of a reified, commodified world.

Feminist

standpoint theory adapts his insights about particularly

situated actors in history to argue that women's knowledges
are potentially revolutionary in relation to patriarchal

ideologies and beliefs.

Standpoint feminism is about the

relationship between social being and the necessary

partiality of perspective and knowledge.

However,

it avoids

relativism because it argues explicitly for a reformulation
knowledge claims.
of the standards of objectivity of

It

objective than
argues that feminist knowledges are more
the world from
traditional knowledges because they map

subjugated spaces rather claiming

a

'God's eye view'

or

.

distance and impartiality as do traditional positivist or
empiricist epistemologies
Standpoint feminisms have thus affirmed the lives of

women as offering privileged access to objective knowledge.
This encourages the general recognition of otherwise

historically marginalized voices and redefines the standard
of
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objectivity' as including an acknowledgement of the

particularity, or interested nature, of any claim to
knowledge.

(Alcoff and Potter,

et al;

1993)

Adapting

insights from Lukacs, standpoint theory shows us that the
powerful, those with a vested interest in the status quo,
have reason not to see the boundaries or limits of their own

positioning in the world.

Making those boundaries visible

from the perspective of the subjugated may illuminate the

processes by which relations of domination become

rationalized in the social world, exposing them to a crisis
of legitimacy.

Standpoint feminism sets out to authorize feminist
knowledge, arguing that women's life activity in the world

offers superior ways of understanding social power

especially in the fragmented and alienated world of
modernity.

Broadening the Marxist understanding of 'work'

as activity that creates the social product,

standpoint

feminism grounds itself in the daily lives of women, their
in
roles as reproducers and the relationships they develop

and
their daily lives as material organizers of family
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community survival and well-being.
said to shape,

if not determine,

These relationships are

the interests of women and

therefore the parameters of feminism.

Women's particular

experiences as gendered subjects are placed in a necessary

relationship to what they will know and do as political
subjects.

The relationship of woman to the body, to

necessity and to the object world grounds her
epistemological perspective.
I

return to Lukacs for a moment to show how his essay

"Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" sets
up present political debates about the subject in history

and the relationship of this history to nature.
a

Lukacs was

controversial figure in Marxian thought because he argued

changes in late capitalist systems and culture to be

determined by changes not only in productive capacities, but
in the organizational and cultural imperatives of the

exchange system.
Lukacs was a major influence on twentieth century

Marxian and critical theory generally.

He was acutely aware

of the difficulty in creating a democratic, Marxist theory
of consciousness in the age of modern bureaucracy and

capitalist organization.

Though he allied himself

politically with some very anti -democratic figures
(including Stalin)

,

Lukacs showed radical democratic

tendencies as a philosopher.
of his work that has had an

(Jay,

1984)

It is this aspect

(often unacknowledged)
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influence

on contemporary attempts to

'

locate'

the subject of history.

His contributions to aesthetic debates about socialist

realism and avant garde art of the early twentieth century
and his book History and Class Consciousness profoundly

influenced the work of the Frankfort School, Althusserian

Marxism and the Critical Cultural Studies movement.

He was

a major figure in the reconfiguration of debates about

culture and the role of theory in Marxism.
In opposition to Leninist vanguardism,

Lukacs developed

an argument about the revolutionary quality of working class

consciousness.
philosophy]

According to Lukacs

:

"...the task [of

is to deduce the unity- -which is not given- -of

this disintegrating creation [the object world] and to prove
that it is the product of a creating subject.

In the final

analysis then: to create the subject of the 'creator'."
(Lukacs,

1967:140)

Lukacs shows how idealist philosophers

attempt to create this subject through categories of the
mind,

arguing that their categories dissolve in the

x

real'

world when confronted with the reified totality which
continues to stand in dominance over and actively fragment
the subject.

Lukacs draws a distinction between the contemplative

subject of the 'classical philosophy' that inspires the
the
attitude of early entrepreneurship in capitalism, and

active subject of Marxism.

The former seeks to understand

his knowledge
how the social world works without staining
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with intervention.

He looks for how the laws of movement in

society\nature might function to serve his particular
interest.

This is the attitude of a proper capitalist.

No

one person or project can fully determine outcomes and each

should refrain from striving for increased control or

organization of the whole for that leads to monopolies and
defeats the individualist premises and promises of bourgeois
life.

What is important is to recognize clearly that all
human relations (viewed as the objects of social
activity) assume increasingly the objective forms of
the abstract elements of the conceptual systems of
natural science and of the abstract substrata of the
laws of nature.
And also, the subject of this 'action'
likewise assumes increasingly the attitude of the pure
observer of these- -artifically abstract- -processes the
attitude of the experimenter. (Lukacs, 1967:131)
,

Early capitalism was thus characterized by an attitude
of experimentation,

of passive observation and interventions

limited to the service of self-interest.

This attitude

intensified over time in light of the increasingly reified
object world.

That which is historical, ie. the movement of

capital and exchange of commodities, became a thing of
nature.

Nature, then, developed in two different forms for

bourgeois consciousness;

it became that which is the stuff,

the raw material necessary for production but it also became

those social effects that are removed from historical

contexts and thus out of reach of human agency.

The

imperatives of human interaction itself are said to be
'

natural' by bourgeois thinkers.
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Lukacs turns to Hegel for the method by which the

subject-object of history can be identified in this reified,

commodified world.

For Lukacs,

the objective attitude

toward the world must be universalizable and emerge not

through mind, but through the dialectic of sensuous
activity, of work and reflection in the world.
genesis,

"The

the creation of the creator of knowledge, the

dissolution of the irrationality of the thing-in-itself

,

the

resurrection of man from his grave, all these issues become

concentrated henceforth on the question of dialectical
method."

(Lukacs,

1967:141)

Lukacs comes to the conclusion that the proletariat

becomes the subject -object of history in a time when the

fragmentation of the bourgeois subject of history is

increasingly apparent.

This fragmentation is signified

first by a commitment to merely experimental knowledge forms

and the removal of self from historical laws of movement.
At the same time, the subject and object come to penetrate

one another in the reality of workers lives, if not yet in

their consciousness.

The subjectivity of the worker is

constituted through the necessity of selling his labor-power
as a commodity.

The

worker is both a subject in and an object of history.

His

(his essence- -that which is most his)

position constitutes a privileged standpoint from which to
view totality and to understand concretely, not only in the
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realm of ideas, reification as a totalizing constituent of
social life.

Lukacs pulls together the fragmented subject of

modernity into the being of the worker because the essence
of the worker is his labor-power.

"Inasmuch as he is

incapable in practice of raising himself above the role of
object his consciousness is the self -consciousness of the
commodity; or in other words it is the self-knowledge, the
self -revelation of the capitalist society founded upon the

production and exchange of commodities."

(Lukacs,

1967:168)

It is in the worker's critical perspective of himself as an

object who is also a subject in the reified world that will

begin to subvert the naturalized categories of chat world.
Reification for Lukacs is the "immediate reality of
every person living in capitalist society.

"

Reification is

the oppressive social condition that needs overturning, that

needs to be exposed as contingent rather than necessary,
Reification is defined in the

man-made rather than natural.

essay as the universalization of the commodity form:

[Objectively, in so far as the commodity form
facilitates the equal exchange of qualitatively
different objects, it can only exist if that formal
equality is in fact recognized- -at any rate in this
relation, which indeed confers upon them their
commodity nature. Subjectively, this formal equality
common
of human labor in the abstract is not only the
it
reduced;
are
factor to which the various commodities
actual
the
governing
also becomes the real principle
production of commodities. (Lukacs, 1967:87)
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Lukacs argued for the privileging of the standpoint of the

proletariat because that subject position constitutes, as no
other can in capitalism, the subject-object of history.
Lukacs remains relevant to critical and feminist theory

because similar attempts to

v

pull together the subject of

history' are still central and considered necessary for

politics.

As self-conscious as this project is,

subsequent

to Nietszche's anti -Hegelian argument for the demise of the

slave-subject and Foucault's historicization of the subject,
it remains central to feminist discourses about politics.

The question,

"who is the 'we'

of feminism?" remains central

to the possibility of feminist critique just as the defining
x

we'

of class theory has been central to the possibility of

socialist critique.

Standpoint feminists still found the

political legitimacy of feminism in the project of creating
the subject of the creator.

Lukacs argues:

the objective reality of
To put it more concretely:
social existence is in its immediacy 'the same' for
both proletariat and bourgeoisie. But this does not
prevent the specific categories of mediation by means
of which both classes raise this immediacy to the level
of consciousness, by means of which the merely
immediate reality becomes for both the authentically
objective reality, from being fundamentally different,
thanks to the different position occupied by the two
(Lukacs,
classes within the "same" economic process.
1967 150)
:

Lukacs understood the project of philosophy to be to

dialectical
locate the subj ect /obj ect of history through a
created
analysis of the relationships and social processes
Capitalist development fragments the
for and by capitalism.
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world.

it creates historically alienated selves in the

capitalist and the worker alike; but the consciousness of
the worker,

constituted by his dis - interested and subjugated

subject position, is better equipped to recognize the limits

and injustices of the social contract of capitalism.

Standpoint-feminists expand this insight for differently
situated subjectivities.
Standpoint feminism invests value in women's daily
lives as potentially critical sites of knowledge production.
It redefines the boundaries around who can and should

describe conditions of "reality."
above,

In addition,

as mentioned

feminist standpoint theory attends to the

epistemological question of the specificity and legitimacy
of feminist social critique.

It theorizes the relationship

between social identity and knowledge, arguing that the

world becomes more transparent to some historically

positioned subjects than to others.
Standpoint feminism responds to a number of

epistemological positions said to reflect patriarchal and
exchange perspectives and values.
(of experience,

of work,

Proximity to the object,

of knowledge)

becomes a key to

developing an emancipatory perspective on the social world.

Nancy Hartsock's discussion of standpoint feminism
of purpose,
offers something like a foundational statement

in Money.

Sex and Power

,

Hartsock characterizes the project

as a
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transformation [which] can be accomplished
by a
° f theor
onto the epistemological terrain
^
def?^^^
defined by women's lives. ...whereas Marx
relocated
power onto the epistemological ground
of production, I
argue that women's lives provide a related
but more
aaequate epistemological terrain for understanding
power.

...i suggest that,

like the lives of

proletarians vis-a-vis capital, women's lives make
available a particular and privileged vantage point
not
only on the power relations between women and men
but
on power relations more generally.
The construction of
a more complete and adequate account
of power relations
on the basis of women's perspectives requires
the
articulation of an epistemology that grows from women's
life activity. (Hartsock, 1983:151-152)

Drawing on Marxian historical materialism but also on the
object-relations theories of Nancy Chodorow (1978) and

Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976), Hartsock argues that women's
lives and experiences are essentially and structurally

defined by gendered dualities and heirarchies which organize
the productive and reproductive sites of social life.

Women's experience for Hartsock, is fundamentally marked by
the oppressive devaluation of her work and social role in
the division of labor.

Yet it is also marked by essential

qualities which can overturn the patriarchal social order.
She argues that feminism must re-value and recharacterize

women as representative of and as inhabitants of the truly
human sphere of reproductive, caring labor.

In doing this

work, women engage in the most creative relationships

possible given the oppressive, alienated

quality of life in

Western capitalist social orders.
For Hartsock, women's closer proximity to nature, to
the body,

to the concrete sphere of reproducing human life-36

in other words,

to those projects necessary to but devalued

in a world organized by meritocratic and
competitive

principles and abstract values-- is not merely an accident
or work of nature, but a necessary fact of Western political

and social life.

Women's reproductive capacity and men's

lack thereof is not a matter of choice but of nature.
However, the roles attached to that

%

natural' difference are

social and mark patriarchal domination.
'natural'

There is nothing

about woman being the primary care-giver.

However, having argued this, Hartsock goes on to argue that

women can look to their socialized roles, those deeply
structured meanings attached to their capacity to reproduce,
to understand their future as emancipatory subjects in

history
Because of the longevity and depth of this structuring
of gendered roles,

she argues that the

"

[u]

nity of mental

and manual labor, and the directly sensuous nature of much
of women's world" informs women's experiences and knowledges

and leads to
labor,

"

[a]

more profound unity of mental and manual

social and natural worlds, than is experienced by the

male worker in capitalism."

Here her difference from a

Lukacsian perspective is clear.

He looked at the dialectic

of nature and history as moving the worker to the

consciousness of himself as subject-object of history.

Hartsock moves "woman" to the position of subj ect -obj ect of
vis-ahistory through her immediate, naturalized identity

vis reproduction.

(Hartsock,

1983:118-122) Hartsock's

standpoint theory relies on a materialist analysis of

women's positioning within the sexual division of labor
in
reproduction.

It is with respect to the moment of women's

participation in reproduction that Hartsock sees a feminist
materialist standpoint to be possible.

reproduction centers knowledge.

The moment of

She argues that for Marx,

alienation is not so much connected to the reification of
the object in the process of exchange as it is to the

removal of that which is most the worker's eg. his labor.

Hartsock then removes the worker from the epistemological
center and replaces him with woman to show how she is in

a

better position, vis-a-vis her relation to nature and the
production of human life, to create a different, less
alienated future.
While Hartsock argues that this particular division of

labor exists only in the West, it becomes clear that she

considers patriarchy (defined as the hierarchical, dualistic

structuring of gendered divisions of labor that privileges

male experience) to be a universalizable concept.

Shifts or

differences in forms and meanings of gender relations are
less relevant for theory than the continuity of the

patriarchal ordering of the reproduction of social life
across time and cultures.

Women's proximity to her objects

of concern is always already closer than men's proximity to

his objects of concern.

For Hartsock, gendered relations of
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reproduction are more fundamental to understanding

oppression before and in capitalism than any other
structuring or cultural conditions of human life,
including,
of course,

those conditions which facilitate the production

of goods and commodities.

Women's construction of self in relation to others
leads in an opposite direction [than the Hegelian
relation to the other which is defined by a death
struggle and competition] -- toward opposition to
dualism of any sort; valuation of concrete, everyday
life,- a sense of a variety of connectednesses and
continuities both with other persons and with the
natural world. (Hartsock, 1983:242)
I

am suspicious of the proximity to the object she

argues renders feminist knowledge superior.

Does feminism

want to argue women "know better" because they exist in a

world of relatedness or naturalized connectedness and
thereby reiterate the necessity of that connectedness?

Hartsock argues that this is

a

socially constructed pattern,

this gendered division of labor.

It does not necessarily

follow from women's capacity to conceive and give birth that
they become the primary caregivers.

It is a patriarchal

norm constructed and variable in history.

However,

it is

this norm that becomes, nonetheless, definitional of what it

means to be "woman."

And the close proximity "woman" has to

her patriarchally determined object of concern, the material

relations of reproduction, makes her, as opposed to the male

worker in capitalism, the potentially critical subjectobject of history.

Finally, the unity of mental and
manual labor and the
directly sensuous nature of much of
women's work leads
to a more profound unity of
mental and manual labor
social and natural worlds, than is
experienced by the
male worker
capitalism.
This unity grows from the
tact that women's bodies, unlike men's,
can be
themselves instruments of production:
In pregnancy
giving birth, or lactation, arguments about
a division
ot mental from manual labor are fundamentally
foreiqn
3

m

(

243

)

On the one hand Hartsock leaves the political
outcomes
of the relationship between experience and knowledge

somewhat open as she argues,

»[t]he liberatory possibilities

present in women's experience must be, in a sense, read out
and developed.

Thus a feminist standpoint may be present on

the basis of the commonalities within women's experience,
but it is neither self-evident nor obvious."
1983:246)

On the other hand,

(Hartsock,

in the above quotations she

identifies "woman" with her life activity, reproduction and
motherhood.

She leaves no distance between the woman as a

subject and her object.
her social role.

The relationship collapses her into

This lack of distance from the object is

compelling if one thinks the only alternative is the

abstraction or absolute separation of subject and object
offered by Enlightenment theories of knowledge.

Hartsock

claims that women represent the subject -object of history

because they can be shown to be one with the external world
in which they are embedded.

However, this image is

claustrophobic because it argues no distance, no space, no

autonomy for a knowing subject and the object of her life
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activity. Feminists are always already

(at

least

potentially) Mothers and thus emancipatory knowers
It is also exclusionary because Hartsock centers a

particular kind of female subject as representative of
patriarchal norms and therefore as representative of what
the feminist standpoint is be vis-a-vis relations of power

and domination:
The organization of motherhood as an institution
in which a woman is alone with ther children, the
isolation of women from each other in domestic
labor, the female pathology of loss of self in
service to others --all mark the transformation of
life into death, the distortion of what could have
been creative and communal activity into
oppressive toil, and the destruction of the
possibility of community present in women's
relational self -definition
The ruling gender and
class's interest in maintaining social relations
such as these is evidenced by the fact that when
women set up other structures in which the mother
is not alone with the children, isolated from
others, as is frequently the case in working-class
communities or the communities of people of color,
these arrangements are described as pathological
deviations. (Hartsock, 1983:245)
.

She centers a middle-class, white subject of motherhood as

representative of the truth about patriarchal oppression,

rendering the meaning of other experiences of families she
mentions at the end marginal to the definition of
patriarchy.

They may be looked to as somehow outside

patriarchal norms for models of a better quality of life,
visbut are not critical positionings in and of themselves

a-vis patriarchy.

In Hartsock' s work,

the historically

ontological status of women's place in the sexual

division

interpretation of meanings
of labor is privileged over the
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which circulate around different women's
work and
reproductive roles in different cultural and
historical
milieus.
Because of her undifferentiated use

of the concept

of patriarchy,

her theory identifies women's experience

through only one lens, pulling together the subject of

history through a process of elimination of other meanings

attached to feminine and masculine roles.

This renders

historical differences across variously acculturated
relations of reproduction insignificant for purposes of

emancipatory theory.
Thus,

on the one hand, Hart sock argues for the

concrete, sensuous, material quality of knowledge, while on

the other hand, she abstracts a representative experience to

describe the cultural conditioning that offers a feminist

perspective on patriarchal norms for all women.

She argues

that we should privilege the sensuous experience of

motherhood, while moving towards the abstraction of that

experience as defining the horizons of women's

identity.

She privileges the ideological images of white, middle-class

Motherhood over the irreducibly different experiences and
understandings different women have of mothering.
To summarize:

because Hartsock allows for no distance

between the subject and the object of concern in her theory
of

"womanness

articulated.

,

"

she leaves no space for differences to be

The subject -object of history is constituted

through (the material reality and desired image of) white
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middle-class motherhood; those mothers come to define
the
political objectives of feminism.
The universalizing of the standpoint produced through

patriarchal desire and subsequent arguments about how how
women are positioned vis-a-vis patriarchy has not been

adequately addressed in Hartsock's later work.
that the "we" she deploys in reference to

She argues

marginalized

peoples only exists as an artifice of a totalizing,
Eurocentric, masculine discourse of the Enlightenment.
says,

as if amending the above quotation,

"I do

She

not mean to

suggest that white Western women share the material

situation of colonized peoples, but rather that we share
similar positions in the ideology of the Enlightenment."
(Hartsock,

1989:191)

Hartsock thus inscribes a globalizing

we and an oppressed they in advance, perpetuating the

tendency for a particular critique to be rendered

universally effective for understanding patriarchal
domination.

If subjects are socially constructed through

material and ideological conditions of life, the structural
differences between and among white Western women and

colonized Third-world peoples (even if we recognize each of

them as artificial construction) may be far more relevant to
theories and strategies of emancipation than their similar

situatedness in relation to a monolithic ideological
construct

.

She offers up extraordinary powers to the

imaginary body of the Enlightenment thinker to proscribe
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emancipatory knowledge, defeating her own claim to
value

specificity and particularity as sources of truth- telling
We see a similar problem in Rosemarie Hennessey's

recent wcrk.

Although she offers

a

creative approach to

developing a non-essentialist theory of gender for feminism,
we will see that she does not respond to the question of how

theorizing patriarchy, even as a thoroughly discursive
regime of power, necessarily abstracts from particularity.
The chain of meaning Hennessey sets up across experiences to

argue the coherent, discursive totality of patriarchy does
not improve upon Hartsock's pulling together of the

representative subject (the white, bourgeois mother) of
history.

She too speaks of the horizons of possibilities

and constraints on women in order to avoid charges of being
a determinist

Rosemarie Hennessey makes an argument for a materialist

theory of feminist knowledge, but with an Althusserian
twist.

For Hennessey, a materialist feminism should employ

discourse theory to show how gender identities are enacted
through language.

However,

she tries to sustain the

analytical link to systems of domination functioning in the

world which make those discourses historically operational.
Hennessy offers a theory of history which places the logics
or systems of domination as the horizons or limits on how

the subject can act in the world.

She argues that feminists

must locate themselves in the counter-hegemonic gaps between
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and among the discourses which condition
the horizon of our
knowledges about ourselves and others.

Hennessy argues that feminism can "people" the

discursive gaps in hegemonic truths, the excesses of

masculinist ideologies, which are never totalizing but
always in process.

While displacing value from objects to

discourses which create meaning and possibilities for

identification (and dis -identification) avoids the apparent

essentialism of Hartsock's theory of subj ect -obj ect
relations, Hennessey relies on the essentially feminized

subject as the ontological grounds for emancipatory
knowledge.

That subject becomes historical through choosing

to enter into battle with discursive regimes rather than as
a

v

result' of her identity.

But the how and why of the

entry is still determined by ideological structuring of

possibilities determined by patriarchy.

She echoes

Hartsock's theory of oppressed people's sharing space within
the colonizing ideological structures of Western patriarchy.

The construction of the colonial male in terms of
feminine sexual excess is only one example that
what counts as the 'feminine' subject is not
always merely a matter of empirical sex
However, while the ideological
difference.
boundaries of the feminine are not limited by an
essential female body, the construction of woman's
reproductive capacity and sexuality as property to
which masculine subject can lay claim has been the
cornerstone of a patriarchal social order whose
genealogy precedes imperialist conquest and the
emergence of sexuality as a discourse. The
particular articulations of this
reproductive/alienated female body and the
interests they serve are, nonetheless,
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historically variable.
emphasis mine)

(Hennessey,

1993-79

Hennessey argues that feminism should be
understood as

a

critical, discursive practice which retains
its own

specificity only through its concrete task of
"disarticulating" the construction of the feminine in

patriarchy in all its variable forms.

However,

in her

concurrent attempt to develop the systemic analysis she

believes feminism needs in order to sustain its specificity,
she has to resort in the "last instance" to the monolith of

patriarchy as its defining other.

Feminism is understood as

an "entry point" to the interdiscourses that constitute

patriarchy.

Feminism is thus a perpetual practice of

critique on the one hand, but dependent upon an assumed

hegemonic meaning of patriarchy on the other.

Hennessey encorporates post-modern moves to "affinity"
or "articulated connections" as the basis for a feminist

politics.

The terms of these politics are temporary and not

to be assumed prior to articulating the grounds for

engagement.

I

do not think however,

identitarian thinking.

that she escapes

Hennessey argues that differences in

experience and meaning can be shown to operate within a
hegemonic discursive regime of the patriarchal ordering of

gender identity.

But is she right?

Can "differences in

experience" be justly represented or recognized within the

given horizons she argues are constitutive of patriarchal
order?

Does feminism need a unified, systemic theory of
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patriarchy to exist as

a critical discourse?

might feminist social theory look like?

If not,

what

This is a question

both Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway explore.

They offer

similiar normative conclusions as to the potential for
feminist critique once the monolithic other of patriarchy
is
deconstructed, but come to different conclusions about the

historical present of feminism and the timing of such

a

proj ect
In her formulation of the feminist standpoint for

science,

Sandra Harding argues that women's knowledge is, at

present, qualitatively superior to men's because it is

historically constructed to be partial.

Women's knowledge

emerges from the concrete sphere of the reproduction of

human social life and is therefore more objective or
reflective of reality than knowledges that emanate from

disembodied or abstracted knowers

.

These disembodied

knowers make claims to legitimacy based on disengagement or
distance.

This argument about the political difference

between disembodied knowers and embodied knowers hinges in
part on the politics of sustaining distance from an object
in order to better know it.

Standpoint feminists argue that

the embodied knower\subj ect should admit its investment or

proximity to the object.

The positivist criteria for better

knowledge demands impartiality on the part of the knower.
Standpoint theory argues this is impossible.

All knowledge

can be shown to be contingent upon subject positioning in
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the world.

For standpoint feminists the close
proximity to

the object of knowledge,

the willingness,

even material

necessity, women are subject to in admitting
their

investment in the object of knowledge makes their
knowledge
more representative of reality than masculinist
abstractions.

"They have made the move from declaiming as a

problem, or acknowledging as an inevitable fact, to

theorizing as a svtematicallv accessible resource for

maximizing objectivity the inescapable social situatedness
of knowledge claims."

(Harding;

1993,69)

She argues that the

politics of knowledge claims are partially pre-determined by
the location of the objects of study.

Harding discusses the conjunctures between standpoint
and post -structuralist theory and is sympathetic to the

decentering and anti -essentialist force of post-

structuralism as theory.

In fact,

she argues that

standpoint theory is a prototype for post-modern theory in
that it historicizes and therefore decenters abstracted

claims about truth and knowledge in the material world.

"Fragmented identities" are richer places to look for

knowledge about the world than abstractly disinterested,

modern knowers

.

However,

she argues it is not yet time to

give up on what she calls the better objectivity of the
"successor sciences" developed from the standpoint of

subjugated subjects.

It is fine to theorize the

possibilities of the post-modern historical condition, but
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even if "we" as knowers may be decentered
or "multiple" in
our commitments and loyalties, political power
and the

making of public policy remains profoundly centralized
and
controlled.
Harding thinks we should pick and choose from
strands of post-modern thinking in order to find what will
be useful to drive feminist politics forward into more

robust and non-dominative forms of solidarity politics that
can confront that centralized power.
However, her discussion lacks a specific consideration
of power as a relationship constitutive of subject

positions.

This is developed in the work of Michel

Foucault. If Harding reflected more specifically on what

post-structuralists said about power, she may find that her
assertions about whether political and material conditions
are "ripe" for a post-modern politics to make sense as

liberatory theory, would disintegrate.

This is one example

of the many disjunctures between the theoretical and

political commitments of standpoint epistemology and poststructuralist theory which make it difficult to argue, as

Harding does, a linear historical movement from one to the
other as respectively appropriate to identifiable,

temporally bounded epochs.

Like Hartsock, Harding argues

women (and other subjugated subjects) presently are in a
superior position, vis-a-vis men or other representative
figures of imperialist patriarchy, to make sense of the

world and to see relations of domination from the
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"underside."

Women will therefore be more invested in

transforming relations of domination, of
all kinds, in the
world.

However, this position of better knowledge,
while

respecting the presence of different knowers,
does not
adequately acknowledge the object (the world)

as an active,

agent in the relationship.

Harding's work, which reiterates

the primacy of the subject as knower, does not
displace the

dualism of traditional theories of knowledge and cannot
avoid reinscribing new hierarchies of privilege among
subjects.

The argument remains defined by the question of

rendering subjectivity transparent in knowledge, even in its

fragmented state.

Harding thinks about power and its

relationship to knowledge as something to which we, as
subjects, can say yes or no.

3

The disjunctures between post-structuralist theory and

standpoint theory become more sharply apparent in Donna
Haraway'

s

work because

1)

she argues we do exist in post-

modern historical conditions and

2)

it is still possible,

indeed necessary, to develop an epistemological perspective
on politics and relations of solidarity with others.

Haraway remains within the standpoint feminist rubric
of analysis,

sharing many of their assumptions about women's

oppression, identity and knowledge, even as she makes use of

post-modern historical imagery to frame the possibilities of
what she calls situated knowledges.

Haraway argues that

"feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated
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knowledge, not about transcendence
and splitting of subject
and object."
this she allies herself with the tradition

m

of standpoint feminisms.

As pointed out above,

standpoint

feminism is about the partiality of perspective
and
knowledge.
it argues that women's knowledges
are preferred
because the y ma P the world from subjugated spaces.
For

standpoint theorists, properly feminist knowledge should
involve neither distancing nor the perpetual deferral of
claims to subjective authorship of knowledge claims.

One's

perspective is always informed if not determined by where
one is looking from.

Haraway agrees with this general principle but
approaches it through the differentiated pathways of what
she calls an "informatics of domination."

Haraway sets up

the terms of a post-modern age in contrast to the terms

through which we understood the world as modern or
Enlightenment subjects.

Through this imaging of the

contemporary social world, Haraway displaces the
subject/object hierarchies of traditional epistemology

While she does not assert any necessarily emancipatory

quality to her post-modern historical references, it is
clear that she recognizes
an affirmative,

a

potential in them for asserting

inclusive, political project.

She critiques

the way some standpoint theorists have characterized

epistemological possibilities as exhausted by the dichotomy,
feminist empiricism vs. the disinterested, God's eye view.
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Each repeats particular assumptions
about the subject' s
control over the world through their
ability to know the
world.

Haraway says this polarized debate should
not

continue to hold us in thrall.

Each argument contains an

implicit positivist commitment to scientific
vision which
acts as a conquering gaze, a gaze that
properly
(even in

some standpoint theories) sustains limited
or no

particularity.

Haraway describes the conditions of possibility for
a

post-modern "cyborg" feminism which we, as ironically mode rn
subjects or,

"situated knowers," may engage in.

She

advances the value of these ironically situated knowledges.
Haraway'

s

theory of situated knowledges demands attention to

the constitutive nature of the object of knowledge.

Because

she diagnoses the world as post-modern, her situated subject
or knower is multiple and not so transparent as Harding

implies. The boundaries of the object are contestable and

unstable.

The object is an active agent in Haraway'

techno-epistemology

.

For example, we cannot reject

technology, nor can we revert to a world of nature untouched

by human subjectivity.

Rather, because of the constitutive

nature of the object world, we must reconceptualize the
subj ect \obj ect relationship as one that neither necessitates

human control of nature and technology nor human

victimization by their own creations.
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Haraway suggests a doctrine of
embodied objectivity
"We need to learn in our bodies,
endowed with primate col our
and stereoscopic vision, how to
attach the objective to our
theoretical and political scanners in
order to name where we
are and are not, in dimensions of
mental and physical space
we hardly know how to name."
(Haraway,
1991;

Her

190)

metaphor of the connection between the knower
and the world
is the prosthetic device,

the scanner,

the eye that does not

have a necessary essence guiding its judgement
but is

certainly invested in the world in particular, identifiable
ways.

Thus,

while sympathetic to post-modern claims about

differencing and the decentered subject, Haraway sustains
more structured social map than post-modern theorists.
claims that there does exist something like
below'

x

a

She

the view from

as a difference that matters in social analysis.

She

therefore argues for an embodied vision, but a vision that
sees its own boundaries and in its reflexive knowledge

production sees a value in its partiality rather than
limit or a deficit.

a

With other standpoint theorists she

argues that partial knowledge is not somehow less real but

actually a better representation of how the world works,
especially in post-modern historical conditions.

For her,

partial connections are always more honest than those that
assume total knowledge.

Haraway argues for the superiority of subjugated
knowledges but not without qualification.
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"

x

Subjugated'

standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more
adequate,
world.

sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the

But how to see from below is a problem requiring at

least as much skill with bodies and language, with the

mediations of visions, as the
visualizations."

(Haraway,

x

highest'

1991;

191)

techno-scientif ic

Haraway situates the

actively knowing body in a conflicted, often duplicitous
site of knowledge production.

For her better knowledge may

be a goal of feminist objectivity, but truth claims are

better left to those defending hegemonic privilege.

Haraway categorizes her knowers by arguing on the one
hand that subjugated knowers are more likely to reject
identitarian, God's eye knowledge and that the patriarchal,

white male defends abstract, authorial, disembodied
knowledges.

She adopts aspects of Hartsock's work to ground

this claim.

However, Haraway renders the claim less

foundational as she argues that

"

[s]

ubjugation is not

grounds for an ontology; it might be a visual clue.

Vision

requires instruments of vision; an optics is a politics of
positioning.

Instruments of vision mediate standpoints;

there is no immediate vision from the standpoints of the
subjugated."

(Haraway,

1991:193)

Her work has a more

experimental quality to it than that of other standpoint
theorists and thus advances the arguments of standpoint
theory.

Her emphasis on the non- innocence of any knower as

they engage with the otherness of the world defeats the
54

standpoint feminists' implicit claim
that some subjects may
stand outside of participation in or
investment in the

relationships of domination whose terms
they articulate
through their material existence. However,
it remains
unclear whether Haraway' s techno-epistemology
and theory of
affinity avoids the questions of representation
raised by
any project whose goal is to pull together the subject
of

history in the fragmented world.
Haraway'

s

theory of the subj ect/obj ect relation

explicitly stops short of relying on dialectical theory.
Even as she acknowledges the agency of the object of
knowledge, Haraway rejects dialectical thinking because she

claims that in its Hegelian/Marxian form, it ultimately

posits the
authorial.

v

slave'

side of the dialectic as unique and

"Situated knowledges require that the object of

knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not
a

a screen or

ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master

that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and

authorship of 'objective' knowledge."

(Haraway,

1991:198)

As she makes this move away from dialectical thinking,

Haraway does not theorize what emerges in the interstices of
the subj ect\obj ect relationship.

"A map of tensions and

resonances between the fixed ends of a charged dichotomy

better represents the potent politics and epistemologies of
embodied,
1991:194)

therefore accountable objectivity."

(Haraway,

The image of 'mapping' displaces dialectical,
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relational knowledge production.

Haraway leaves us with the

subject and object separated, albeit a
separation that
witnesses agency on both ends.

Haraway has been critiqued by post-modern theorists
and
by standpoint\socialist feminists.

The latter critics point

to her move away from systemic analysis of how the
various

subjugated knowers she celebrates come to be as they are.
For example, Rosemarie Hennessey argues that while Haraway

defies modernist commitments to disembodied objectivity, she

disembodies her knowers in

a

different way in that they

become situated within post-modern plays of difference.
This implies that subjects simply are in the world with no

systemic logics of domination structuring the conditions of

possibility of existence.

However, Haraway argues that

"Some differences are playful; some are poles of world

historical systems of domination.

knowing the difference."

(Haraway,

x

Epistemology'
1991:161)

is about

Haraway'

s

work

is more closely aligned to the tradition of standpoint

feminism and a materialist perspective than Hennessey
recognizes.

She explicitly acknowledges the tension between

standpoint theory which focuses on the situatedness and
limits of identity and post-modern theory which rejects the

project of situating identities and instead finds

difference everywhere (thus locating itself in a theoretical
nowhere)
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Joan Scott critiques another aspect of
Haraway'
argument. (Scott, 1989)
She argues that Haraway's example of
'women of color' as an identity which
opposes imperialist
markings of otherness repeats the "old/new left's"
tendency
to romanticize or reify the struggles of "the
most

oppressed" as if they represent something truer than other
struggles.

I

agree that this reflects a well-worn tendency

to romanticize the given condition of otherness thereby

avoiding responsibility for complicity\participation in
setting the terms of struggle (through action or inaction)
However, Haraway's refers to women of color because their
self -identified multiple affinities and multiple loyalties

defeat any notion of the unified political subject of
feminism.

Feminism has long relied on the uniformly

gendered subject whose gaze
patriarchy'

.

is on the

'horizons of

Haraway refers to women of color as a

materialist counter to the essentializing tendencies of

white feminists who forget their multiply situated

(at

least

partially dominative selves) in favor of assuming the role
of essentially oppressed gendered subjects.

So Haraway does

not fetishize 'women of color' in any simple way as unified

subjects

(others)

in the world who can tell

'us'

(subjects

too embedded in imperialist knowledges to see ourselves)
truth.

the

Instead she invokes the concept to argue against the

unified, always primarily gendered, subject of feminism.

Haraway cites the example of women of color as an identity
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forged through affinity rather than through
monocausal
relationships to the material world.
^Women of
color'

represents affinity because it is created through
multiple
forms of resistance to the othering strategies
of the

Eurocentric, patriarchal, capitalist, global order.

It is a

non-foundationalist, but no less situated, subjectivity.

I

agree with Haraway's discussion of how the notion of women
of color came about,

ie.

through a series of oppositional

positionings vis-a-vis the differentiated forms systems

dominance assume.

However, once it becomes a political

identity or reference for better knowledge claims it is

collapsed into an identity politics which may obscure as
much about the differences among women of color as it
illuminates about their material conditions.
The above developments in standpoint feminisms advance

awareness of the constitutive limits of the situated self
and the horizons of feminist identity, both temporally and
spatially.

But these approaches do not adequately explore

the possibilities of the dialectical theory that is the

backdrop to their work.

Hartsock assumes a static

relationship between being and knowing which approaches
synthesis, as does Harding.

Haraway, on the other hand,

explicitly rejects dialectics.

Her critique references the

Hegelian dialectical tradition, but rejects its telos in
favor of the multiplicity of post-modern identity forms.
addition, her futurist image of the "cyborg feminist"
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In

collapses the historical tensions between
technology and
human creativity.
Her theory of situated knowledges
sustains a correspondence between being and knowing
and
assumes a relationship between social identity and
critical
politics.
She assumes an identitarian reconciliation

between (off-shore) workers and the technologies that
condition the possibility of their identities.

Yet her

imagery of globalized, post-modern existence presupposes

unlimited possibilities.
Post-modern theory takes an explicit stand against

privileging epistemology as prior to politics.

It rejects

the privileging of any knowing subject, even those situated
in a mode of resistance,
to consciousness.

as rendering the world transparent

This radical questioning of the subject

has been one of the reasons feminists who turn to post-

modern theory are said to be apolitical (lacking normative
grounds for their claims)
ways,

.

Haraway wants to have it both

to critique the unified subject while sustaining a

notion of subjectivity to which critical theory might refer,
The dis juncture between privileging the subject on

epistemological terms and arguing for multiplicity on

political terms is not reconciled in Haraway'

s

work,

though

the delimma is dynamically profiled.

Thinking about the dialectics of experience involves
asking different questions about the relationship between
being and knowledge than do standpoint feminisms.
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Feminism

does not need a better science
of political life, grounded
in experience, as Sandra Harding
argues.
This risks

supplying further fodder for the
management of politics
instead of encouraging contestation
and action.
We
4

cannot render our experience as knowers
transparent within
the outcome of our research as Harding's
essay about 'strong

objectivity' implies.

Trying to approach objectivity by

checking the impact of our material situatedness

or

,

subjectivity, on each knowledge claim controls the

possibilities for creating meaning in the world rather than
illuminating them.

In an essay critiquing Harding's goals

of better objectivity,
v

Kirstie McClure argues,

theory' privileged here is a specific

rather than a specific

v

*

"Although the

theory of knowledge

social theory as conventionally

understood, theory is again charged with the task of

providing an authoritative foundation for a unified politics
capable of effective intervention in the operative dynamics
of a social whole."

(McClure,

1992:364) McClure is critical

of the authorizing strategies of Harding's work,

arguing

they limit political possibilities rather than expanding
them.

I

agree with McClure in general, but my critique is

more concerned with how standpoint theories ultimately treat
the subject/object relationship of knowledge.

The political

problem of closure McClure discusses is immanent in the
epistemological frameworks of standpoint theory.
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While standpoint feminism advances
itself as a critical
social theory, these epistemological
arguments ultimately
rely on causal explanations for social
phenomenon.
The
knowing subject remains the manager of
the objective world.
Feminist knowledge is therefore not
deconstructive of

boundaries and limitations placed on the subject
in the
social world, but is ultimately instrumental.
While
standpoint theory plays a progressive role in cracking
the

hegemony of knowledge claims whose legitimacy depends
upon

abstraction from concrete, situated subjects, it sustains
problematic commitment to identity thinking.

a

This will not

move feminism into the coalitional or affinity politics
invoked by socialist feminists as necessary for the

recognition of difference and the reconfiguration of
self\other relations.

Instead it invites a further sorting

of identities into categories determined through given

social relations and hierarchically organized with respect
to whether the participants in each category approach

historical truth.

It remains within the parameters of a

politics of representation because the subject in history
becomes a monadic entity for politics rather than a
multiple, conflictual problem of politics.

Feminism can acknowledge its immanent limits as an
interpretive discourse without dissolving into particularism
or relativism.

This will require interpreting the political

significance of experiences without relying on materialist
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or scientific conclusions that close
down contestation in
the name of collective commitment.
Experience is messy,

infinitely complicated and intrinsically
resistant to even
the most nuanced of description.
Conceptualization reduces
it to categories.

Experience is particular and resists

rationalization.

Feminism thus needs to be generous with

its interpretive schema, never parsimonious.

merely

a

question of

v

This is not

more voices' entering into the

cacophonous but liberal (tolerant) crowd of truth-seekers.

And its certainly does not preclude considerations of what
socialist-feminists have argued to be central to feminist

understandings about women's lives,
of life,

sexuality and reproduction.

beyond the limits

I

ie.

material conditions

Though it cannot move

have discussed, feminist standpoint

theory developed out of profound concerns for creating the
terms of a radical form of feminist solidarity that

encorporates from the beginning a respect for the diverse,
experiential knowledge claims of subjugated, marginalized
subjects.

But

I

think it cannot address the present need to

reconfigure the relationship between being and knowledge

which in turn can help us develop new political forms for
interaction with others.

prior to politics.

Epistemology is embedded in, not

This means rethinking the effort to

theorize the political out of the lived experience of women.
The project itself is critical to developing normative
theories about relations of domination, but the issues that
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arise about experience and knowledge cannot be
addressed on
the terms of standpoint theory.
Ideally,

standpoint theorists argue, theory should help

us know the world as we act in the world.

clearly impossible.

But this is

The tensions inherent in the project of

self-knowledge are best elaborated in the work of Theodor
Adorno.

We cannot know as we act all the time and, at the

extreme, a world constructed out of such a vision is

totalitarian.

Totalizing self -consciousness is impossible

to complete as a project and can lead to paralysis vis-a-vis

action.

In the epigram

I

chose for this work, Nietzsche

says we cannot and do not know experience as it tolls in our

ears

.

We are always already working on the distortions we

call the truth after the fact.

Adorno agrees with and

responds to Nietzsche's radical skepticism about knowledge
and truth.

For Adorno,

the abstractions that emerge with

the creation of knowledge defeat individuality and

difference.

The colonizing relationship of the subject to

the object world in modernity is expressed through systems
of abstract exchange which collapse and obscure difference.

Adorno'

s

immediate concerns were only occasionally directed

towards women or gender.

He was,

however,

committed to

exploring the possibilities of subjectivity in modernity and
how we come to know ourselves and others in the world.

I

appropriate ideas from Adorno 's Negative Dialectics for

a

theory of interpretation that works against identity logic
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while sustaining engagement with
experience in the social
world
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CHAPTER III

ADORNO AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDENTITY
In the last chapter

I

discussed the political tensions

within feminism resulting from historical and theoretical
challenges to the construction of "woman" or "women" as

unified political identity.

I

a

discussed the limits of the

ways the subject and identity are understood in

socialist\standpoint feminisms.

The state of the feminist

subject is put into sharp profile by a discussion of the

developments and the critiques of these theoretical
perspectives.

The deconstruction of "identity" has

destabilized the subject
feminism.

(s)

and political projects of

Questions have surfaced about the possibility of

solidarity and collectivity, and indeed about how to sustain
the specificity of a feminist project at all.

Contemporary feminisms' concerns about the subject

(s)

of feminism and the potential for collectivity among women

calls for a closer look at the work of Theodor Adorno

Contemporary critical theorists have dismissed Adorno as

hopelessly pessimistic, elitist and, perhaps worst of all,
for
as having neither a positive nor an accessible program

political practice.

However, Adorno'

s

work can contribute

to feminist theory and politics in two ways.

First,

his

of
analysis of the constellational logics and limits

domination in modernity could contribute to critiquing
their limits and
feminist identity discourses by exploring
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exclusionary premises while sustaining feminism as
critical,

self -reflective project.

a

Second, his theory of

experience simultaneously communicates the fragility and the

potential power of experience as a site of critical,

oppositional knowledge production in modernity.

Both of

these areas are central to the politics of identity as they
have developed in feminism.

The interpretive theory of

constellations emphasizes the potentially multiple meanings

embedded in any particular practice or experience.

It

reconfigures the relationship between knowledge and

experience
Adorno's theory of negative dialectics challenges the
limits of modern subjective cognition, encouraging

resistance to closure in identitiarian categories in thought
and practice.

This challenge can move us beyond the brittle

and often static limits of feminist identity politics to an

open-ended but more consistently critical and sustainable
politics of knowledge and recognition.

In addition,

Adorno's attention to the fragility and temporality of
resistance can offer feminism means to understand its own

multiple and ongoing identity crises and strengthen its
reflexivity as

a critical theory and practice.

5

Adorno offers a radical reconceptualization of
relations between the self and other (and the other in one's
self)

which needs attention by feminists concerned with the

possibility of collectivist theory and action among subjects
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in conditions of modernity.

He does this through a critique

of the principle of identity and a dialectical
theory of

experience.

He shows how experience, understood

dialectically, is

a

critical force that works against

identity thinking, even in what he calls the "administered
world."

6

I

will show how Adorno's negative dialectics can

help us conceive of

a

politics of experience, to theorize a

different meaning for the feminist principle that the

personal is political that does not resort to identity
thinking in either universalist or particularist forms.

7

Negative dialectics argues for a non-identitarian
relationship between subject and object, between self and
other, which allows experience to play a critical role in

political relationships.
Before further discussing the positive

8

moments of

Adorno's work, we must look at his critique of the dominant
forms of reason and the demand for identity thinking in

modernity.

The dismissal of Adorno as anti-modern misses

the project embedded in his critique.

Adorno argued that

the contemporary demand of philosophy must be the

recuperation of modern reason's capacity to reflect upon its
formation in the world, to be immanently critical of its own
forms.

He was, therefore, a critic of the forms and

consequences of modern reason, but not ant i -modern.

He did

not reject identity thinking as hopelessly dominative.

He

considered its terms to be unavoidable and even potentially
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emancipatory.

So while he was a theorist of non-identity,

he was neither anti-modern nor a prototypical
post-modern

theorist.

subject

In addition,

he did not consider any particular

(working class, national liberationists

,

women,

in

fact any marginalized subj ect - -including himself as

intellectual

9
)

to have immediate or predictable future

access to emancipated forms of reason.

It was this latter

claim that has led him to be dismissed by later critical
theorists and feminists who believe one must have a subject
of history to whom one addresses one's theory or exist in a

hopeless, aporetic void as a theorist.

Benhabib,

(Fraser,

1989;

1982)

Adorno is most closely associated with the text

Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947)

.

This text has recently

received quite a bit of attention by those who would
resuscitate it for critical theory.

10

For that reason and

because my concerns involve how negative dialectics as

method and

a

a

theory contributes to a critique of feminist

identity politics,

I

will discuss only briefly the

apocalyptic story of modernity set forth in DoE to introduce

Adorno as

a

theorist centrally concerned with the potential

subversion of the logics of domination in modernity.
In Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer

interpret Homer's Odyssey as a history of the prototypically
patriarchal, bourgeois individual.

Their interpretation

shows Odysseus in the process of coming to know (to separate
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himself through cunning and
instrumental reason) and to
dominate nature in order to
achieve a strong ego/identity
formation.
As Odysseus travels, that
which cannot be
captured by him in thought, or
controlled by him physically
is eliminated or outwitted
in thought and practice as
"other"-- as that which represents
desire, the irrational 01
nature.
Through this retelling of the
Odyssey nature is
shown to become (historically)
that which inhibits
,

the

movement of instrumental reason whose
telos is the rational
society.
This makes necessary nature's exclusion
as a
threat from the circle of enlightenment.
The cognitive logic of identity, shown in the
Odvssev
to be linked to self-preservation which in
turn is

understood to be in opposition to the unpredictability
or
the unknowability of nature, becomes a necessary and

socially integrative aspect of modern life.

Individuals

develop this historical process of identity formation

through separation from and domination of otherness as

a

substitution for mimetic relationships to nature and the
external world.

11

Jurgen Habermas argues that Adorno and Horkheimer (but

mostly Adorno) falsely accuse Enlightenment reason of
creating and enforcing the internalization of relations of

domination with the necessary consequence of

administered society.

Thus,

for Habermas,

a

totally

their authorship

of the Dialectic of Enlightenment constitutes a performative
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contradiction in which modern
reason is apparently rejected
but then deployed to critique.
This criticism has
encouraged contemporary critical
theorists to identify
Adorno with a reductive reading
of Dialectic of

Enlightenm ent which places

it in the annals of intellectual

hrstory as an apocalyptic, totalizing
critique of modern
reason.
This reading and Habermas'
alternative view of the
modern life world has achieved a common
sense status among
many contemporary critical and some
feminist theorists eager
to move on from Adorno' s seeming
pessimism and intellectual
mandarinism to theorize a brighter potential
for approaching
modern visions of justice, autonomy and freedom
through
critical reason.

(Benhabib,

1982; Young,

1990; Fraser,

1989)

in the course of his intellectual journey,
Habermas

developed a fundamentally different vision of modernity than
did Adorno and Horkheimer.

Habermas remains loyal to

Enlightenment's own historiography of its relationship to

myth or tradition: "The process of Enlightenment leads to
the desocialization of nature and to the denaturalization of
the human world."

(Habermas,

1982:19)

Enlightenment

enriches our understanding of the world; it is a creative

and progressively rational context for understanding life in
its differentiated forms.

Adorno and Horkheimer argue that

Enlightenment brings the socialization (domination) of

nature (away from understanding it in its magical immanence)
and the naturalization of the human world (so that reason in
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itself has „o history)
the

MornQ

.

^ meimer

Enlightens

^^

centers knowledge of the
world in the
transcendent or empirical
subject, leaving
it

undifferentiated and situating
it as universal
consciousness-in-itself
Habermas argues that

»m

mo dern times,

traditions
become temporalized; the
changing interpretations are
clearly distinguished from
the world itself.
This external
world divides into the
objective world of entities and the
social world of norms (or
normatively governed interpersonal relationships)
both are in turn silhouetted
against the inner world of
subjective experiences."
:

(Habermas,

1982:19)

This gentle image of the world of

objects and the social world of norms
being silhouetted
against subjectivity is in contrast to
Adorno and

Horkheimer's story of Odysseus as an original
modern subject
outwitting and undermining the external world in
order to
come into dominance over it.
From the above
contrasts, one

might get the impression that the difference between

Habermas and his mentors is merely one of emphasis so
that
the otherwise parallel directions of their inquiries

diverge.

Habermas is consumed with mining the positivity of

modern reason, Adorno and Horkheimer with showing its
treachery.

This would make it necessary to choose between

them; do we accept the gentler vision of Enlightenment

71

^

offered by Habermas or do
u we ac
acmt
u
cept the *
harsh
vision of
Adorno and Horkheimer?
Habermas goes much further,
however, than showing his
disagreement about the
possibilities of liberation on the
terms offered by modern
reason.
He asserts that Adorno and
Horkheimer have engaged in a
performative contradiction.
His critique (which he uses
against many of his
philosophical adversaries) » moves
from presenting an
alternative image of Enlightenment
to claiming that Adorno
and Horkheimer are anti-reason
even as they deploy reason tc
critique modernity. This renders
their work internally
illogical and therefore irrelevant to
creating emancipatory
(critical)

theory.

This in itself, all other disagreements

aside,

defeats their claims about the dominative
structures
of modern reason.
He says they argue that there are no

grounds on which to escape the modern trajectory
of

instrumental reason though, according to him, clearly
they
have escaped in order to issue a critique.

Contrary to Habermas' reading, however, Adorno and

Horkheimer do not issue

a

totalizing critique in Dialectic

of Enlightenment and therefore do not engage in a

performative contradiction.
journey.

Homer's text represents a

The "reason" Adorno and Horkheimer critique in the

Odyssey is instrumental reason that remains blind to its own
historicity.

They do not engage in speculation about what

reason that is transparent to itself might look like,
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precisely because they do not
ccnsider themselves to have
privileged access to that vision.
mstead, they immanently
critique the terms upon which
instrumental reason moves in

the world and the consequences
of its arrogant belief in i
ts
autonomous self -formation, its
necessary connection to selfpreservation, and participation
in cumulative progress
(making
wj_xu bettPr.-mnm
3 the world
ueuter -more ~-f^efficient, predictable,
transparent to the self)
•

It is this differentiated
form of instrumental reason

that Adorno and Horkheimer take
on in the Dialectic nf

Enlightenment

.

Even this reason, in spite of the brutal

historical consequences of its arrogance
(the destruction of
otherness through cunning)
never completes
the task of

,

making what it considers irrational fully
rationalized.
Adorno and Horheimer express the incompleteness of
the task
through pointing out a moment in Homer's text that appears
coldly dismissive of suffering but actually indicates a
critical reversal in the otherwise seamless narrative of

instrumental reason.

They interpret this moment as

sustaining an anti -rationalist remembrance of suffering.
Adorno and Horkheimer close "Odysseus or Myth and

Enlightenment" with a discussion of Homer's self-

interruption as he describes the hanging of women unfaithful
to their spouses during their absence.

"The passage closes

with the information that the feet of the row of suspended
women 'kicked out for a short while, but not for long.'"
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(DOE: 79)

The phrase "not for long"
could be read as a
dismissal of the women's suffering.
For Adorno and
Horkheimer, however, the phrase
signifies an interruption in
an otherwise seamless,
inexorable, novel-like account of
the
Odyssey.
"By cutting short the account,
Homer prevents us
from forgetting the victims, and
reveals the unutterable
eternal agony of the few seconds
in which the women struggle
with death." They further explain
the significance of this
moment: "Reticence in narrative (the
cutting short of the
text), however, is the sudden break,
the transformation of

what is reported into something long past,
by means of which
the semblance of freedom glimmers that since
then

civilization has not wholly succeeded in putting out."
(DoE:79)

In this otherwise apocalyptic interpretation
of

Enlightenment through the Odyssey

,

which was written during

the years of the Holocaust, Adorno and Horkheimer pull out
a

moment in Homer's text as an acknowledgement of the memory
of suffering.

This anti-rationalist moment sustains a

memory of freedom that is not extinguished even in the most
rationalized genocide.

The rationalization of the murder of

the women for transgressing the patriarchal boundaries of

properly female sexuality is therefore incomplete.

This

reversal does not glorify the moment as necessarily adding

meaning to the murder by the patriarch.

It is there in the

text as a momentary but critical reversal of the Homeric

narrative history of instrumental reason.
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Robert Hullot-

Kentnor explains:
has happened,

"In the possibility of remembering
what

the coldness and impassibilite
of the novel's

narration reverses as memory of nature.

...In reflection on

this dialectic at a standstill, the
necessity

of the

...

world's daring-do dissolves, and enlightenment
comes to
terms as the consciousness of the uselessness

of sacrifice.

In this consciousness,

reason recovers its telos."

(Kentor,

1989:26)

Even in DoE Adorno and Horkheimer show instrumental
reason to be neither

a

transcendental (out of reach of human

thought or agency) nor a seamless totality.

It always

remains in a process of becoming a totalizing force as it

consumes\subsumes the particular in the dialectic of
history.

Instrumental reason's claims to progress and

rationality are not realized in part because it is
contingent upon the process of conquest, of the double

movement of creating the enemy other and subduing
never finally conquers what lies outside of it.

it.

It

While the

moment of nature is cognitively controlled or excluded by
the individual in order to construct a rational society, it
is never finally conquered as an independent moment in the

dialectical movement of history.

13

In Adorno'

s

theory,

it

comes to represent the non-identical.
So for Adorno,

the philosophy of Enlightenment and the

history of modernity is not

a closed system.

He therefore

did not set up, even in the Dialectic of Enlightenment
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,

an

inside and outside to which
we as subjects might have
immediate access now or in the
future.
Nor did he think of
nature or of non-identity as
necessarily utopic. " claims
to privileged access as a
thinker or as a social actor to
radical new forms outside of
domination or
to the

ontological sources of domination
will reflect or repeat
that which they claim to be
escaping.
"There is no peeping
out.
What would lie in the beyond
makes its appearance only
in the materials and categories
within."
(Adorno,

1969:140)

Adorno did not claim that that which
is excluded from the
dialectic of enlightenment at any given
moment is knowable
on terms that would necessarily offer
freedom.

The project

of reversing or subverting the terms of
instrumental reason

must be immanent to its logic.
Adorno'

s

particular version of critical theory

developed as a philosophy of resistance or negative
dialectics.

Negative dialectics preclude ideas of escape

and encourage an image of constantly pushing and

transfiguring the limits imposed by identity logic on the
self and other while sustaining the tension between theory

and practice, subjectivity and interpretation, subject and
object.

15

it does not offer an escape route from the

hazards of the conditions of the modern social and political
world.

It keeps us perpetually aware and critical of how

knowledge creation or conceptualization, while necessary,

potentially disguises, suppresses and even destroys
76

qualitative differences or
experiences that lie outside the
grasp of that conceptualization.
As a contingent and selfconsciously critical world view,
negative dialectics helps
us resist the absorption of
critically diverse experiences
in identitarian categories.

m

Ne^ive_DiaJ^ciic^ Adorno engages

in immanent

critique of idealist forms of
Enlightenment knowledge.
He
critiques the philosophies of the
subject which place it
first, as prior to or transcendent
over the external

world,

or the object.

Kantian philosophical idealism, in

particular, naturalizes the subject at the
subject's own
expense,

sacrificing its spontaneity and the potency of its
experience in the world in exchange for the ideological

certainty of subjective control and stability.
Yet the generality of the transcendental subject is
that of the functional context of society, of a whole
that coalesces from individual spontaneities and
qualities, delimits them in turn by the leveling
exchange principle, and virtually deletes them as
helplessly dependent on the whole. The universal
domination of mankind by the exchange value- -a
domination which a priori keeps the subjects from being
subjects and degrades subjectivitiy itself to a mere
object, makes an untruth of the general principle that
claim to establish the subject's predominance. The
surplus of the transcendental subject is the deficit of
the utterly reduced empirical subject. (Adorno,
1987 172)
_

:

Kant's idealism, with its uncritical (affirmative or
positive)

stance toward the transcendent subject, reflects

the dominance of identity logic in the social world.

Adorno,

For

in addition to being an economic principle

justifying exploitation, the exchange principle dictates
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social relations on
epistemological levels.
identity logic
reduces the social world to
interchangeable parts; it
reduces or brackets off
inconvenient differences,
simultaneously enforcing and
justifying the

interchangeability and manipulation
of objects.
This does
not imply that there is a
reality or truth to experience
which, but for epistemic
distortions, would shine through.
It is to say that for Adorno,
there are always differences
between the specificity of embodied
interaction with the
world and the conceptualization of the
interaction.
in

addition to ctiquing Kantian idealism, Adorno
spent a good
deal of time critiquing the claims of
neutrality
made by

modern positivists who argue they separate themselves
from
ideological forms and represent the given world in
knowledge.

Adorno shows their very methodology to reflect

the dominance of the identity principle implicated in

exchange relations and commodity culture and therefore to be

deeply ideological and historical in its attempted

absorption of difference.
Adorno'

s

critique of identity logic and its function in

the social world reflects the influence of Nietzsche and of

Weber in addition to the most obvious influence of Marx.
For Marx, the politics of exchange are related to the

circulation of commodities; the alienating effects are
specific to capitalism.

In capitalism,

exchange value comes

to rule over use value as simple exchange- -C-M-C becomes M-
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C-M'

This heralds the hxstorical
creation of profit as a
motive for exchange rather
than simple need or social
convention.
Exchange-value in capitalism is
implicated in
the alienated condition of
workers, in the fetishizing of
commodities and in the progressive
value of capitalist
development in moving us from a
condition of scarcity to the
heights of our productive capacities
as humans.
For
.

Marx,

the contradiction embedded in
the exchange principle lies in
the historical necessity of that
principle to develop as
social productivity increases while
at the same time it
functions to alienate and immiserate a
particular historical
class.
This class, according to traditional
interpretations
of Marx,

will eventually overthrow the very system
that

brought it into being.

Adorno,

following the insights of

Lukacs as to the subordination of production to
exchange in
late capitalism, argues the logic of identity to be deeply

embedded in social structures and norms.

Adorno understands

the exchange principle as a reductive and ultimately violent

social mechanism not only attached to the formal economy of
capitalism, but to the very question of identity in

modernity.

As a critic of late capitalism Adorno found the

exchange principle operative in the reduction of human labor
to waged hours and interchangeable products.

But he

broadens the meaning beyond what Lukacs argued about the

commodity form to show how the exchange principle informs
modern methods of constructing knowledge and juridical
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norms.

For Adorno, the exchange
principle is embedded in
the very substance of social
relations among subjects of
modernity.
In the second essay of
the Genealogy of

Mn^ic,

Nietzsche says that the concepts
of measurement, of
valuation, of identity emerge
as the basis for conceptions
of justice.
Harms done to individuals or the
community can
be 'forgiven'

in exchange for the punishment
which,

particularly in modern criminal justice, is
quantitatively
and qualitatively designed to match the
harm done.
Justice
becomes contingent upon finding equivalencies,
so the
creditor,

the victim of the crime or society can have

vengeance.

(Nietzsche,

1976:72)
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in other words,

justice

is contingent upon the abstraction from the
physicality and

experience of suffering and the establishing of
equivalencies through the exchange of which the social world
claims vengeance.

For Nietzsche,

the process is embedded in

historical relations of power and the enjoyment of cruelty,
not in transcendent knowledges of 'the good' as classical

idealist philosophies would have us think nor in actual

equivalencies as modern scientific positivists would have us
think.

This process of abstraction becomes a very concrete

form of violence, done in the name of justice, which reduces
the experience of the self, whether it be the wrongdoer or
the wronged,

to abstract equivalencies.
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Using the legal sphere as
an example of the violence
of
the exchange principle Adorno
says
W
ln law

'the^orma/nr"

0 ™ 611

norm? everyone Ts t?eated

ine^aStr

P?

11

° £ ir "*ional rationality,
f e " uivalolre bec
°™^ the

?^

^^SS^-^'SSg ^

closed circle, of anything guod
non est in actis
at 8.
(Adorno,

"

1987:309)

There has been much contemporary
work done on the 'myth of
equal treatment' under the law and
how it perpetuates
inequality. The actual day to day
functioning of the legal

system is less static than Adorno argues
here, but the myth
of

'

equal treatment' before the law serves to
perpetuate

inequalities in the manner he describes.

The myth is still

so powerful that it is commonly noted that even
oppositional

(anti-capitalist, anti-racist, or anti-sexist)

social and

political actors turn to the courts as the last site of

arbitration for their claims more often than any other
social site.
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in spite of the increasing integration of

social, political and legal spheres, the law rarely, as it
is structured,

takes into consideration the different

bodies, needs and experiences which come to be arbitrated

under its auspices.
effects.

Adorno,

And when it does, it has contradictory

like Nietzsche, argues that the law is

founded in the exchange principle, reducing experience to

manipulable quantities in order to seek
81

'appropriate'

vengeance.

The 'law- only artificially
wipes clean the
slate of conflict.

in addition to drawing
on Marx and Nietzsche to
theorize how the exchange
principle functions to eradicate

difference in modernity, Adorno's
social theory of exchange
recalls Weber's famous "iron
cage" of late capitalist
development, within which subject's
fate becomes

bureaucratically and functionally
determined outside of
their individual agency or subjectivity.

The Protestant

Ethic and the Spirit of Camtalisrg
is only the most famous
of Weber's discussions of how the
dictates of the social
world come to bear on the individual, how
social categories
and processes considered to be natural or
outside of the

control of the individual deny the ability of
subjects to

know others in freedom.
Spirit of Capitalism

,

in the Protestant Ethic and thP

Weber shows how an original motivation

of modern economic development,

the highly individualized,

spiritual calling to do good works was gradually
transformed, taking on a life of its own and rendering the

individual but a cog in the disenchanted mechanisms of
progress.

As the exchange system of late capitalism became

more complex, the motive to work came to be dictated by the
instrumental, functional necessities of the system and was

only apparently individualized.

Individuals' activity in

capitalism was mediated not through the meaning offered by
religious commitment but by the instrumental imperatives of
82

rules abstracted from their
particular lives. This
abstraction of the activity of
the self from concrete
experience, is a historical
and oppressive phenomenon
implicated in the systems of
domination within which modern
individuals live.

Adorno's critique of modernity
occupies a unique
position among these thinkers.
He follows in the tradition
of Nietzsche and Weber in his
historicization of
the fate of

the individual in modernity.

Like them he looks to the

birth of the individual, of Man, in
Enlightenment as holding
potential for freedom. And like them he
sees that potential
defeated in the rise of organized, mass society.
For Adorno, Enlightenment epistemologies and
social

systems falsely render moments of suffering transparently
knowable.

The irrational, desire- -that which would not

otherwise naturally have an identity in the social world
comes to be identified.

It forces them into interchangeable

relationships with other objects in the service of

explanation and regulation.

The modern emphasis on the

individual and subjective knowledge denies the critical
limits of the integrative forms of representation and

communication available to the subject at any given time.
As mentioned above, Adorno's historical reference for

the extreme harms of identity thinking is the Holocaust.

"Genocide is the absolute integration.

It is on its

18

way

wherever men are leveled of f -- 'polished off as the German
83

military
call pH it -until
1mH
y caned
one exterminates them literally
as
deviations from the concept of
-it-

^

i

their total nullity.

Auschwitz confirmed the philosophers
of pure identity as
death.
Even in his formal freedom,
the individual is as
fungible and replaceable as he
will be under the
liquidators' boots." (Adorno,
1987:362)

That argument has led to Adorno
being critiqued,
particularly from the left, for theorizing
a social world in
which all resistance or opposition,
because it must rely on
the identity principle for articulation,
inevitably becomes
complicit with systems of domination. (Habermas,
1982;

Benhabib,

1981,-

Piccone,

1973

;

Buck-Morss,

1972)

it

is

argued that for Adorno all social and popular movements
are
imbued with bourgeois principles of knowledge and are

therefore incapable of real resistance or of affecting the
social world.

(Freedman and Lazarus,

1988)

I

disagree with

these interpretations.
Adorno'

s

historical reference points to the path of

knowledge construction in identitarian forms as being so
treacherous as to potentially result in genocide.

But this

should not be read as an argument about the inevitability of
the system of abstract exchange in modernity leading to

gendocidal practices.

Nor should it be read as arguing the

impossibility of oppositional politics in the administered
world.

"It is precisely the insatiable identity principle

that perpetuates antagonism by suppressing contradiction.
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What tolerates nothing that
is not like itself thwarts
the
reconcilement for which it mistakes
itself.
The violence of

equality-mongering reproduces the
contradiction it
eliminates."
(Adorno, 1987 142 -143
While identity is
coercive social and political
principle, identity
:

)

a

and

difference never historically collapse
into a reconciled
state.
For Adorno, any totality produced
by identitarian
thinking (including social movements)
is potentially
antagonistic
Adorno'

s

negative dialectics resuscitates the Hegelian

dialectic but critiques its telos.

Identity formation as

understood in the tradition of Hegelian dialectics, involves
the double movement of engaging an other (in the

Phenomenology of Mind this other is internal to mind and
external to self) and conquering it in order to create the
boundaries, or consciousness, of one's self.

Adorno argues

through and against Hegel that believing the reconciliation
of identity and difference to have been realized in any

historical form, whether it be the bourgeois individual or
the State, participates in sustaining and naturalizing a

status quo still riven with relations of domination.

The

logic of identity, the creation of boundaries for the self

and other, comes to have no history in itself but becomes a
fact of nature.
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In other words if,

following Hegel, we

assume the reconciliation of identity and difference in any

given institution or form of social life, what is actually
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still a moment in history and
potentially affected by the
movement of consciousness, becomes
naturalized.
However,

since nature,

including human nature, contradictorily

remains as other vis-a-vis history, we
remain in a
relationship to those institutions which is
actually

antagonistic (non-identical) but understood
(ideologically)
as final and unmoving.

The Hegelian reconciliation of

identity and difference, the founding of identity in
its
final form in the modern individual and the modern

State

apparatus is shown by Adorno to contribute to enforce the
spell or the reification of the given world.

Adorno argues the contradictory nature of social and

epistemological principles of modernity.

He does not argue

that these led to an historically inevitable conclusion, nor

did he argue that late capitalism is without space for

critical thought and action.

He is not simply arguing that

subjects cannot resist because they are imbued with the

ideological forms of a closed totality, of the administered
world.

This would imply the existence of some pure

subjectivity before the laws of modernity or capitalism
enforced their dictates.

For Adorno, we are embedded in our

social context through which our sense of self is

continually being constructed.

Critique is in the awareness

of the limits of the constitutive nature of the social

world.

We cannot return (indeed should not return)

to some

happily reconciled state prior to the damage of the modern
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condition, nor whould we assume
future

access to a

reconciled state given particular
positioning of subjects in
the world.- instead, we should
recognize that relations
of domination between the self
and what is other never quite
absorb the excess of what is other.
Adorno's is a
limit

philosophy of knowledge.

He argues in a lecture on "The

Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy,"
that Hegel
understood "that the limits of knowledge to which
its

critical self -reflection leads are not something
external to
knowledge, not something to which it is merely condemned

from the outside; rather, they are inherent in all moments
of knowledge.

"

(Adorno,

1993:76-77).

dialectics recognizes this as

a

Adorno's negative

critical principle negating

totalizing or transcendent knowledge.

What is outside, what

cannot be known or covered by the concept assigned to a

thing negates any claim to totality or the universality of
that concept
This discussion of the identity principle can be used
to consider the emergence and potential of new social

movements.
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As these historical movements have emerged

as oppositional political identities to imperialist or

patriarchal structures of domination, participants have come
to develop prior forms through which to know one another.

On the one hand these emergent movements challenge

traditional axes of power and domination which denied the

particular subjects involved

a
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political identity or

relevance in the social world.

On the other hand,

in

considering those identities to
exist in an ontological
relationship of otherness to a
particular enemy, such
movements suppress differences in
experience and create
rigid structures of belonging.
Those
differences, as

I

will

argue later in the context of feminist
theory and politics,
could render the political relationships
among participants
less rigid as oppositional movements
develop
into

significant historical forces.

Those differences could

prevent identities which are critical and deeply
politicized
in one historical context from relying on
a priori
forms of

knowledge and thus creating new forms of domination in
another.

This emphasis on differences presents a problem

when we desire continuous solidarity, reconciliation, safety
in knowing where we stand in relation to the other.

The

chaos within solidarity that difference ensures is

unpredictable in its outcomes.
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However,

it is only in

recognizing the lack of finality about those constructions
that we sustain critique in an as yet unreconciled world.

Through critique, through the determinate negation of
positive forms of knowing otherness, and without mapping out
or presuming to plan the outcomes, we can suggest

alternative ways of knowing otherness in the world.

The

dialectics of this process, however, the negative dialectics
leave a remainder, something not covered by the concept.

This remainder sustains the possibility for critique and for
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change from

world whose dominant epistemologies
and social
forms encourage projects that
privilege the subject and thus
a rigid separation between self
and other.
a

Habermas and others dismiss Adorno for
ignoring the
potential of modernity and its central concepts

of freedom,

autonomy and justice.

Adorno does say much more about what

freedom is not than about what freedom could be.

He never

says what freedom is because for him it is not yet,
in

thought or in practice.

moments of becoming.

It is a

potentiality and exists in

Freedom is not, as it is for Kant,

realization of our private capacity to use reason within the

rationalized framework of public obedience.

Neither is it

realized in the abstracted form of the bourgeois individual
or the institution of the modern State as it is for Hegel.

For Adorno, domination, the denial of freedom and just

autonomy to the self and other, is sustained through the
public and private systems of modern life.

Against the

bourgeois individualism of Kant, he argued there is no site
of escape,

either into individual consciousness or in

privately constituted and publicly sanctioned institutions
like the family or the community.

Against the

Marxist/Lukacsian left he argued that theorizing privileged
sites of social identity, whether it be worker, woman or any

other historically subjugated subject obscures non-identity.
For Adorno the potential for freedom and a just form of

autonomy lies in the reconstitution of how we know and
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physically relate to otherness, to
what is alien or apart in
ourselves and outside ourselves.
This other takes the form

of desire

the Sirens)

(remember Odysseus' self bondage
as he outwitted
of difference,

of the strange or unknown.

Freedom is denied in modern paradigms
of reconciliation or
final knowledge of historical process.
In a critique of the left's
abandonment of Adorno for

his alleged retreat from political
theory that can inform

practice, John Lysaker and Michael Sullivan
make the

following comment about the aporias of immanent
critique:

After successful immanent critique, however, a poignant
problem arises. in the search for new means to achieve

the ideals [freedom, autonomy, justice] that prevalent
practices fail to accomplish, it becomes apparent that
theory has no understanding of these ideals apart from
their role in those practices found to be deficient.
The leaves emancipatory theory between a rock and
no-place:
it has neither the ends nor the means with
which to achieve emancipation. (Lysaker and Sullivan,
.

.

.

1992/95)

The authors then go on to explore this aporetic dilemma of

thought and practice in Adorno'

s

work.

They show that

Adorno sustains the program of critical theory as an

exploration of the tensions immanent to the relationship
between thought and practice in modernity.
that the impotence of attempts

(of

Adorno argues

theory and practice)

to

radically change the status quo forces dialectical criticism
and reflection on the conditions which make thought what it
is.

If reason is not self -legislating,

then any thought

must be critiqued in its relationship to the social world.
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Damaqed Life expresses his own sense
of impotence in the
context of his necessary relationship
to the world and his
thought's embeddedness in instrumental,
dominative reason,
in Neg ative Dialectics he says
"Dialectics is

the consistent

sense of nonidentity.

standpoint.

it does not begin by taking a

My thought is driven to it by its own

inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what
thinking."

(Adorno,

I

am

1987:5)

Adorno never claims to have escaped the aporia
critical
theory's critique of reason creates for thought.

However,

he does offer a sense of how we can think about the

potentiality to live in freedom with otherness.

Lysaker and

Sullivan argue that freedom for Adorno is "...a property of
practices, not persons.

Persons become free only though

participation in practices that are themselves free."
(Lysaker and Sullivan, 1992:112)
I

will make a slightly different argument about

freedom, not about what it is --even as a property- -but how
it is as a potential of inter-subjectivity mediated through

the object.

Adorno argued that the aesthetic realm is

a

place critical theory can look for concrete practices

encorporating freedom.

His Aesthetic Theory informs a

radical reconception of relational knowledge production and

relations to otherness.

Lysaker and Sullivan point out that

for Adorno, art does not dissolve the tension between
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subject and object so his turn
to the aesthetic to find t
he
potential for an emancipatory
politics in modernity is not a
regressive move to elitest forms
of expression, but an
increasingly radical approach to
theorizing within the
tension between theory and
practice.
They argue against
Martin Jay, who claimed Adorno
"denied the possibility of
intersubjective communications in
favor of aesthetic
experience"
(as cited in Lysaker and
Sullivan, 1992:122)
that Adorno' s aesthetic theory is
exactly an exploration of
the possibility of intersubjective
communication.
I want tc
explore how he understood experience,
aesthetic and
otherwise, as holding that potential.

In other words

I

agree with Lysaker and Sullivan that Adorno remained

committed to working within the necessary aporetic quality
of the critique of reason, but

I

disagree with their

discussion of freedom which limits it to being
practices.

I

a

property of

am interested in looking at how freedom

emerges through practices but with attention to the broader

interpretive concept of experience.

Experience is our

relationship to the world but also as a subjective lens

through which we view the world.

The question of experience

is embedded in the tension between subject and object that

creates the practices Lysaker and Sullivan describe as
critical, as refusing the illusion of reconciliation in an

unreconciled world.
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The notion of totality
is necessary to Adorno<
s
theory, but I have arqued
yuea znat
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discusses the relationship between
the
social whole and particular
experience in both philosophical
and h 1S torical terms.
For Adorno, the meanings
of

particular moments (experience)
need to be traced critically
within the social whole.
it is the politics of this
relationship between the social whole,
which Adorno calls
totality or the administered world,
and the particulars of
experience with which I am concerned.
Two aspects of Adorno'

s

approach to experience must be

considered critical to revising contemporary
theories of
identity.
The first is his historicization of the
quality
of individual experience.
The second is the potential
for

resuscitating experience through knowledge forms that
recognize critical moments of non-identity.
Adorno argues for a theory of experience that does not
posit its ontology, its finality or any sort of authorizing
link to truth.

"Spontaneity of experience is neither

continuously maintainable nor downright positive; the truth
is not there.

The most subjective, the immediate datum

eludes subjectivity."

theorizes
memory,

and

3)

2)

1)

(Adorno,

1987:39-40)

Rather, Adorno

the historicity of experience and its link to

its increasingly mediated quality in modernity,

the politics of our efforts to represent experience
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tor Adorno,
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fundamentally historical quality
of experience shows that it
is a relationship between
the self and other and that it
mediates knowledge between the
particular and the social
In his lecture on "The
Experiential Content of Hegel's

Philosophy"

Adorno discusses the individual as
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by the social world:
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He goes on:

A mode of thinking that understands the individual
as
zoon politikon and the categories of subjective
consciousness as implicitly social will no longer cling
to a notion of experience that hypostatizes the
individual, even involuntarily.
Experience's advance
to consciousness of its interdependence with the
experience of all human beings acts as a retroactive
correction to its starting point in mere individual
experience.
(Adorno, 1992:64)
Apart from being a response to those who argue he is

nostalgic for

a lost,

bourgeois individuality, this passage

argues for the advance to an inter-subjective politics of

recognition through the dialectics of experience.

With

Hegel and Marx, Adorno believes that it is in the sensuous

world that we create knowledge, that we become cognitive
subjects.

This relationship is our experience and in itself

constitutes objects for interpretation by ourselves and
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others.

our relationship to
otherness then becomes an
object of interpretation,
we can thin, of experience
as a
prism through which we
interpret the world.
The pattern of
reflection is mediated by
a dynamic totality and
by parts of
our lives and the lives
of others to which we have
no
immediate cognitive access.

Adorno's discussion of
experience, however, is
complicated by history; the
quality of our experience
changes over time, with the
totalities which experience
confronts.
Walter Benjamin had a profound
and lasting
influence on Adorno's understanding
of the changing quality
of experience in late modernity.
The notion of experience
in the name of which Adorno
mobilizes remembrance
is not

measurable or easily described.

it refers back to

Benjamin's theory of the relationship
between ehrfarung and
erlebnis.
In order to better set off the
dialectical
quality of Adorno's approach to experience, I will
briefly
discuss its relationship to Benjamin's ideas about
experience
Benjamin refers specifically to the quality of

experience in modernity in two essays,
"Some Motifs on Beaudelaire"

(Benjamin,

"The Storyteller" and
1968)

.

These essays

articulate the difference between the knowledge of
experience elicited through information, and the experience
that develops meaning through the remembrance and passing on
or communicating of experience over time.
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It is the latter

which is elicited through
the art of storytelling.
Storytelling engages the audience
in an active contemplation
of the world.

The auratic quality of the
experience related through
the art of storytelling survives
through the contemplative
relationship the audience develops
to the story.
The story
becomes embedded in their lives, as
it has been in the life
of the storyteller, rather than
merely "jostling the

consciousness" temporarily as pieces of
information.

It may

be the simplicity of the story, the
"dryness" of its terms
and its lack of explanation that makes it
live on

historically, gathering meanings.

23

Being in the company

of an audience or fellow listeners makes
storytelling about

things in faraway lands different from modern ways
of

knowing otherness or strangeness.

As with painting, which

entails the looking back and forth of the painter and the

painted and subsequently creates

a

living relationship

between the audience and the painting,
his audience interact.

the storyteller and

The reconstruction of experience as

information eliminates that part of communication, making it

instrumentally available to everyone while reducing its

meaning to a brief shock effect.

Information, that which

attempts to bring factual experiences of others close to the
listener or reader through explanation, destroys the auratic
content of the experience, fails to enter it into the life
of the listener as anything but a passing moment,
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easily

replaced.

The story which does not strain
to tell all the
verifiable facts or to explain
them to a respondent, lives
in the life of the listener.

The difference between erfahrung
and erlebnis is
elaborated in Benjamin's essay "On
Some Motifs in

Baudelaire"

:

The greater the share of the shock
factor in
impressions, the more constantly consciousnessparticular
has to
oe alert as a screen against stimuli;
the more
efficiently it does so, the less do these
impressions
enter experience (Erfahrung)
tending to remain in the
sphere of a certain hour in one's life (Erlebnis)
,

(Benjamin,

1968 162)
:

in modern conditions of industrial life,

the shock defense

becomes a way of experiencing the world and giving it
meaning.

it becomes part of Baudelaire's creative energy,

"Thus Baudelaire placed the shock experience at the very

center of his artistic work."

(Benjamin,

1968:163)

For

Benjamin, Baudelaire expressed the disintegration of auratic

experience subsumed in the turn to information, to the kind
of experience exemplified by the man in the crowd- -hurrying

and tensely defensive against the momentary shocks of modern
life- -not wanting to look at others for fear of engagement.

Auratic experience invested the object with the ability
to return the gaze.

Experience of the aura thus rests on the transposition
of a response common in human relationships to the
relationship between the inanimate or natural object
and man.
The person we look at, or who feels he is
being looked at, looks at us in turn. To perceive the
aura of an object we look at means to invest it with
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in

>The Storyteller' Benjamin
writes of the consuming flame
of the story.
Experience is only tellable in retrospect,

never in its lived moments.

As it is told,

the life of the

teller-- he whose experience is being
told-- becomes

remembered only through the terms of the story.
His gift is the ability to relate his life,his
distinction, to be able to tell his entire life
The
storyteller:
he is the man who could let the wick of
his life be consumed completely by the gentle flame
of
his story.
This is the basis of the incomparable aura
about the storyteller ...(Benjamin, 1968:109)

Experience evaporates upon contact with deliberative
consciousness.

For Benjamin it is the unapproachability of

experience that sustains its non-identity.
it is consumed.

As it is known

Like the wick of the storyteller's life

which is a source of wisdom, experience can only be known in
retrospect; distance is the key to understanding, the closer
one is the harder it is to see.
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This is why Benjamin,

in

this essay, privileges the
storyteller and the flaneur over
the man of the masses.
These characters sustain a kind
of
relaxed, contemplative distance
to the object which allows
the experience of aura, of the
witnessing of history -at a
standstill' in the object.

Adorno sustained the argument about
the quality of
distance that Benjamin said offered
access to the aura of
the object, allowing it to live.
However, Adorno 's ideas
about experience encourage an intensely
political, though
aesthetically styled, existence with otherness

in the world.

The dialectical images of Benjamin's theory
of experience

become still and then consumed as they are known
in the

contemplative life of the knower.

History becomes a series

of images seen only in retrospect, not in a
dialectical

movement in which subject and object are necessarily
interactive.

Benjamin's storyteller only knows experience

as always already past.

Adorno'

s

theory allows for a

sustained engagement with the world in experience.
Adorno'

s

desire to redeem the qualitative, critical

force of experience in the administered world engaged him in

discussions of individuality. This rendered his theory
suspect to socialists and feminists who have dismissed this

aspect of his work as bourgeois idealism.

He is accused of

a nostalgia for an age of individuality which ignores the

potential of popular movements and the rise of collective
consciousness among various groups (students, workers,
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women,

anti-colonialist) in the twentieth
century.
He is
dismissed for romanticizing a
past when access to nonidentity was possible on the
terms of bourgoeis
individualism itself.

Adorno considered individuality
potentially to sustain
resistance to the integrative forces
of exchange,

argued

the

(rational)

but he

individual of Enlightenment to be a

reified concept that does not exist
in freedom either as
subject or object of knowledge.
Similar to Walter Benjamin, Adorno found
things
immanent in the quality of individuality
in the nineteenth
century that sustained non-identity. Adorno
looks to the

19th century to show how the potential for
non-identity,

immanent in historical movement, is continually
extinguished
by encroaching instrumental reason.

He argues that 19th

century bourgeois individualism weakened the objectifying

power of knowledge, contributing to the subversion of

grandly oppressive systems theories of philosophy and
science which privilege the obj ectif ication of the world in

explanation as a path to knowledge.

He said the

individual's capacity to be discriminating in his experience
of the object rather than objectifying it through grand

systems was present in early capitalism.

In other words,

individuality in the 19th century contained moments of
resistance to the encroaching instrumental forces of
enlightenment.

It strengthened the individual's capacity to
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be discriminating in his
experience of the object.
explains the dialectical,
negative effects of this

discrimination

He

:
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The concept of discrimination is a
complex blending of a
secularized mimetic element of intuition
with the modern
rational approach to knowing the object.
This is not an
affirmation or uncritical celebration of
19th century

individualism; it is an effort to articulate how
the

capacity to experience the object without instrumentalizing
that experience or flattening it to agree with the
terms of

exchange is present even during the historical rise to

hegemony of the most abstract individualism.

It is an

effort to redeem non-identity, which never fully disappears,
on terms immanent to historical experience in capitalist

society.

The longing for non-identity, of the "groping for

the concordance which the magical delusion used to place

beyond doubt" continues, even in late capitalism.
Calvin Thomas persuasively argues that Adorno does not
argue for a "going back to" but rather for a resuscitation
of experience that is always already there,
of organization.

even in the age

In "A Knowledge that Would not be Power:
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Adorno, Nostalgia and the
Musical Subject" Thomas argues
that Adorno "mobilizes nostalgia."
other words, he
engages it for purposes of critique
rather than engaging
himself in an empty yearning for
times gone by.
Thomas
wonders how accusations of Adorno
for engaging in an empty
nostalgia could hold when Adorno'
s life work was consumed
with critiquing the regression to
or f etishization of any
historical moment or theory of days
gone by.
Thomas argues.-

m

Adorno's nostalgia,... is not for a lost
object but
Possibility, is not a conservation of
the past butt a move to redeem the
hopes of the past
Adorno does not favor a regression but
calls for the
reactivation of a fundamental human capacitycapacity without which the word *human' in the-a
sense
not of humanist' but of ^humane' could
hardly apply
the capacity to suffer and to recognize the
sufferinq
of others. (Thomas,
163)

^

*
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Thomas goes on to argue that Adorno was attempting to

reactivate this capacity to hear, to experience, to be in

relation of mimesis to the suffering other and the suffering
in ourselves; to hear,

to know not through abstract concepts

or totalizing knowledge, but through an elective affinity to

otherness.

It is through this

relationship of elective

affinity that we might know otherness in

a

manner which

sustains connection without erasing difference.
The definition of the object in idealist philosophies
has generally been contingent upon presupposed thought forms

and unities of the transcendental subject.

This

glorification of consciousness places the subject first,
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thereby putting it in a
position of omnipotence over
the
object of knowledge. The
traditional

bias towards the
subject in idealist theory
reflects the relations of
domination in society or man
over that which is constructed
as Other.
Adorno found this bias present
particularly
in

the Kantian a priori which,
in response to the inevitable
contingencies of the tension between
reason and desire
(nature)

explicitly presupposes how experiences
are to be
thought about.
For Adorno, this denies the particularity
,

of

experience, and causes the philosophical
enterprise to
participate in hypostasizing the social
world, or totality,
in a dominative position over the
individual.
This contradiction in the separation of
subject and
object is imparted to epistemology
Though they cannot
be thought away, as separated, the pseudos of
the
separation is manifested in their being mutually
mediated- -the object by the subject, and even more, in
different ways, the subject by the object. The
separation is no sooner established directly, without
mediation, than it becomes ideology, which is indeed
its normal form.
The mind will then usurp the place of
something absolutely independent- -which it is not; its
claim of independence heralds the claim of dominance.
Once radically parted from the object in Enlightenment
knowledges, the subject reduces it to its own measure;
the subject swallows the object, forgetting how much it
is an object itself."
(Adorno, 1988: 499)
.

Adorno argues that Enlightenment knowledges assume the mind
to be capable of wrapping around the totality of objects, of

knowing them completely either through prior categories or
through empirical observation.

This denies the many-

sidedness of any object and forces it into dimensions of
103

m

total visibility.

denying many-sidedness, idealist

philosophy creates abstract forms
in the name of truthtelling,
it argues we can know
through knowledge

forms that

affirm, prior to engagement,
our access to the object.
it
signifies a will to identify first
and engage only after the

cognitive relationship is in place.

This offers a sense of

familiarity with the object, even if
it the familiarity is
bred from our prior awareness that
something is strange or
alien as opposed to normal and close.
For Adorno,

the rise of positivist sciences in the

twentieth century signifies the continuing
and increasingly
ideological affirmation of the isolated, reified
consciousness.

Idealist philosophies privilege the subject

as transcendent while

positivism attempts to remove the

moment of subjectivity from the object as a means of

approaching truth.
world.

They have similar functions in the

They each represent a longing, in a secular,

disenchanted age, for a sense of autonomy, of place or
centeredness, of certainty about that which lies outside of

our given or immediate consciousness.

We rely on these

knowledge forms to ensure that we will be left alone,
separate from the object, or if we are to engage, to be sure
that we can manipulate it successfully to pre-determined
ends.

For Adorno, these epistemologies participate in

constructing and reinforcing the will to dominate otherness,
to determine, prior to engagement,
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the meaning of the

object.

as methods of knowledge
production they rely on the
exchange principle; on making
unlike things like,

comparable, or conceptual for
purposes of analysis. They
are complicit with modern structures
of dominance.
Thus, for Adorno, in modernity
the separation between
cognition and reality, between subject
and object, is

hypostatized,

creating truth as that which is detached
from

the subject and its experience,
or embeddedness in the
world.
Looking back at our discussion of the
Dialectic of
Enlightenment we can make the connection to
the domination
of nature,

of the irrational,

of desire,

of that which does

not fit into given historical categories and
concepts.

in

idealist philosophies, the subjective understanding
of the
object,

though constructed through social categories of

thought and practice, dominates the object.

Positivist

thought attempts to eradicate the subjective moment from
knowledge.

However, Adorno argues that the subject is

dialectically constitutive of the object, so positivism
falsifies the object.

It is important to note that Adorno

refers often to the idealisms and postivist tendencies in

Marxian thought as well.

He believes that many Marxisms

offer little that is substantially different than bourgeois

theory or traditional theory as they posit the proletariat
as the reconciled subject/object of history (Lukacs)

scientific prognoses of the fall of capitalism
(positivist/economistic Marxisms)
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or make

Does Adorno thus bring the
critique of ideology t,:o a
close, arguing that there is
nothing except ideological
forms and concepts dominating
the objective world and

constructing individuals' subjective
interpretation of their
needs and experience?
For Adorno critique lies in
practices of cognition and
recognition among subjects. The
moment of non-identity in
the object world defies totalizing
knowledge forms and
falsifies claims to truth. Historical
experience is nonidentical, a moment of remembrance which
resists

subordination to the whole.

However,

it is not the

immediacy of given experience that offers
access to truths.
Negative dialectics critiques the concept without
reifying
the object as truthful in its givenness.
Adorno argues that experience is rationalized or

collectivized and loses its particularity in modernity.
This process of constructing knowledge, or historical
meaning, constitutes a political relationship with

experience playing a critical role.

For Adorno experience

can be a critical check on these Enlightenment forms of

knowledge, but in itself, or in its immediacy, it is not an

ontological source of knowledge.

Our experience is not

transparent to us but always subject to interpretation.

Because experiential cognition is an interpretive process,
we should acknowledge that there is always something more to
that experience than we can name.
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Adorno argues that the

objects of cognition (experience)
will never fit completely
into constructed concepts -the concepts will never be
sufficient for understanding the
object.
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The cognitive process always leaves
a remainder, a
constitutive outside, a difference.
And objects, or
experience, will always resist totalizing
abstraction or
conceptualization

Experience forbids the resolution in the unity
of
consciousness of whatever appears contradictory
For
instance, a contradiction like the one between
the
definition which an individual knows as his own and
his
role,' the definition forced upon him by
society when
he would make his living- -such a contradiction
cannot
be brought under any unity without manipulation,
without the insertion of some wretched cover concepts
that will make the crucial differences vanish
(Adorno,

1987:152)

This quotation shows Adorno'

s

respect for experience and the

subject's potential knowledge of his own defining
differences.

Adorno critiqued the concept as a

sociological/scientific tool, but also as a political

process by which the administered world sustains and
integrates itself through social codification.

The "cover

concepts" referred to above create what becomes a socially

necessary second nature understanding or definition of what
the worker is.

They are as complicit in the systems of

capitalism and the coercion of that subject as he makes his
living.

Through them the worker comes to know himself as
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the same as others even aq h-i* «
as his experience tells
him
something different, tells
him about his difference.
However, that telling,
that sense of difference,
of the
remembrance of otherness
within the self, however
inarticulable, will always
resist the currently more
powerful, totalizing impulse
of identity logic.
This
perpetuates the antagonistic
totality.
It is not only the knowledge
of otherness in ourselves

with which Adorno is concerned.

He demands we take

responsibility for the limits of our
cognition of many-sided
otherness in others. Like Hegel,
Adorno argues that there
is a separation from the object
necessary for subjects'

consciousnesses to develop, but because he
was committed to
the unending movement of the dialectic,
Adorno argues that
this separation should never be hypostatized
nor collapsed
in identitarian forms of knowledge.
It is not through the totalizing and distancing
effects

of objectivism,

or through knowledge stimulated by reliance

on subjectivity and identity that we will come to live
in

peace with otherness.

Rather,

the subject must see its own

power enough to yield to the object without fear of selfannihilation.

It is through a complex process of

recognition, one allowing for the constitutive nature of the
object,

that we might come to know ourselves and others.

This "coming to know" implies an endless,
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iterative and

reflexive process of understanding
which is receptive rathe,
than absorbant of the other's
experience.

in "Subject and Object"
Adorno argues explicitly for a
subject that recognizes itself
also as an object.
This is e
subject that rejects the ideology
of the transcendent or

always already identified self.

m

critiquing the

epistemological separation of subject
and object, Adorno
does not argue instead for a
relationship
of identity.

As

expressed in the quotation above, what
it is to be a worker
is always already complicated by
difference among workers.
Working class consciousness that depends
upon the subsuming
of those differences becomes yet
another cover concept and
systematic devaluation of experience.
In "Subject\Object,

"

Adorno argues that the separation

of subject and object in thought expresses the
real

dichotomy of the human condition, our alienation from the
object and from our selves.

hypostasize that separation.

But critical thought must not
If we think

only the

separation we collude with relations of dominance created by
the claim to independence by the subject.

How might we most

adequately think about the relation between subject and
object?

Adorno begins by describing subject and object as

historical terms and critiquing the common usages.

He then

argues the absolute necessity to preserve both sides of the
dichotomy, albeit in a transformed relationship.
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Earlier

noted that Adorno did not
suggest a going
back to a time gone by in
early capitalism when true
individuality existed, at least
as a potentiality.
His
aversion to this kind of
nostalgia is reiterated in
..Subject
and Object." The passage
is worth quoting at length
because
it expresses Adorno's
complicated relationship to the past
and to the question of the
subject:

^P^

I

U re of a temporal or
extratemporal original
state of happy identity between
subject and obiect is
romantxc, however- -a wishful
projection a? times but
0
ie
The ^differentiate! state
before'the subject's Jformation was
the dread of the
h?^H
k f natUrS
f myth
was
in Protest aglinst
°
it ?h,r^°
eat r igi ° n had their tr^ th content.
?
Besides ?n
Besides,
,
to be undifferentiated
is not to be one- even
11
alectics - ni ty requires diverse items
Sf
which
which'it
it is ?i
the unity.
For those who live to see it
the new horror of separation will
transfigure the old
horror of chaos--both are the ever-same.
The fear of
yawning meanmglessness makes one forget
a fear which
once upon a time was no less dreadfulthat of the
vengeful gods of which Epicurean materialism
and the
Christian "fear-not" wanted to relieve mankind
The
only way to accomplish this is through the
subject
if
it were liquidated rather than sublated in
a higher
form, the effect would be regression- -not just
of
consciousness, but a regression to real barbarism
(Adorno, 1988 499)
,
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Thus,

the subject is absolutely necessary to overcoming the

alienation of the mythical undifferentiated self /other
relationship and of the modern, idealist transcendent self.
Self -reflection is central to Adorno's suggestions as to
what freedom might look like.
However, Adorno limits his conception of the subject

through theorizing the primacy of the object.

The subject

must see itself as in the world, as constituted by the
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social world.

-The subject is more the
less it is, and it
is less the more it credits
itself with objective being."
(Adorno, 1988:509) He continues:
As an element, hoever, it
[the subiectl
i„
e
iC le
Aft6r an ^i-ination of the
subjective
COa* dif
meetingq stirring
stirrings and instants of subjective I ike the
life.
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Without the element of subjectivity,
of knowing the world,
the tyranny of the particular
would reign.
Knowledge of the
object would become only self
-referential according to the
"fleeting stirrings and instants" of
subjective life.

Subjectivity is reflection on the subject
and subjective
reflection.
it includes the recognition of the
ideological
basis for the self -legislating individual or
subject,

because it means the subject becomes an object,
a social
object subject to reflection.

"Subjectivity is to be

brought to objectivity; its stirrings are not to be
banished
from cognition."

(Adorno,

1988:504)

Thus, Adorno places the

subject and object in an asymmetrical, non-hierarchical

relationship which recognizes the constitutive nature of the
object without eradicating the subject.

It is asymmetrical

because the subject is objectified in thought in a radically
different way than the subject knows the object.

The

subject cannot be without the object, without
obj ectif ication,

while the object can be (but not be known)

without the subject or the subjective element.

However,

without society, without the objective world, the subject
ill

cannot even be.

The transcendent or
empirical individual is
a construct. The subject
cannot be without the sensuous
world or without society.
If he argues that the
subject is a thing of the world

and for the primacy of the
object how is the relationship
non-heirarchical?
»
by primacy Qf fche object g
that the subject, for its part
an object in a qualitatively
different sense, in a sense more
radical than the object,
which is not known otherwise than
through consciousness, is
as an object also a subject."
(Adorno, 1988:502)
The
subject must see power in its objective
status,
.

.

.

.

not

weakness.

it must see that a dominative
relationship to the

object is not necessary to exert itself in
the world.

He

argues that it is in the cognitive relationship
to

experience as an object that the subject can do this.
The objective content of individual experience is
not
produced by the method of comparative generalization,it is produced by dissolving what keeps that
experience, as being biased itself, from yielding to
the object without reservation- -as Hegel put it:
with
the freedom that would relax the cognitive subject
until it truly fades into the object to which it is
akin, on the strength of its own objective being.
(Adorno,

1988:506)

This is Adorno'

s

version of what others have called unity in

diversity or the problem of sustaining autonomy within
community of solidarity.

But his understanding is more

complex than either of those familiar phrases imply.
Adorno,

other

24

a

For

in experiencing the other one must yield to the

without losing one's sense of self.

Only then

can one know the other
er ln
in such
e „«v, a
,
way as to resist the
dominative relationship that
comes with positivist or
idealist forms of knowledge
which demand that the knowing
subject wrap its mind around
the known object or the other
and assume total knowledge.
For Adorno, this subject/knower
is more powerful, not more
resigned, in its contingency.
addition, this subject would
recognize that it too is an
object of knowledge to the other.
We should always already
be vulnerable to being seen and
transformed in relationships
to others

m

hin

kno led 9 e of the object is the act
in which
^ th veil
is saving around the
^.
obiect
T, can do this
object.
it
only where, fearlessly passive
it entrusts itself to its own
experience.
where subjective reason scents subjective In places
contingency
the primacy of the object is shimmering
through-whatever is in the object is not a subjective
admixture.
The subject is the object's agent, not its
constituent; this fact has consequences for the
relation of theory and practice. (Adorno, 1988:
506)
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For Adorno,

^

the critical issue is not who or which

social identity can know truth, but how truths that always

already exist for us in the social world can be unlocked
through constellations and how that interpretation can be

transformed into new social meanings.

"As for the

privileged character which rancor holds against

it,

truth

will lose that character when men stop pleading the

experiences they owe it to- -when they let it enter instead
into configurations and causal contexts that help to make it

113

evident or to convict it of
its failings."
1987:42)

(Adorno,

As discussed above, Adorno
argues for a subject that
recognizes its power of critique
in its contingency in
relation to the objects of
interpretation.
Those include
the various truths that emerge
in history which must be

deciphered and critiqued in relationship
to the objects they
claim to represent. Constellations
provide a metaphor for
this cognitive process that does
not deny the necessity to
identify and yet allows non-identity
perpetually to take

apart categories in an approach to freedom.

As cognitive

beings we must relentlessly place concepts in
relationship
to the object in order to decipher it instead
of identifying
it.

One must not only recognize the historicity of that

object, but remember one's own embeddedness in subjectivity,

that one's own subjectivity is affecting the knowledge

created
The history locked in the object can only be delivered
by a knowledge mindful of the historic positional value
of the^ object in its relation to other objects--by the
actualization and concentration of something which is
already known and is transformed by that knowledge.
Cognition of the object in its constellation is
cognition of the process stored in the object. As a
constellation, theoretical thought circles the concept
it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open
like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: in
response, not to a single key or a single number, but
to a combination of numbers. (Adorno, 1987:163)
Adorno'

s

perspectivism.

theory of constellations is not the same as
He is not arguing that there are many
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Afferent approaches to knowing
the object nor that there
are competing truth
claims about the object.
According to
the simple form of this
latter theory, competing
truth
claims are resolved on cne
the hs>
= = of
basis
power or instrumentality
which can be rendered
transparent through critique.
Neither
did constellations imply
« form of relativism because
Adorno, there are indeed
social and historical truths
to be
unlocked in objects, objects,
hoever, are not stable
-i

^

in

their historical constellation
of meanings.
Truths lie in
the performative process
of interpreting the positioning
of
objects in constellations, not
in the immediacy of the
object in-itself. Truths are
not discovered, but emerge as
one places ideas, objects or
moments in juxtaposition to one
another with the intent of interpreting
yet another idea
*
object or moment.
Truths,

for Adorno, are socially constructed,
but not

because of materialist interests that become
transparent to
a particular class.
Truths are complex phenomena
of the

social world; they exist but are never final.

in his

critique of metaphysics, Adorno makes clear that truths
exist in the world and affect it materially but cannot

represent it totally.

"Yet the surplus over the subject,

which a subjective metaphysical experience will not be
talked out of, and the element of truth in reity- -these two
extremes touch in the idea of truth.

For there could no

more be truth without a subject freeing itself from
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delusions than there could be
truth without that which is
not the subject, that in which
truth has its archetype."
(Adorno,

1987:375)

Truths, as the cognitive relationship

between the subject and the object,
are in flux and are
permeable
If Walter Benjamin was the
primary influence on

Adorno'

s

theory of constellations » in
Negative Dialectic

he looks to Max Weber to concretize
the theory.

Benjamin

influences Adorno to see the importance
of the idiosyncratic
and the unexpected aspects of the object
through the process
of interpretation.
The element of surprise, as if one were
shocking oneself into a realization about an
object,

is

critical to Benjamin's method of knowing within
the

conditions of modernity.

Benjamin juxtaposes the

constructed perspectives of many different, representative,
historical figures such as the flaneur (made famous by
Baudelaire)

the whore and the streetsweeper

called dialectical images.

,

to what he

"Benjamin's images functioned

like switches, arresting the fleeting phenomena and starting

thought in motion or, alternately, shocking through to a

standstill and setting the reified objects in motion by

causing them to lose their second-nature familiarity."
(Buck-Morss,

1977:106) But remember that for Benjamin,

the

experiences elicited through this were consumed in telling.

They could not live in the present, but only as the past.
They identify the experience being told through the process

of the story,

reconstituting it.

live in the present.

Adorno wants experience to

He theorizes a manner of
telling the

truth that tried to let the
particular survive the process
of objectif ication.

Adorno refers to the Weberian
"ideal type" to elaborate
his theory of constellations.
He argues that the concept
understood as an ideal type could be
used in constructing
constellations rather than being def initionally
embedded as
models in traditional social scientific
arguments about
cause and effect.
Rather than being used as static models
or categories in which to plug social
phenomena,
ideal types

become tools for unlocking the seemingly total
integration
of social elements in late modernity.

They function as

means to approach knowledge of the object.

Ideal types are

devoid of any inherent substantiality and potentially

reliquified at any moment.

Adorno'

s

theory of

constellations is an open-ended process of interpretation,
one in which nothing should be taken for granted and to

which there is not
shock,

a

of surprise,

static development. The element of
of being startled out of complacency so

as to avoid resting in second-nature interpretations of

history and of objects, is critical to Benjamin, Weber, and
Adorno.

Adorno'

dialectic,

s

theory,

however,

is grounded in the

the negativity of which prevents any assumed

reconciliation, but the form of which allows for

understanding the lived qualities of particular experience,
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the situatedness of the
Liie particular
narHnu^v.

m
•

a social world

organized through the identity
principle.
Adorno understands concepts
as historical images,
produced by human beings, which
can be placed in
relationship to an object in
order to center it and
illuminate its contradictory
positioning in a world
characterized by reification, the
exchange principle and
identity thinking.
-Authentic philosophic interpretation
does not meet up with a fixed
meaning which already lies
behind the question, but lights it up
suddenly and
momentarily, and consumes it at the same
time."

(Adorno,

1977 127)
:

Experience is always in the process of being
objectified.

it is not something possessed by a subject,

had by a group.

or

This offers us a sense of distance from it

which defends against the smothering identity principle
and
demands that time be taken, that the many-sidedness of

experience as an object be allowed to emerge and influence

interpretation
Contrary to what it has become, both in parody and in
its dogmatic petrification, dialectic does not mean
readiness to replace the meaning of one concept with
another illicitly obtained.
When the concept is
pinned down, that is, when its meaning is confronted
with what is encompassed by it, its nonidentity- -the
fact that the concept and the thing itself are not one
and the same- -becomes evident within the identity of
concept and thing that is required by the logical form
of definition.
The movement of the concept is not a
sophistical manipulation that would insert changing
meanings into it from the outside but rather the everpresent consciousness of both the identity of and the
inevitable difference between the concept and what it
.

118

.

.

is sup poRPri to exnrpqq

^^^^

=>

(AdornoTl992T7l7^iy emphasis)

Immanent critique and placing
concepts in
constellations in order to decipher
the truths in objects
(in experience) precludes
thinking in terms of 'escaping'
the totality.
Thinking on those terms perpetuates
definitional boundaries between
good and bad, between
freedom and bondage, between identity
and otherness, which
are the very oppositional categories
Adorno successfully
critiques.
For Adorno, total breaks, or escapes
are
impossible because the social world is
not final or thorough
in its ability to define and codify
lived experiences.

Attempts to break out or to escape to an
outside only serve
to reaffirm the definitional quality of
the dominant
structures of exchange.

Rather, we must see how knowing the

experience (the object) of others differently could

perpetually defer the collapsing of differences into
identitarian forms.

The experience of antagonisms and

irreducible differences, retains a critical function in
spite of the identitarian impulse.

These experiences can

create a different kind of social knowledge, one cognizant
of contradictions immanent in all social relationships.

Adorno argues that as cognitive subjects we must live
in the tension filled spaces at the edges of our particular

being in order to live in freedom with others.

Persistent

critique of the limits of one's own cognition may keep the
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moment of obj act if ication
temporary while sustaining the
distance that defeats the
smothering requirements of
sameness.
it will help us avoid
the reif ication of
difference as merely the flip
side of identity
or as a

generic space between
self-contained identities.
We need to develop a
politics of knowledge that
persistently and militantly critiques
the colonizing
tendencies of knowledge construction.

Unbroken and all too human slogans
lend themselves to
bStWee the SUbj ^ Ct and hat is not
its
"
Mke^Thina"
5 congeal? as fragments of that which was
subi^aJL
subjugated; to rescue it means to love
things
We
cannot eliminate from the dialectics
of the extant what
is experienced in consciousness
as an alien thing
negatively, coercion and heteronomy,
but
marred figure of what we should love, and also the
what the
spell, the endogamy of consciousness,
does not permit
us to love.
The reconciled condition would not
philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien be the
Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact
that the
alien,
the proximity it is granted, remains what
is
distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous
and
beyond that which is one's own. (Adorno, 1987:191)

m

For Adorno, resistance to the integrative forces of
the

world requires distance between self and object or other.
This is not the distance of disinterested objectivity, which

implies that as subjects we can remove the moment of

mediation from our relationship to others.

It is the

distance of respect, of identifying with rather than

identifying in the sense of classifying others into
immutable and therefore manipulable categories.

It is the

distance encouraged by the method of knowing in
constellations which perpetually illuminate those sides of
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the object, of the other,
that traditional means of knowing
disregard as a burden or as
insignificant to the conclusions
the knower is obliged to reach.
In a lecture on "The
Actuality of Philosophy" Adorno

argues,

"For the mind (Geist)

is indeed not capable of

producing or grasping the totality
of the real, but it may
be possible to penetrate the detail,
to explode in miniature
the mass of merely existing reality."
(Adorno 1977:133)

Unlike post-modern theory, Adorno
does not argue that
reality is something enacted through
linguistic
constructions.

On the other hand, he does not posit the

truth of reality as prior to historical
interpretation and
meaning.
He places reality and interpretation in
a

dialectical relationship, arguing for the immanence of
thought in reality and also of reality in thought.

Adorno 's

thinking functions more like a cipher than like a diagnosis:
He who interprets by searching behind the
phenomenal world for a world-in-itself which forms
its foundation and support, acts mistakenly like
someone who wants to find in the riddle the
reflection of a being which lies behind it, a
being mirrored in the riddle, in which it is
contained.
Instead, the function of riddlesolving is to light up the riddle, gestalt like
lightening and to negate it (auf zuheben)
not to
persist behind the riddle and imitate it. (Adorno,
,

1977 127)
:

What is it in Adorno 's theory that

politics possible?

I

would argue makes

His theory has helped me see the

importance of the different meanings with which we invest
the objects of political discourse at any given historical
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moment.

For example, women's experience
becomes

intrinsically political when it
illuminates in a broader
sense the integrative function
of norms, previously
invisible, which dictate gendered
identities and roles.
This makes it impossible for
those norms to function in the
same way or with the same legitimacy
as they did prior to
the exposure.
This politics does not depend upon the
collectivity of women as a monolithic
identity, but assumes
the relevance of creating meaning
through interpreting
specific experiences as gendered.
For Adorno, experience is interactive with
the

constellations of concepts, representational forms,
which
shape the possibilities of meaning.
argued:

As Peter Dews has

"One of the fundamental problems confronting post-

structuralist thought, therefore- -a problem which accounts
for many of its disinctive features--is how to reject

simultaneously both the repressive rigidities of selfconsciousness and conceptual thought and the available
dialectical alternatives

."

(Dews

,

Adorno shows how the

1989)

subject exists without hypostasizing it.

Post-structuralist

critique does not sustain the relational quality of
experience.

Rather than seeing experience as being in a

dialectical relationship to the possible forms of
representation, it comes to rest in a dependent relationship
to those forms in the deconstructive method of

interpretation.

(Scott,

1991)

Adorno'
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s

conception of

experience allows for recognition
of the qualitative and
critical nature of experience in
constructing meaning
without relying on identity logic
through reifying
experience as a necessary foundation
for truth.

Adorno shows us that delinking
historical experience
from claims to truth does not
necessitate the eradication of
the subjective moment from politics.
Further, arguing that
subjectivity is always already imbued with
and reproduced in
webs of power-suffused social relations
does not remove the
subject in itself from a politics of contestation.
I argue
this essential contestability is a function of
the prism of

experience
We too often assume a great distance between reality

and representation or narratives about that reality.
However,

lived experiences are translated as they are put

into political discourse.
be represented.

They are interpreted in order to

This process is one that can be intervened

in and struggled with politically.

Building a life together may be contingent upon some
shared meaning, but that does not exhaust the task of
politics.

Politics lies in the contestability of those

meanings and the process of producing them.

The idea that

we have to impute an essential nature or quality to the

subjects who struggle for recognition reflects dominant

biases about how lives have meaning and which experiences
count

.

The turn away from ontological standpoints and
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truth-telling subjects does not
defeat the possibility of
politics.
interpreting experience in
their constellations
of meaning is a contemplative,

reflexive project of

constructing political meaning.

it is political because
it

exceeds the terms of the
experience and the concepts we
begin with and alters them.

Adorno criticized any privileging
of the producing,
knowing subject. On the other hand,
he understood the
significance of subjectivity and did
not attempt to wipe it
clean of historical effectivity as
do some post-modern
critics of essentialism.
For Adorno,
there are traces of

recognition which offer temporary access
to critical
knowledge.
He argues that moments found in the
uniqueness
of experiential traces and knowledge of
difference
can

subvert the dominative logics of identity.

These traces,

placed in conceptual constellations, are no less
significant
for critique for not being foundational.

The relevance of Adorno'
theory,

s

work,

and much of Critical

for feminism has been recognized insofar as as

concerns about the relationship between women's oppression
and the domination of nature.

Feminists have shown in many

different ways how the repression of "woman" and the
"feminine" represents the denial of nature and the

catastrophe of historical progress.

Modern Western thought

consistently looks to woman as representative of what is

necessarily private, natural and pre-rational
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.

The

Hegelian-Marxian tradition has
been shown to be no less
biased in its perspectives on
public and private lives and
the contribution of each
to history.

Women only become

histories] actors if and when
they enter the sphere of
public production; there is
nothing specific to gendered
lives that has anything to do
with historical change.

Critical theory calls attention to
the crises of modern
subjectivity, challenging the concept
of Reason as an

emancipatory tool of conquest over
necessity by a unified,
self -knowing subject.
Through these theoretical
moves,

it

contributes to challenges to the notion of
the unified
Subject and examines the ego-centric identity
development of
the individual as always interrupted by that
which is

inaccessible to instrumental reason.

Rather than assuming

the suffering of nature as a residual effect of
historical

progress, as do many Hegelian-Marxian theories of history,

Adorno argues that the persistence of the dialectic, the

domination of nature in history, defies closure in identity.
I

attempt to advance these important insights with an

inquiry into how Adorno might be relevant to urgent

questions raised in contemporary feminist theory and

politics about identity.

Adorno'

s

work did not develop in a

linear fashion; it is difficult to argue that any concept,

including experience, is used consistently across his works.
However, his critical theory of totality in modernity as

legislated by Reason and identity logic, is relevant to
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feminists concerned with
politicizing knowledge in a world
apparently fragmented and contingent,
yet thoroughly
suffused with relations of
domination and power.
For
Adorno, i argue, totality is
not final.
it is not a selfcontained apparatus operating out
of the reach of
individuals,
it remains in a state of
antagonism with its
own terms of existence.
It is non-identical with its
objects.
Thus, while as subjects we cannot
willfully step
outside of the terms of its logic, we
can potentially
subvert its terms where its limits become
identified as such
through interpretation of experience. There
is always a

constitutive outside to any system.
is to bear witness to its boundaries,

The project of critique
to make them visible

and thus to denaturalize the givenness or common sense
status of subject /object, man/nature, self /other relations
of dominance.

This is where experience and the

constellatory quality of Adorno'

s

thought precludes

reductionist causal or structural analysis in interpreting
the meaning of experience.
Part of the project of feminism must be the creation of

recognized meanings for women's experience in the world.
This is a necessary part of political work, to develop
fields of representation through which the multiplicities of

women's experience can be understood.

No singular cause or

structural law exhaustively represents the meaning of any

particular experience.

My concern with discussing

experience and interpretation is
not to argue that feminism
will render the world transparent
to knowing subjects.
Nor
is it to reduce diverse,

heteronomous experiences to

parsimonious explanations.

The point of constellational

interpretation is to open up the field of
representation to
possibilities that will enhance self\other
understanding and
oppose the enclosure of critique in self-contained
categories or some form of inter-subjective synthesis.
Walter Benjamin argues,

intention."

in other words,

"truth is the death of
no truth claim about an

experience will completely or finally represent the
intention of a teller.

The truths we develop in the world

are always larger than the sum of the aggregate parts of
discourse, whether that discourse is conflictual or

consensual.

Ideas circulate through the social world,

are not settled or self -legislating in their meaning.

they
This

is why the image of constellations is so compelling for

thinking about a process of interpretation and the creation
of feminist meaning in the world.

It offers more than

liberal theory in that truth is not simply the better

knowledge that emerges through willful challenges and 'openended'

discourse.

And it offers more than deterministic

theories which search out the underlying structural laws
that drive knowledge claims attached to the interest of a

particular class or social group.

"Truths" will not

ultimately be transparently proven to be driven by
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particular (even if ideologically
unacknowledged)
intentions.
Experience has too often been understood by
feminists to be something one can own,
or a substance that
inhabits our consciousness as ontological
source material.

Consciousness-raising was premised on the right of
the
individual to interpret her experience in
a safe setting,

free of judgement and often free of
challenge.

As Black

feminists and lesbians began to challenge the
meanings

applied to women's experience in the world by white,
heterosexual feminists, it was no longer progressive to
see

feminism as singularly mapped onto the axis of gender as a
system of domination.

Instead,

feminist thought has been

emerging and exanding through engagement with internal
differences among women.

Feminist theory has become

increasingly situationally grounded and contextual as shown
in the discussion of standpoint epistemology

.

We can take

this tendency in a direction that does not lead us into the

aporias of identity thinking through looking again at

Adorno's theory.
How do constellations work as a political theory of
interpretation?
as events,

Various experiences should be thought about

rather than presumed to represent a collective

experience prior to interpretation.

collectivity of experience.

Women,

This is not to deny the
for example, have the

experience and the fear of sexual violence in common in the

United States.

However,

the meanings attached to the
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experience, how it is represented
to women (never only
autonomously by women) and the fears
of being a victim will
not necessarily fall out in common
cause.
The differences
between white and black women in thinking
about
rape,

particularly inter-racial rape, may be as
significant for
any program of social change as the
description
of the

experience being held in common at any given
time.

Rather

than seeing all violence against women as existing
on a

continuum and revolving on the limited axis of gender
identity, violences should be pluralized to allow the

multiplicity of meanings to emerge.

Finding ways to speak

about rape is critical to ending it.

But understanding the

contextual meanings of rape to be plural rather than

dependent upon one causal moment proliferates the

opportunities for intervention and prevention.
Adorno's negative dialectics argues experience to be a
sensuous,

interpretive relationship to the world without

essentializing it as a kind of property of the self.
Experience is always already social; it is simultaneously
our contact with the world and the prism through which we

interpret the world.

It should therefore hold a place in

feminist thought as an object of dialectical interpretation.
27

It should not be thought of as a subjective as opposed

to objective source of knowledge.

Nor should it be

understood to unilaterally determine perspective.
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Adorno's theory of negative dialectics
contributes an
incisive social critique of identity thereby
challenging it
as a grounds for feminist politics.

His dialectical notion

of experience sustains the feminist
insights about the

personal and the political without collapsing one into
the
other.

We should not demand experience be enclosed within

identity logic in order to act politically.

Much of what

I

have argued about Adorno's work points

us in the direction of post-modern theories of

representation.

In order to better situate his work in the

context of feminist debates about identity,

I

look next at

how feminists have taken up the challenge of post-modern

critique to recast 'the political' and questions about

representation
Adorno's critique of epistemology and of the imperative
for identity between subject and object foregrounds the

terms of contemporary debates about identity politics.
the next chapter,

I

In

cast these debates in terms of what

theorists say is necessary for politics to happen given the

fragmented state of the world.
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CHAPTER IV

PERFORMATIVITY AND THE HABITUAL
SUBJECT
Post-modern feminists argue
that feminist appeals to
reality and experience as
a source of truth limit
rather
than expand the possibilities
of politics.
Women, as
political actors, must accept
the inevitability of
contingency and interpretation,
(see esp

Brown,

1991)

.

Scott,

1993

;

Appealing to claims to truth regarding
women's

lives empties feminism of political
content,

leaving it in

the perpetually anachronistic
position of arguing over

metanarratives and laws of history rather
than taking a
willful stand within the historical present.
Max Weber
argued in "Politics as a Vocation" that in
conditions of
modernity, politics becomes a "battle among
gods on earth,

detached from truth, but nonetheless invested with meaning.
(Weber,

1964)

For post -moderns

,

however, once one accepts

that meaning is created by Man on earth,

it is reactionary

to take the leap of faith Weber advocated to combat the

devils of contingency and relativism in a disenchanted
world.

Politics is defined by those devils now and

feminists need to kick the modern habit of asserting

correspondences between experience and truth.

They need to

learn to engage on the always moving battlegrounds produced

through historically contingent power relations.
to Wendy Brown,

According

"For the political making of a feminist

future, we may need to loosen our historically feminized
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attaChmSntS

S°

"^-ctivlty

a„ d mo rality, and re(Jress

_

historicaHy underdeveloped
taste for political
argument

we may need to learn
public speaking and the
pleasures of
public argument, not to
overcome our situatedness
but to
assume responsibility for
our situations as well as
to
acqurre perspective and
aspxre to possibilities that
expand
them." (Brown, 19 91;81
This claim Qf post . modern
,

,

theory warrants further
examination.
What does Brown mean
by "assume responsibility"
and "aspire to possibilities

that

expand [our situations]"?
A common claim of post-modern
theory is that textual or
discursive representations of
selves has a constitutive
effect on modern subjectivity.
Thus, for feminism, the
sexual, racial and gendered
imaginings of modernity can be
shown to have importantly differentiated
effects on how
women are represented in the world.
From this perspective,
the social world is thought of as a
weave of texts

constitutive of everyday, normalizing patterns
of behavior
and identification.
Feminist interpretation can show the

multiplicity of ways in which this weave of social
texts
creates gender as

a self

-stabilizing effect

thinking of gender itself as

a cause)

(rather than

of certain

power\knowledge regimes
The destabilization of these regimes would then

constitute the political project of feminism for post-modern
theorists.

As

I

will discuss, post-modern feminists argue

that in order to engage
politically we must find the
fissures in dominative
efforts that proscribe the
project of
being women in the world.
They place the tropes of
"difference.- and "perf
ormativity - in opposition to
identity
in order to reconfigure
the complexly mediated
relationship
between being and forms of
resistance.
Post-modern theories
of this relationship
are radically anti-ontological
with
regard to being, and place
resistance as always already
within constitutive relations
of power.
Thus, feminists who
engage with post-modern theory
critique discursive regimes
of power\knowledge (particularly
those about sex)
Some
study how representative discursive
regimes of power place
the feminine as an object within
a phallogocentric hierarchy
that denies the feminine its
autonomy or intrinsic value.
(Braidotti, 1991; Jardine, 1986).
.

For post-modern feminists, identity
is thoroughly

contingent; the "concrete-, or "real" self
posited by

socialist feminists is political "all the way down";
its

possibilities for being in the world are constituted
through, not in spite of, power relations.

Gendered

identity is so deeply embedded in the normalizing axes of

domination and power that the mechanisms of everyday life
are implicated in the sustenance of the social world.
the association of daily life, sensuous activity,

Thus,

identity

and political empowerment argued by socialist feminists may

actually undermine the goal of exposing how gendered habits
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and .ores are enforced
by various systgms
Qf
arguing women's social
posi tio nali ty as the
foundation for
political activity, socialist
feminism may be rewriting
£he
scrrpt of women's
subordination. The assertion
that ..
knowing self is discoverable
if „ e remove the
distorting
oppressions of patriarchal
domination forecloses,

^

for
example, on the possibilities
that emerge with inquiry
into
women's varied parMcipation
(not necessarily a willful
participation) in discursive
regimes of sexuality. »
Post-modern feminists attempt
to move feminism beyond
ideology critique. The truth
of the subject's knowledge
or
consciousness is not ideologically
distorted or complexly

mediated by the social world;
discursive regimes (speech)
actually position the subject
as a subject.
(Fuss,

Spivak,

i 989;

1982)

Rather'than engaging in the discovery
or
recovery of subjectivity, it is the
subject's emergence into
discourse that we must study for
political insights into how
relations of power and dominance work.
Thus,

a critical theory of the representation
of

gendered identities considers how they are
produced through
power relations over time and space.
Post-modern

feminisms

consider how to disidentify from and disrupt
the constraints
and habits that reiterate the terms of social
domination.

As

I

will show in a discussion of Judith Butler's theory
of

drag as a

subversive practice, this is often a process

contingent upon interpretation and perspective rather than
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on an obvious or

undated

'

quality of the performance

itself.

This renders the
possibility of prior commitments
to particular political
agendas unstable at best
and a
reactionary longing at worst.
As

noted earlier, post-modern
feminists place
questions about difference
at the center of their work.
The
value of arguing for the
-we., of feminism is
not necessarily
denied, but the political
value of the "we" becomes part
of
the question rather than
a presupposition.
I

(Riley,

Flax,

1989;

will the positing of woman or
even women as
knowing subjects only succeed in
reiterating the terms of
1989)

representation that generated feminist
critique in the first
place? (Butler, 1990) Does it
unjustly reduce and distort
the textured quality of women's
lives and the differences
among them? The historical pursuit of
sisterhood and
identification among women on the basis of
common
differences from men, has been shown to be
untenable for
women of color and working class women whose
lived
experiences of oppression are not reducible to a
self-

contained gendered analysis.

with respect to the question

of the "we", black feminists and third-world
feminists

critique the assumptions of white feminists regarding the

significance of racial, ethnic and class differences among

women and among women and men.
1991)

(Anzaldua,

1993; Mohanty,

For example, black women's history of slavery tells

feminism that the idealized, representative images of
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"woman" as particular kinds
of sexual objects or as
particular kinds of mothers holding
together the nuclear
family, have little to do
with the specific expectations
most women experience in their
communities. 29 it is clear
that the grounds for feminist
theory and the self-

understanding of white feminists is
radically challenged,
not merely altered or expanded
by anti-racist and postcolonialist critiques. The project must
be to reconsider
the epistemological\political commitments
and interpretive

methods of feminism, not merely to include
different women
in feminist theorizing or to expand its
explanatory
capacities to Black and third-world women's lives.
1991/ Mohanty,

1991; Spelman,

1989)

challenge the very search for the we.

(Trinh,

The project must
I

think many ideas of

post-modern feminisms contribute to this project but will
suggest some ways their approaches come up short

strategically and politically in light of demands for antiracist, post-colonialist feminist politics.

The dialogue between post-modern theory and feminism
has contributed to the political project of

reconceptualizing relations of power and domination among
women.

Feminist attention to post-modern critiques of the

unified subject and ontological or phenomonological accounts
of domination and power encourages carefully nuanced and

specific discussions of difference and identity.

It

furthers the unearthing and denaturalizing of gender

politics as it is imbricated
and implicated in the
multiplicity of systems of
domination.
Theorizing the
subject and gender as political
effects rather than as
sources of ontological certainty
directs us to theorize
difference as effectively subversive
of multiple, dominative
norms rather than as the obverse
of identity among priorly
individuated subjects. »
other words, once we are no
longer wedded to stability and unity
as subjects we expand
our possibilities for acknowledging
the multiplicity

m

of

subversive political practices among differently
situated
actors.
However, I will argue that if we are to move

politically in conditions of post-modern fragmentation
and
uncertainty, we still need to be able to articulate our
reasons to make judgements about differences and how they

matter even if we no longer wish to appeal to modernist
versions of Reason to make those judgements.
"Difference theory" emerged as feminists theorized the

effects of dualist sex\gender systems.
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But the project

of writing the multiplicity that is women into an

emancipatory or, as Drucilla Cornell (1992) boldly calls it,
Utopian discourse of sexual difference needs a much more

complicated mode of interpretation.

Otherwise, one

difference becomes the difference that matters for the
continued life and survival of feminism; the future of

feminism becomes telescoped through sexual difference.
critique of the subject must not proceed only from the
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The

'

assertion that the subject
is always already male.
All
other inquiry into the status
of subjectivity, the
complexities of which should be
central to feminist work,
will instead be derivative
if this is the starting point.
"Others" become, no matter what
their particular history,
femininized and chains of equivalency
are set up among and
around oppressions.
Specific arguments about the effects of
racism in feminist theory and politics
become faint shadows
within the discursively overdetermined
processes of sexual
differencing. 32
Feminist political theory must theorize
the specific

negotiations made necessary within feminism by
the multiple
and often immanently contradictory political
commitments of
all women.

The absorption of feminism under the discursive

symbolics of dualist sexual difference otherwise precludes

attention to very specific and deeply historical tensions in

feminism around women's differences.

multiplicity is

For women of color,

a historical experience specific to their

condition of subordination and to their terms of resistance.
It is not the result of recently issued invitations to write

themselves into history through the junctures opened up by a
crisis of Western cultural identity vis-a-vis the unified

subject and humanist philosophies.

33

Arguments initiated

by women of color over the terms of feminist struggle
reflect historical, material and symbolic differentials in

privilege among women and persistently prohibit any easy
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answers about the parameters
DaramptPrc of feminism as a
project.
My
focus is on the post-modern
theory that encourages the
strategic articulation of how and
where differences matter
in a constellational process
of creating politicized
knowledge about women's lives.
•

The post -structuralist theory
of Michel Foucault 34
offers insights into power and
resistance and the
disciplinary qualities of modern social
life which disrupt
historic assumptions in feminism about
the politics of the

Subject and differences.

Theories that emerged as feminists

took on the challenge Foucault 's work issues
vis-a-vis the
subject and power will be the focus of this chapter.
Foucault produced complex genealogies of politically

marginal sites of social life such as the constitution
of
madness and criminality.

His work attempts the "critical

ontology" of a present he argues is constituted through

multiple power\knowledge regimes that shape the
possibilities of the self and subjectivity.

35

His analyses

of the relationships between power, knowledge and resistance

are meant to expose the historical practices of our present.
Foucault contributes
feminism.
theory.

a

relational theory of power to

He does not accept the closures of identity
He builds his critique around the coercive,

disciplinary practices that result from modernity's
insufficiencies vis-a-vis identity and difference.

In

addition, his work explicitly calls for the transgressions
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of limits as a necessary
quality of resistance.

One limit

factor he points to are the
limitations of "criticalinquiries which seek to establish
once and for all the most
likely cause or the best
explanation for phenomenon.
He
displaces the pursuit of cause
and effect explanations for
the vagaries of modern
subjectivity and social life with
inquiries into how medical,
psychoanalytic, scientific and
humanist discourses are constructed
and deployed in
modernity.
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With feminism, Foucault refutes the
epistemological

claim that the Truth is made accessible or
even that better
truths are accumulated over time through
positivist or
humanist sciences and philosophy.

However,

Foucault, unlike

standpoint feminists, believes the pursuit of truth is
never
innocent or outside of the terms of historical relationships
of power.
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Foucault argues for a relational theory of

power that makes impossible any presumption of the innocence
or ontological purity of any subject.

He argues we must

resist the tendency to assume the autonomy or agency of any

particular subject without taking into consideration the
historicity of the very intelligibility of that subject
position.

Foucault 's argument implicates the identity

politics of standpoint theory in a politics of

representation that calls subjectivities to order in a
process of normalization.

What many feminists have taken

from his work is the seemingly simple, but difficult to
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remember, point that what we
assume is true or real should
always be open to the question
of how it becomes true or
real.

it is through this process
of critique that acts

which wil] be transgressive
or subversive of the »real'
become intelligible or available
to interpretation.
Foucault's genealogical perspective
on the subject in
history does not deny the presence
of the subject in
modernity; it understands it as a
production of discursive,
thoroughly historical, relations of
power that allow the
subject to emerge as an intelligible
object of inquiry.
find Foucault's attention to "the event"
and his
argument that we must remain locally committed
in the social
practice of interpretation particularly valuable. 38
For
example, gender, if assumed as an unquestioned
conceptual
I

starting point, is not local enough.

It is too ladened with

differences and is clearly not a seamless social project
across time and cultures.

Particular events may become

significant through gender analysis in irreducibly different
ways than they were understood before, but they do not then

accumulate as a final answer to the question of what gender
(or feminism,

for that matter)

as a phenomenon.

is in itself as a system or

Anti-racist and post -colonialist feminisms

have convincingly shown how "gender" understood through

Western eyes is insufficient for interpreting the lives and
experience of non-Western women and coming to terms with
difference in feminism.

(Mohanty,

141

et.al.

1991)

Thus

Foucault's work speaks to
feminist debates about the
politics of identity and
difference and questions about
the
status of the authorizing
voices of feminism.

Judith Butler's theory of
identity as habituated
performances continues Foucault's
work to break down
assumptions about authenticity
vis-a-vis gender identity and
feminism.
Butler's work encourages a spirit of
experimentation.

she argues the fragmentary, contingent,

non-innocent qualities of feminist subjects
of power in
post -modernity.
with other post-modern feminist

theorists,

she argues that we remain in the
position of interpreting

meaning,

judging what to do, and negotiating over
what
differences matter when- -even as we give up
claims to truth
and authentic knowledge about our deep selves.

discussion of Adorno's work,

I

In my

argued that the normative

points of reference for this politics are the somatic

qualities of self\other relations which offer guidance in

assessing practices of resistance and subversion.

I

discussed the dialectics of experience and how they move us
forward from the static qualities of standpoint theory.
Here

I

further situate my critique of feminist identity

theory by considering Judith Butler's use of perf ormativity
as a counter to identity claims in feminism.

I

examine the

political messages in her texts.
Butler argues that feminist identity politics mirror
rather than subvert the constraints of the politics of
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representation within which
feminism (necessarily) operates
Feminist identity claims
place women as either powerless

in

the context of patriarchy
and in need of proper
representation, or powerful
because they can escape or
displace from outside its
borders patriarchy's terms of
representation.
she describes the conundrum of

representation in feminism as
follows':
Is the construction of
the category of women as a
coherent and stable subject an
unwitting regulation and
reif ication of gender relations?
...
To what extent
does the category of women achieve
stability and
Ce nly
e C ° ntSXt of the heterosexual
matrix? T ? a stable notion of
gender no longer proves
,
foundatlonal Premise of feminist politics,
oerhL^ a new sort of feminist politics
perhaps
is now
le t0 co * test th e very reification
?S!if??
identity, one that will take the variable of gender and
construction
of identity as both a methodological
and normative
prerequisite, if not a political goal. (Butler,
1989:5)

"

t\^

Judith Butler theorizes perf ormativity as a way
of
confronting this politics of identity and
representation in
feminism.
She argues it moves feminism beyond the time-worn
debate about constructionism vs determinism in identity
theory.
theory,

These arguments, as developed within feminist
fail to account for the complexity of

*

subject

positions' as sites of action constructed through discursive

regimes of power.
free,

Constructionism implies an otherwise

self -determining or at least relatively autonomous

subject.

If the female subject is constructed,

the feminist

task is to discover the possibilities of a true self that

always already lies beyond the construction.
143

If the subject

is determined,

it is less free,

called into being through a

set of prior constraints that
are not challenged by any
notion of agency or will.
Butler argues that the notion of

performativity better captures the
process through which
subjecthood is assumed. She argues:
The ^performative' dimension of
construction is
precisely the forced reiteration of norms.
In this
sense then, it is not only that there
are constraints
to performativity; rather, constraint
calls to be
rethought as the very condition of performativity
Performativity is neither free play nor
self -presentation; nor can it be simply theatrical
equated with
performance.
Moreover, constraint is not necessarily
that which sets a limit to performativity;
constraint
is, rather, that which impels and
sustains
performativity. (Butler, 1993:94-95)
Thus, performances are ritualized and produced
through

constraints, none of which is fully determinant of the
shape
of the production.

(Butler,

1993:95)

Performance is not

the expression of an identity that exists prior to

articulation; it is the appearance which will tell us what
we can know about the subject.

We should not hope for any

more truthful identity to be discovered through revelation.
We can, however,

search out those practices that expose

identity norms as acts that are delimited in a temporal and
social sense.

Practices which disallow the complacency of

identity are more valuable to a radical democratic politics
than practices that reiterate naturalized, always already

gendered qualities of social life.
Butler argues that modernist feminisms participate in

affirming the habits of gender identity through starting
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from the subject positions
proscribed by heterosexualist
demands.
On the one hand, Butler
points out that women's
desire may not be o^oloaically
distinct from paternal
power.
women's "true" desire will
not be discovered in the
imaginary beyond the present
or have a pure existence; it is
a product as well as an
object of paternal
power.

On the

other hand, no power, including
patriarchy, is capable of
the total interpellation of
subjectivity.
There are always
fissures and disjunctures between
hegemonic power and the
resulting identitarian forms. >
Thus, the subversive
quality of any act or principle will
exist in relation to
the heterosexualist principle, not
prior to it in some
originary state waiting to be recuperated.
(Butler 1990 93
,

:

To clarify this argument, Butler shows
how Julia Kristeva's

critique of the paternal law, in which she deploys
the
figure of the lesbian, reinstates the perspective
of

patriarchy.

Kristeva places the figure of the lesbian as

strictly at odds with paternal desire.

She projects the

lesbian as "Other to culture, and characterizes lesbian
speech as the psychotic whirl -of -words
reading,

.

"

In Butler's

the lesbian is thus ^merely' the psychotic

production of the law of the father and is therefore
radical identity in itself.
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a

"This tactical dismissal

and reduction of lesbian experience performed in the name of
the law positions Kristeva within the orbit of the paternal

heterosexual privilege."

(Butler,
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1990:87)

Butler

continues:

"Significantly, this
description of lesbian
experience is affected
and tells us more
about the fantasies that
a fearful heterosexual
culture
produces to defend against
its own homosexual
possibilities
than about lesbian
experience itself... (Butler,
1990:8 7,
other words,
s, tor
for Butler,
rhh ot k~
being a lesbian is not
subversive
because heterosexual culturp
f oare H
icure fears
th, e presence and identity
of lesbians as totally
outside the norms of cultural
hegemony.
That would imply that lesbians
are only what

toa^^

m

.

•

heterosexualist projections say they
are, binding the
qualities of lesbian sexuality
to the symbolic
identifications of paternal law. The
heterosexualist
duality of sex and gender become
final in this

formulation,

with heterosexualism on the inside
and lesbianism on the
outside as two distinct and mutually
exclusive rather than
mutually constitutive possibilities.
Butler goes on to argue what "lesbian
experience
itself" represents as a subversive act;
she argues how
lesbian sexuality can be read as subversive
without

reiterating the terms of heterosexualist dualisms.

Lesbian

identification may or may not subvert the limits of
heterosexualist symbolics of desire.

Lesbian sexuality does

not exist outside of the terms of constitutive power-in
fact,

no practice exists totally outside cultural hegemony

or the norms of daily life.

"If subversion is possible it

will be a subversion from within the terms of the law,
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through the possibilities
that emerge when the law
tuirns
against itself and spawns
unexpected permutations of
itself." (Butler, 1990;93)
Much of Butler's work is devoted
to theorizing those
"unexpected permutations." she
relies
on Foucault, but also on
phenomenology and post -Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory to develop
the thesis of

performativity which allows the space
for unexpected
permutations to emerge and political
subversions to be cast
through interpretive action.
In Butler's theory identity
and essence are rendered

thoroughly mutable.

They are thus potentially more free

than any identity theory allows.

In fact,

identity theory

or even theory that relies on bodily
essence or behaviors as
given preclude the recognition of innumerable
radical (and

unpredictable and risky) possibilities for the subversion
of
the normalizing demands of power.
How does this then
translate into a politics? What are the implications of
thinking of every permutation of identity, even that of
the
body,

as a potentially subversive,

historicized appearance

rather than as a foundational or at least structuring

principle of social life?
Feminists often argue for pragmatic, rationalist and

protective responses to the "real" vulnerability of woman's
body and the oppressive "material" aspects of women's lives.
Butler critiques this, implying it is a retreat from
politics into the truthfulness of
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"a

body that experiences."

It places that experience
outside of the terms of
production

«

discourse.

she argues that the
female and male body is
always already encoded by,
among other things, the

regulatory constructions of
sex.
constructs punitive measures

The social world

to enforce properly gendered,

heterosexual identities,

while agreeing with Foucault
about
the discursive construction
of identity, Butler shows how
even Foucault privileges the
body that experiences
as

somehow prior to the cultural
imprints that make its sex
intelligible.
His use of the diaries
of Herculine,

the

French androgyne, to express the
purity of pleasure of an
ambiguously sexed physical being fails
to take into account
the tragic quality of gender enforcement.
(Foucault,
1980)

Butler argues that Herculine'

s

body is what the social world

makes of it, not a pre-social site of
pleasure that becomes
other under society's imprints.
"She" becomes gendered man
in spite of her desire to live as a woman who
loves
women.

"She" is not in an unintelligible state of polymorphous

sexuality or merely androgynous, as Foucault says, nor is
her sexuality comfortably ambivalent prior to the social

operations that make her into a man.
is always already there for bodies,

The gender imperative
it is not imprinted on

otherwise "polymorphous," ambivalent flesh.

In light of

this thoroughly enculturated quality of the body, Butler

critiques all appeals to identity as even minimally settled

within the confines of biological or material "realities."
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As pointed out above,
Butler is particularly
concerned

with reclaiming marginalized
sexualities as critically
subversive of heterosexualist
systems of power.
However,
she rejects the claims of
outsider status for these
sexualities made by some feminists.
instead Butler argues
that lesbian women may reflect,
through the rituals and
practices that constitute their
identities as lesbian,
the

productive
hegemony.

opposed to the merely repressive) power
of
They may or may not, given the
circumstance,
(as

represent 'unexpected permutations'
of naturalized
heterosexualrst assumptions.
In other words, Butler does
not think lesbian existence can
remove itself from those
assumptions through claiming either the
purity of

identificatory relations among women

42

or practices that

are ontologically out of the reach of
heterosexualist

expectations.

43

Butler argues that lesbians should be

self-consciously anti-gender as a systemic constraint on
their identities; but they will not achieve a transcendence
of gender through androgynous combinations of masculine
and

feminine traits or by assuming an already freer identity

outside of heterosexualist culture.

In other words,

they

should not remain ontologically committed to gendered traits
as they are presently written into the world.

"Only from a self-consciously denaturalized position

can we see how the appearance of naturalness is itself

constitutive."

(Butler 1990 110)
,

:
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Butler looks for the

extra-ordinary instances
of1 action t-h^
that a
de-naturali.ze
everyday gendered life,
not to consolidate them
i,
.nto a
-herent political program
or blueprint for liberation,
but
to interpret them as
exposure that
w
t-^=- bear
exposures
witness to how the
conventional is constituted
as natural." Butler asks
that
we cease to assume in
advance a binary sexed
identity and
ask instead, what is at
stake in sustaining binary
sexed
identities.
Through looking at "deviance"
from those sexed
identities differentlv
at
ently, ae
as at
least Partially constitutive
of rather than outside the
terms of the normal,
-

n

we can

approach an understanding of
what is at stake in holding the
oppositions steady. We may then
begin to undermine
commitments to the proper performance
of gender and thus to
the prohibitive and repressive
constraints that heterosexist
gendered life sustains.
Butler's argument does not render gender
any less
effective as a structuring principle of life
and experience.
In a critique of Butler's thesis of
perf ormativity

Christine Distefano rejects the option to understand
gender
as performance,
a

arguing that gender is better understood as

deeply historicized, effectively determining,

generalizable quality of social life.

Distefano makes a

normative judgement about the thesis of perf ormativity
representing a playful attitude, one dangerously less
serious about its commitments to social change than

materialist social analysis that assumes its generalizations
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to be recognizable in
the world as it is.

(Distefano,

1991)

DxStefano implies that
Butler's work signifies a
retreat
from normative theory
about gender.
However, Butler never
claims that gender is not
a deeply structuring
and
generalise quality of social life.
Nor does she argue
that it is declining in
significance as freely constituted
sexual deviance and gender-bending
practices proliferate.
Rather, she wants to interrupt
the persistant tendency
toward thinking about gender
as determinate and society
(patriarchy)

as an immutable object to
which options of

resistance are exhausted by assuming
an insider or an
outsider status. « She wants to make
the demands of any
dualist understanding of gender strange
and unfamiliar in
order to expose them to reflection and
subversion.

The thesis of perf ormativity is the pivot
upon which
Butler turns away from identity theory in constructing
a

feminist theory of gender.

The argument that gender is

constituted through performance is not original to Butler.
It has been made vis-a-vis the distinct practice of

theatrical performance.

Jill Dolan has similarly argued

that gender is performance in that it has no ontological

resting place before the representationalist practices of
social life.

Dolan adopts a post -Lacanian critical

perspective on the feminine as represented as the absence of

masculine desire.

She argues a feminist interpretation of

theatrical performances should set itself to examine how the
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^

femxn.ne is configured only
in terms of the paternal
Qf
symbolic identification. Thus,
in the performance that
is
gender, we should encourage
alternative representations of
women as subjects of dramatic
art, rather than merely as
objects of masculinist desire.
(Dolan,
1989; Dolan,

ed.

Butler expands this thesis
beyond the proscenium and
beyond Lacan, making the Shakespearean
adage
1992)

that all the

world is a stage (managed but
not determined by paternal
laws of identification) into a
theory of politics.
Butler's
thesis thus faces the potentiality
of aestheticizing
political life, of turning it all into
a play of willed
performances.
However, she avoids this move, arguing
that
the thesis of performativity is not like
a staged
"performance".

She offers insight into what is at stake
in

arguments about "reality" as immutable and
"performance" as
merely imitative.
In other words, Dolan argues that

representations of the feminine in the theater reflects how
women are expected to "be" in the world.

Butler does not

differentiate between the theatre as a site of performance
and the social world as

prosecnium as

a site of

a distinct line

"being."

She removes the

between performance and

reality and argues the social world to be constituted
through a series of performances.

Butler uses the aesthetic

form as a metaphor for rather than as a reflection of how
"reality" works.

Butler's work.

Realities are constituted as "acts" in

(Butler,

1993)

These acts, as in the Acts of
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traditional dramatic forms
S

n 3 , 0 action
,
Place
within constraining
thereby producing meaning
and coherence.
i

'

forms,

Butler argues, against
the expressive politics
central
to the pract.ces of
radical feminism, that
there is no truer
or better identity in
us waiting to be
discovered.
"Women"
for example, may become
more visible through
political
struggles, as have "lesbians".
However, what becomes
visible is not an unchanging
truth about woman
or even

multiple truths about women.

what becomes visible is an

effect of discourse and remains
"essentially" subject to
interpretation.
it is subject to the
conditions of
possibility which created the
terrain of emergence in the
first place.
For Butler, there is no essentially
gendered
subject prior to the performance
of gender.
For her, what
emerges and congeals as the truth
of identity is thoroughly
contingent upon interpretation.
In other words, we identify
in particular ways because of the
constraints
of

representation.

Our identities have no ontology prior to

the acts and modes of representation in which
we are

embedded.
Thus,

Butler argues that the boundaries of any system

will not become transparent to particular revolutionary

perspectives while remaining opaque to others.

In response

to Monique Wittig's theory that revolutionizes lesbian

existence as the ultimate mode of resistance, Butler argues
that it is logically impossible that heterosexuality is
153

radically determined,
completely compulsory and
nonvolitional while lesbian
sexuality is somehow more
free of
determinant structures
structurpq or norms.
Butler does not think
there is this radical
disjuncture between compulsory
heterosexuality and homosexuality.

^

m

addition,

she

critxques the theory of
heterosexuality as a compulsory
system developed by lesbian
and feminist theorists as
diverse as Adrienne Rich,
Monique Wittig and Catharine
MacKinnon.
instead, Butler argues there
are psychic
affinities that cross the fictive
boundary between these
sites of sexual identity.
In other words, homosexuality
is
ritualized and riven with power
relations that also weave
through heterosexuality and constitute
the possibilities of
its existence.
This does not make it the
same as

heterosexuality, it does imply that homosexuality
in itself,
as an identity, is always already
constructed in part
through the terms of hegemonic heterosexuality.
The

political trick is to expose the norms of exclusion
that
operate within heterosexuality to degrade homosexuality
to

outsider status, not to claim a purity or coherence to

homosexuality in-itself.

This poses a threat to the

stability of heterosexualism and therefore potentially opens
up possibilities for movement beyond its dualisms.
Further, Butler does not disagree with the project of

unearthing gay and lesbian historical lives.

Because of

certain historical periods when homosexuality has been
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necessary
invisible,

clandestine, and lesbian
existence
the signals put out
about

idenfcity

are consciously ritualized.

^^^^

xhey constitute an

cultural world and make
possible claims about a
distinct
history o f lesbian culture. «
Butler does disagree with
the use of this project
to determine the essential
truths
about lesbian existence «
and the terms of lesbian
identity. « Unlike many
lesbian

^

does not think the political
value of asserting the
cultural/historical consistency
of gay life lies in its
consolidation alongside heterosexuality
as a legitimate
identity choice. Habits and
rituals of identity formation
take on naturalized qualities
as they exist over time.
This
is a danger, not necessarily
the strength of gay and lesbian
community. » The codification of
rituals of sexed
relations begins to reflect the
exclusionary qualities of
the heterosexualist system and like
that system, to disallow
experimentation and openness to differences
as threats to
lesbian existence." The politics of gay
identity thus is
in the subversion of gender and the
heterosexualist matrix

that enforces its terms, not only in the
consolidation of

gayness as an alternative "choice."
The operations of gender are quite effective at

disguising themselves in necessity and in the vicissitudes
of everyday life.

Thus,

for Butler the subversive exposure

of the actual inessentiality of gendered identity will lie
155

«

the hyperbolic,

of the

self-consciously performative
imitation

(always fictive)

ideological presence of an
original

This exaggeration of the
terms on which the world
makes
itself intelligible to
knowing subjects has traditionally
been the territory of the
theatrical.
As discussed above,
Butler brxngs it into the
world, refusing the separateness
between the performance or
the expression and the reality.
For example in the case of
Queer politics, the public
theatrics of groups like Act Up
represent a deliberate
reappropriation and subversion of
meaning of terms
ordinarily used to shame, to
interpellate the abject social
identity that acts differently from
the heterosexualist
norm.

Arguing for the perf ormativity of
gender changes the
"realities" of gender from behaviors, or
immutable facts of

socialization, into a politics which might
then be

intervened with.
Contrary to what some critics assert (Distefano,
1991;
Benhabib, 1991), Butler sustains a theory of gender
as a

system that gives form to her theory of perf ormativity and
does contribute to a politics of interpretation.

For

Butler, gender is a contingent sexual positioning but it is

also constituted through a "tacit collective agreement."

Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals
its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform,
produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as
cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of
those productions- -and the punishments that attend not
agreeing to believe in them; the construction compels'
our belief in its necessity and naturalness.
The
historical possibilities materialized through various
*

Butler makes clear the
punitive measures this tacit
collective agreement' engages
in order to properly engender
bodies.
However, the circularity
of her discussion of
gender as a tacit collective
agreement obscured by the
credibility of its productions,
recalls liberal social
contract theory. The artifice
that is the social contract
of liberalism is sustained
precisely through agreement
>

generated by its self -legitimating
effects
and individual security)
Butler drops

(of

collective

the rational

.

individual who exists prior to politics
and enters into this
contract, but sustains the social metaphor
of
agreement,

which begs many questions about social relations.

Post-

structuralist theory displaces the opposition
between
liberal

(rationalist) and deterministic

engineered)

(socially

theories of social relations with a theory of

constitutive power.

This moves theory beyond the notion

that there exist potentially innocent individuals or

identities before the laws of history (or before the social
contract is made)

.

The premise is that we are all complicit

in cultural hegemony, not in the sense of being guilty

rather than innocent, but in the sense of having
participated, and needing to reflect deeply on the forms and

substances of this participation.

Thus,

changing "tacit

collective agreement" to "tacit, collective participation"
157

adjusts the liberal connotations
of Butler's phrase and
moves towards a more material
and active sense of how
social
relations work.
« This piece
of her analysis,

however,
shows why anti-ontological
social criticism is often
conflated (by its critics) with
a liberal or pluralist
politics.
it is quite difficult
to see the normative
qualities of anti-ontological
critique.

With reference to Monique
Wittig's fictional accounts
of lesbian experience and
radical potential, Butler writes:
d
UrCe ° f P ersonal and political
agency [in
Sese
these t.v^f°
texts] comes not from within the
individual
but
in and through the complex
cultural exchanges among
9
ir whlct ^entity itself
\
is ever-shifting?
\
?n^H
indeed, where
identity itself is constructed,
disintegrated and recirculated only within
a context of
a dynamic field of cultural
relations

(Butler, 1990 127)
:

What are these complex cultural exchanges?

How do we assess

the difference between exchanges and
appropriations?

Butler

does not explain the relationship between culture
and

politics or between differentials in social power and
exchange.

This is where

I

think we need to look beyond a

theory of symbolic identity formations, derivative from

psychoanalytic theory, which Butler's thesis of subversive
perf ormativity sustains.
"There is no gender identity behind the expression of

gender; that identity is perf ormatively constituted by the

very expressions' that are said to be its results."
1990:25)

(Butler,

Butler invokes expression which generally implies

a representation of something enigmatic that lies below the
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surface of appearances.

The performance of an
identity

ordinarily impli es that one is
deliberately setting up a
ruse, that one is outside
of one's normal self.
it is

distinct from expression, but
can be expressive.
"Performativity, » on the other
hand, argues that the
expression is the
thino i-h^t« are
cue cnmg,
that tT
we
not moving in and out
of our selves in ways more or
less
truthful or authentic.

It implies that there is no
distinction between appearance

and reality whereas expression
implies

a

difference and a

relationship between appearance and
reality.

Post-

structuralist theory deconstructs social
relations as
"texts" to show that they do not leave
any remainder in

reality, but indeed are constitutive of
reality.

think an

I

expressivist politics implies the sustenance, if
not the
essentiality, of a moment that provides a sub (con) text
for
the act.

One is expressing something that is other than the

appearance.
total,

I

While the correspondence is never exact or

think of the relationship as

a

stratified,

dialectical layering where expression never exactly

communicates the experience nor the prior intent.

The

intentions of the speaker are never exactly met, but there
is something other than the appearance itself to be

considered as a political problem.

The notion of

performativity tends to erase this stratified, dialectical
relationship between action and interpretation in social
relations
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Post-modern theory refuses dialectical
methods for
thinking about society and social
relations on the grounds
that traditionally, dialectics
assumes a teleological
overcoming.
Butler eliminates the consideration
of
dialectics in explaining gender identity.
In particular she
critiques dialectics' dependence upon
the realm of necessity
for explanation of historical change
and progress.
in

Subjects of DesirP

(i 98 7)

she examines the tradition of

dialectical theory which argues the historical
relationship
between necessity and human will or agency. Butler's
work
attempts to move beyond dialectics to the deconstruction
of

the moment of "necessity" in itself.

As pointed out above,

this necessity includes the body and/or sex.

Butler rejects

any normative claim that oppositional movement should be

organized on the basis of identity or "reality".

Social

life is always already organized through and around
identity.

Appropriating and reinventing categories in the

name of autonomy from prior identifications potentially

constitutes new exclusions that reiterate the political

processes of representation feminism has set itself the task
of critiquing.

Butler is not only suspicious of identity but rejects
outright any notion that identity exists in itself as

anything but a fictive representation of who we think we
have to be.

For Butler, we do not need identity to be

critical actors.

Instead we need to expose, persistently
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disidentify from and actively disrupt
the naturalized
identity demands placed on us. As
I

have discussed, Adorno

thinks of identity as a necessary
moment of cognition and of
recognition, but one that needs always
to be recognized as
incomplete, as not covering the excess,
and as coercive in
its defensiveness against that excess.

identity as constitutive habituation.

Butler thinks of
There is no somatic

moment, no going through the object or anchoring
of

knowledge in the normative qualities of self\other
understanding.

This becomes particularly apparent in her

discussion of the politics of drag.

it is here,

where she

advocates a practice that exposes the inessentiality of

gender that the normative potentialities of her work come
through most clearly.

However, her theory of identity as

performative is not sufficient as

a

basis for interpreting

the always only potentially critical qualities or the

politics of drag.
Butler's discussion of gay and lesbian drag as

perf ormatively subversive of heterosexualism has been highly

controversial among feminists.

She argues that the

performance of drag is intrinsically deconstructive and
therefore constitutes an oppositional movement vis-a-vis

oppressive gender identity.

This rubs against the grain of

feminist critique of gay male drag as a classic expression
of misogynist, masculinist appropriations of the feminine or
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lesbian drag as a glorification
of male-centered
heterosexualist values. (Frye,
1983)

Butler rejects this critique
of drag as a homophobic
reversal of the claim that
lesbians are 'really' women who
cannot find a man.

she argues that this critique
of gay

male drag engages in a homophobic
logic- -that gay men create
themselves only with reference to
the absent woman.
That is
an astute reversal of feminist
critiques.
However, Butler's
reclamation of drag as subversive does
not take into account
how it is constituted through a complex
of meanings.
Instead she defines it only in terms of
resisting

heterosexualist desire.

Her discussion implies that the

meanings of being sexed male in this society are
somehow

detached from gay men in drag.
misogynistic.

Many gay men are actively

This is not intrinsic to or a necessary

determinant of gay male identity; rather it is related to

being male in a misogynist culture.

Homosexual men are not

always only homosexual men defying the rules of

heterosexuality

.

Even as men who love other men are

abjected through heterosexualist identity norms they have
access to other social identifications that lesbians, for
example, do not.

If Butler is going to argue,

Denise Riley (1989)

,

along with

that women are not always only "women,

but move in and out of that identity in complicated and

often unpredictable ways, she should apply the same insight
to any identif icatory system.

Otherwise she approaches the

reification of gayness or sexual
difference as intrinsically
subversive of gender oppression.
in a later discussion,

Butler argues that she was not

arguing that drag is universally
subversive.
instead she
was theorizing the ambivalence
of drag within the
heterosexist matrix in which it
stands.

However, her

qualifications of the theory and caveats
about how drag
performances work their subversions do
not adequately
respond to the criticism that all
performances are layered
with multiple meanings, not only embedded
in singular
contexts.
Practices subversive of social demands for
proper
performances are immanent ly ambiguous and contradictory.

They may not be subversive of sexism or of racism-even if
they call naturalized heterosexuality to account for
its

fictional status.

Gay men "participate" in complicated ways in sustaining

patriarchal hegemony that offers them privileges as men and
constructs opportunities depending upon what race and

ethnicity they are.

These aspects of how homosexuals are,

whether we think of the self as a performer or as essential
identity,

should not be bracketed off from their

performances as gay men.

This would collapse gender into

sexuality, avoiding the different implications for politics
of their distinct terms of reference.

Drag queens may need

additional performances to be convincing to women who have

experienced the effects of misogyny and sexism of men
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generally and interpret drag
through that lens.
subsequent implications for
the appropriation

The

of the

feminine may or may not be
negative for women, but they
should not be dismissed as
irrelevant in a society drenched
with differential power linked
to gender identity norms.
Feminism should look at gay
male drag with an eye towards
the potential disidentif
ications they make from
heterosexualist culture. But this
will not eradicate the
speculative gaze it should sustain in
relationship to the
way the performer sets off the
glories of male gayness from
lesser identities represented by womanness.
The quality of
the self\other relationship upon which
the politics of the

performance rests will speak to the normative
value of drag
for women and feminism (and indeed of "women"
and feminism
for drag)
On the other hand, drag can and should be read as
a

parody of gender essentialism and as potentially subversive.
As mentioned, Butler argues the ambivalent quality of drag.

However,

she interprets the ambivalence with reference to

whether particular queens perform on the terms of parody, or

whether they are merely reasserting the value of real

gendered identities and then placing value on those
identities through performance.

In other words,

the

critical quality of drag depends upon its immanent belief in
itself as representation rather than its embeddedness in

particular social relations or material life.
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This point

can be illustrated by
considering Butler's discussion
of the
ambivalence of drag as a subversive
act in an essay about
the film *Paris is Burning'
entitled "Gender is Burning."
in this essay she argues
that drag is subversive if the
desire of the performer does
not lead her to want to
finalize or really "be" the other
gender because of a final
value placed on that otherness.
"Paris is Burning" shows us
that performing drag can be deadly,
not subversive, if the
performer wants to become other. This
is the desire of
Venus.
Venus Xtravaganza is a Latina, transexual
man,

becoming a woman who says to the camera
that she "really
wants to have a house in the suburbs to clean

and a man to

take care of her."
a woman.

m

other words, Venus really wants to be

When the previously fooled man who she hopes will

bring her to his house in the suburbs finds out the
"truth"
of her gender,

he kills her because of her left-over organ.

There are several messages to be read out of Venus'
life and death.

One implication of Butler's discussion is

that Venus was trying to be too real and paid the price.

Venus should have realized that drag could only go so far,
that drag is drag-

She suffered in life and died from her

desire for the real thing.

Her left-over organ signifies

the excess, that which was unaccounted for in the

calculation of the man who murdered her, who refused to
forgive that she could not really be the woman, no matter

how powerful her performance.

Either way, the desire for
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the real becomes deadly.

what message do we address to

Venus and the man who murdered
her?
her discussion, "Recognize the

Butler might say, given

limits of your performance,

not in mourning over an
inaccessible real thing, but in
recognition that no one's life is
defined by the real thing,
only by symbolic identifications."
Butler would warn Venus
about thinking fulfillment was
possible through being a real
woman and instruct her on the constitutive
partiality of all

identities.

I

think this shows that Butler's argument
about

drag is not "playful".

Rather she succeeds in showing how

dangerously invested we are in enforcing the real.

Given

present social conditions, living with the ambivalence
of
her condition may have kept Venus in the underground,

impoverished world she thought she could escape through

becoming

a

complete woman.

But her yearning for escape

through becoming totally other (white and female) is fatal.
Venus' yearning for completion in nature of a socially

constructed and socially valued identity is tragic.
The other queens in the film, who do not try to be too
real,

but allow the audience to 'see'

the parody,

survive.

The audience knows the parody and participates fully in it.
Is this then subversive?

For Butler it is because the

parodic quality of the practice of voguing creates

a

culture, a community, which she argues is a valuable counter
to heterosexualist assumptions about sexual "deviants" and

their capacity to live affirmative, empowering lives.

She

refutes interpretations of
the fil m that argue the queens
only live lives of despair
and unfulfilled longing to be
the
dominant other." The
representation of the Queens in the
film radically subverts the
terms of hegemonic
heterosexualist assumptions about
how particular kinds of
family and sex are necessary
to sustain community.

Butler takes note of the
punishments that await those
who insist on not doing their
gender right or who refuse the

"reality or "essentiality"

of their gender identity.

Social marginalization is viscerally
painful and Butler does
not romatnicize the community as being
immune from these
effects.
However, for Butler the critical move is
not to

discuss the oppression of deviants but to
rewrite the script
through which dominant culture understands their
lives.

This means breaking down the assumptions that Black Drag

Queens in Harlem are only oppressed and kept down by their

delusional desire to be white and female.
of gender create the idea of gender,

considered to be

a

The various acts

and as gender is

matter of cultural survival, there is

much at stake in participating in the writing of those acts.
Butler shows the queens to be participants in subverting the
script of gender, to be subjects and not only passive

objects of oppression.
It is thus clear what Butler means by subverting

gender.

However it is less clear what she means by "doing

gender right" and whether women can or do submissively
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participate in the heterosexualist
structures that shape our
gendered lives. Generally,
even participating in
heterosexual ..normalcy i s
contingent upon unpredictable
and
often unstructured expectations.
For example,

the

unpredictability of heterosPvnaHef
necerosexualist, male expectations
y
of
women from one moment to the
next is dangerous.
Women who
live their lives "doing their
gender right" are as likely to
be beaten or raped as often
as women who violate the
current
rules or ideals for proper
gendered
behavior.

To talk to

women who have survived battering
relationships is to hear a
litany of attempts to get their
gendered role right in order
to stop or control the violence.

In these situations,

heterosexual women cannot "do gender right."

even

Many "proper"

performances never lead to the rewards Butler
implies women
are receiving who do gender right.
I make that
point to

suggest that Butler's work creates too stark a
difference

between the ability or willingness to do gender right
and
sexual subversions as if the former is easily accessible
to

men and women and the latter more dangerous to men and women
alike.

It should be acknowledged that there is no symmetry

between (or among) the sexes vis-a-vis the dangers of acting
outside of gendered norms.

Judith Butler has developed a compelling argument for

dispelling identitarian myths about gender and essentialist
reinscriptions of heterosexist dualisms.

I

find,

that she places too much faith in the immediacy of
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however,

appearances and too much
emphasis on representation as
a
site of subversion.
This leaves little room for
discussions
of history as structuring
the political potential of
subversive acts and the
political significance of loyal
acts
Butler argues the denaturalizing
performances of drag
to be intrinsically subversive
of the myth of the original
or essential relationship
between biologically sexed and
gendered identity.
Inspiring gender trouble with parodi,
-C
performance causes the construction of
gender identity t,:o
lose its foundational source of
stability which is

constitutive of heterosexual and heterosexist
gender
identity.
Butler analyzes gender as the

result of the

experience of desire emergent from differentiation
from an
other (gender) in the framework of institutionalized
heterosexuality.

She argues that this relationship

constitutes and reinforces heterosexual gender construction.

Butler sees gender as an experience of desire constituted
through the heterosexualist opposition of male\female.

The

performances she argues subvert dualist hetero-genders
therefore are linked specifically to gender understood only

through its constitution as heterosexual desire, as male and
female.

But gender is never completed through its

constitution into male and female as sexes.

Gender is

dependent upon a grid of identif icatory mechanisms,

including but not limited to class, race and ethnicity, that
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add up to be larger than
the mere sum of their parts.
We
cannot linguistically
represent the entirety of the
effects
of gendered experience.
Gender is not only the aggregate
of
performances and habits; social
identity is more than the
sum of the parts of the
performances in which subjects
engage.
Being a black woman or a white
woman is not equal
to the sum of performances of
racial and gendered
identities.
One of the key issues of black
feminism is the
inarticulable qualities of being black
women in a social
world that has historically coded black
as male and gender
as white. » Black feminists have
struggled not to use
additive language for a quality of life that
is different
and more than the sum of those two parts. As
a social

identity "black womanness" exists in tension with the
conceptual forms of representation available to them as
subjects of experience at any given time in history.

White

feminists have begun to struggle with this question as well,

though clearly for very different political reasons.

Butler argues that radical politics lie in particular

subversive practices through which any claim to gender
identity is exposed or denaturalized.

While

agreement with aspects of this critique,

I

I

am clearly in

do not think it

adequately addresses the question embedded in all
discussions of identity: that of self\other relations forged
through differences.

Other post-structuralist feminists

who critique essentialism in feminism articulate the

complexities of struggling
within multiple or webbed [as
opposed to bilateral) relationships
of power and
domination. (Flax, 1993)
Gender is a relationship and
a
concept which intersects other
relationships and concepts in
the social world, including
but not limited to race and
class, to sustain particular
norms of behavior.
(,

However, in
radical reaction to the "exclusions"
Butler argues are
embedded in feminist identity politics,
her interpretation
abstracts the moment of parody as
subversive without linking
it up with the historical meanings
which all performances
carry with them. The cultural form
Butler is politicizing
always does more than subvert naturalized
a

gender.

isolate that moment is reductive.

To

There is a social world

of perception which must be considered in
relationship to

particular moments.

Within that world the meanings of

particular moments need to be critically traced along
various axes of domination and exclusionary practices.

Thinking about women's experiences as localized events
embedded in identity forms that simultaneously render them
intelligible and limit them can avoid assuming in advance
that "womanness" and modes of sexuality are defined

primarily through heterosexualist interpellations rather
than through race, class and other politically intertwined

strategies of othering.
It is clear from the heated quality of the arguments

"for and against" that there is much at stake in feminist
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discussions of post-modern theory.

some have argued that

post-modern feminists are in fact
using alternative
metanarratives (that all resistance
is a discursive effect)
Other feminists critical of the
turn
away from

philosophical reflections on subjectivity
and materiality
follow Lukacs in claiming that
while the world may be a
fragmented mess of interests and
relative claims to power,
critical theory should not fall into
acceptance of that
state.

According to this reading, post-modern
feminist
theorists are merely making the best
of a bad situation in
embracing fragmentation and indeterminacy
in their

rearticulations of politics.

Women have been denied Subject

status or a positioning as historical actors for
too long;
the triumphs of feminism are too fragile to move
away from

the theoretical resources that positively affirm

subjectivity.

In this vein, Nancy Hartsock argues that it

is no accident that just as oppressed,

colonized subjects

are fighting their way onto the historical stage, white,
European, mostly male theorists are proclaiming the Death of
the Subject.

(Hartsock,

And Seyla Benhabib states in

1992)

"Feminism and Postmodernism:

An Uneasy Alliance":

What follows from this Nietzschean position is a vision
of the self as a masquerading performer, except of
course, we are now asked to believe that there is no
self behind the mask.
Given how fragile and tenuous
women's sense of selfhood is in many cases, how much of
a hit and miss affair their struggles for autonomy are,
this reduction of female agency to a 'doing without the
doer' at best appears to me to be making a virtue out
of necessity. (Benhabib, 1991:140)
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In other wordss,

thp mi
tne
roleo ^-f
of feminism is to
buttress woman's
selfhood and subject
jecL stai-na.
status, to accept the
contingencies and
vagaries of (masculinist
political lite
pu_L_Lcicai
lifp as
ac „
•

•

necessary is to

)
/

give up ground barely even
won.
However,

for feminists sympathetic
to post-modern
theory, the crux of the political
argument has to do with
whether feminists are clinging to
the very modalities of

Enlightenment principles of the self
and identity that have
buttressed the historical marginalization
of women and the
feminine principle. Most feminists
who have turned to postmodern thinking argue that we cannot
create a politically
and ethically effective feminism without
sacrificing our
search for the determinate subj ect\obj ect
or the immanent

values of womanness.

Jane Flax and Wendy Brown respond

sharply to feminist hesitations in the cold light
of the

post-modern crisis of epistemological certainty.

They argue

that the commitments to truth and epistemological

foundations professed by some feminists are a reactionary

response to the fragmented course of the world.
Brown,

1991)

(Flax,

1993

Rosi Braidotti goes somewhat further with a

historical argument that feminism itself is a part of the
crisis of the Subject in modernity because the emergence of

women as subjects necessarily deconstructs the

phallogocentric norms that situated the Enlightenment
subject of Reason and History.

For Braidotti, post-

modernity should be treated by feminists as an opportunity
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;

rather than as a process
of dissolution or a
reason for
despair.
i t is only reasQn
fQr

^

^^^

power on the terms of
Enlightenment political orders.
(Braidotti,

1991)

think Brown and Qther fem
n sts aii ed
with post-modern theory
are right; possibilities
for the
future lie in work done on
the agonistic, conflictual,
unstable sites of coalition
and not on the situated, settled
grounds of identitv
Rni- t
v,^,
Clty
But
1 have
reservations traceable to
their treatment of experience
and history.
z

.

.

.

-

For example, the parodic
performance may subvert
essentialist commitments to particularly
coded, gendered
identities, but the social meanings
evoked will alter the
politics of the parody, even as an act.
Thus, for example,
white men cannot engage in performances
of black women as if
the differences between them are merely
phenomenal or

apparitional rather than historically defined.

television show,

The old

"Amos and Andy" in which white men in black

face played black men and black women, representing
them

through the images white America imposed on blackness,
can

hardly be said to be subversive of racial meanings.
it reinforced them through representation.

Rather,

It is not only

the parodic quality of the act that matters politically but
the social relations as a backdrop that makes the act

intelligible to an audience.

55

If understood as social relationships rather than

ontological sites or ahistorical concepts, modern identities
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can be understood to oe
be inventinvested „4i-u
with meaning in a process
that does, as post-modern
theory argues, defy the
traditional essence\appearance
dichotomy of dialectics.
Butler argues for the politics
of appearances that parody
and subvert the very idea of
essences.
The limit of this
argument is that it does not
account for
the

(always

relational) differences between,
for example, white men and
black women that render the
performance possible in the
first place as an intelligible
event.
This is what I
believe to be the politics of identity.

Through our critiques of the logics
of organizing
principles of social life, we begin to break

the habits of

identity thinking.

As

I

will explain,

this does not mean

giving up the specificity of feminist criticism.

it does

mean interpreting different women's experiences
as

intelligible through constellational forms rather than
as
only other than the masculine or as fully determined by
patriarchal\phallogocentric hierarchies of symbolic

representation and organization of material life.
After reviewing the defenses of and attacks on identity
and identity politics that have emerged over the last ten
years in feminism,
loaded,

I

have come to think that identity is too

too "heavily imprinted with the footprints of

metaphysics"

(Caraway,

1991)

to continue to be held up as a

paradigmatic foundation for feminist praxis.
hand,

I

On the other

am not so optimistic as post-modern theorists about
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the politics of breaking
down the identitarian for
ras that
renders the very way we
speak and act in the world
intelligible.

The meaning of moments
of resistance like the
ones
Butler describes should not
be separated from their
historical and socxal context.
Meanrng emerges through a
dialectical tension which
prevents stasis on either the

particular (the performance) or
the social (the contextual)
level.

we can see a connection
between the critique of

identity (and therefore of
standpoint feminisms that start
from identity)
offered by Butler and Adorno. Both
recognize the dangers of reifying
,

the -given- or the "real."

And both offer ways of re-presenting
critical differences
among gendered experiences seen as
politically loaded events
rather than as necessary or inevitable
realities.

Butler's

approach to identity as an act argues for the
subversion of
identity using the logics of its own self -legitimating
effects,

ie.

if gender is said to be essential and final,

let us do our politics through practices and/or acts
that

parody the very idea of gender as essential and final.
Adorno'

s

critical theory anticipates post-modern

feminist critiques of identity.

More than any other

modernist theorist, he shows the danger of identity thinking
and refuses to capitulate to any reconciled vision of the
world.

But unlike post-modern thinkers, even in their most

political, post -structuralist incarnations, he locates the
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operatives of critical
philosophy in
self\ oth er relation.
Morno

,

s

^
^

politicize(J

^

theory Qf

always already relational
quality of experience allows
the
subject to re-cognize
itself tfeaj its experience
with an
other

Feminism should not retreat
from the fragmentary and
contingent conditions of
politics.
But this places all the
more weight on the constellatory
interpretation-on
localized, immanent philosophical
inquiry.
The different
interpretations that emerge among
women about an experience
apparently held in common reflect
the changing shape of that
moment (of the experience) that
was other in its own

present.

We must not continue to think
we "own- our

experience or that we can ultimately
control how they will
be read or represented by other in
political contests over
meaning.
We cannot decide in advance which
events will be

emancipatory, especially not if we are truly
engaged in

coalitional politics; but we can and should, nonetheless,

strategize and plan and struggle over the terms of

representation of experience and social relations.

We are

not expressing a settled reality when we talk about

experiences; we are participating in the reconstitution and

transformation of that reality.
The post-modern turn in feminist theory has shown that

many of the foundational concepts of feminism repeat the
epistemological and identitarian strategies that create the
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terms of dominance and
exclusion against which
femini-.sm
claims to be stru ggling
For
example;

.

±f

^

is

claims about representing
all ..women- as an
abstract
category, they may be
reinscribing the juridical
practices
that disallow difference,
deviance or disobediance from
established norms of political
life.
Abstract
representation of others carries
with it the danger of
obscuring difference and
particularity.
Thus feminism needs
to locate itself on the
discursive edges of otherwise
naturalized systems of dominance
like heterosexualism.
Performative strategies can expose
gender as a historical
effect undermining its naturalized
claims.

Judith Butler repeatedly admonishes
feminism to be
aware of its own exclusions and
the paradoxes of
representation.
she describes the deconstructive

contribution to feminist politics as follows:
would argue that the rifts among women
over the
h term [woman ou 9 ht to be safeguarded
and
prized ?S
that fu
this constant rifting (sic) ought to be
attirmed as the ungrounded ground of feminist
theory
To deconstruct the subject of feminism is
not, then to
censure its usage, but, on the contrary, to release
the
term into a future of multiple significations, to
emancipate it from the maternalist and racialist
ontologies to which it has been restricted, and to give
it play as a site where unanticipated meanings
might
come to bear. (Butler, 1993:16)
I

J

!r

In Bodies That Matter,

in place of feminine embodiment as

ontology, Butler argues for a radical perf ormativity that

will deconstruct the

f oundationalist

biases of feminism

toward the 'reality' of women's lives.
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Butler relies on

Lacanian notions of the

syndics

of identity and the

habituated performance that
is gender.
Thus the body
becomes relevant to politics
through strategies of
representation.
For example, Butler says
that appeals to materiality
as
a grounds for feminist
struggle ignore the always already

historically inscribed "sex of
materiality."
1993:54-55)
other words, Butler

m

(Butler,

textualizes the notion

of

"matter" in order to challenge
feminists who would claim
that the vulnerability of women's
bodies and the materiality
of injury determine a common
political or epistemological

foundation
These challenges inspire reconsiderations
of experience
as a foundational concept for feminist
theorizing and
practice.
I have argued that while we
must challenge any
notion of an unmediated relationship between experience
and
identity, we should sustain that relationship as
relevant to
feminist inquiry and transformative strategies.

I

have

argued that difference is historical and relational, not
textual.

My arguments with Judith Butler revolve around her

dismissal of experience as

a

qualitative moment that informs

discursive (social) understanding.

I

discussed in chapter

two an alternative way of thinking about experience that

loosens its association with identity thinking while

sustaining the material stakes of political struggle.
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For Butler the insistence
upon difference each time
representationalist discourses
claim to have settled
identity claims is the life-hl^n
lire blood of *feminism.
For Adorno,
the materiality qualities
of experience that defy
the
colonizing terms of representation
are what make those
differences Butler
xer reters
„ „
refpr-Q to significant.
The excessive
quality of experience, the
moment of non-identity that
confronts an oppressively
organized object world, drives
Adorno' s critique.
it prevents him from settling
for an
identity between theory and
practice as it engages him in a
•

•

.

persistent critique of dominative
forms that deny extraconceptual differences.
For Adorno, identity is not a
habit,

it is a requirement of a world
organized through

abstract exchange and equivalencies.

Adorno abandons the

modern quest to identify the revolutionary
subject of
knowledge as he critiques dominative forms
naturalized
through the object world, or the world external
to the self.
However, he remains concerned with self-other
relations
as

they are constituted through the object world, the world
of

creation and historical change.

Adorno spends most of

Negative Dialectics critiquing those philosophies that
settle the subject in place prior to engagement with the
object.

He and Butler may agree that freedom or liberation

depends upon the exposure of the constraints of identity,
but Butler's thesis of perf ormativity renders social

relations,

ie.

how we are in the world as social beings,
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ins lg nifi cant

.

Adorno remains a

.

ch nker

^^^^ ^

sustains the premise that
inter-subjectivity is organized
through the object world.
To struggle

^

^

^

identity means to engage
in a critique of the
object world
as a shared space of
artifice
but also of social

relationships
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CHAPTER V

™

"M
WH ° 13 SPEAKING? THE POLITICS OF RE PRESENTING EXPERIENCE

TXTnT^c"
in this chapter

I

consider contemporary feminist

political strategies and
practices against sexual viol,.ence
in the light of some of the
arguments about the politics of
identity I made in earlier
chapters.
Sexuality has attained
its ideological influence in
modernity by virtue of
its

private and individuated status;
feminism has made public
the terms on which sexuality and
sexual relationships
actually work to sustain particular forms
of male dominance.
The experience and the threat of sexual
violence disciplines
and controls women's bodies (or those
bodies marked as
feminine)

placing severe and often unpredictable limits
on
the feminine subject's action and agency.
Feminism exposes
those forms of private violence previously protected
by
,

ideological commitments to social non-interventionism into
the

(heterosexual) domestic and/or sexual sphere.

However,

56

identity thinking informs feminist theorizing

about sexuality and inhibits feminist strategizing against
sexual violence.

As

I

will discuss, with particular

reference to arguments articulated by Catharine MacKinnon,
in exposing to public scrutiny what had been hidden as

private suffering, feminists claim to have discovered an
immutable reality of gender relations.

Radical feminists

generally argue that the cultural assumptions about and
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practices of sexuality offer men
the socially sanctioned
choice of whether to be violent
or not and strip women of
their sexual autonomy and
physical freedoms. 57 The
foundations of sexual politics are
thus created by mens'
ability to rape, to control and
to exploit women's
sexuality- -that which is most
private and her own.
The
"anti-violence against women movement,"
as inspired by
radical feminists, has set up sexual
violence
as a

fundamental and apparently immutable
source of male power.
They have exaggerated the agreement
dominant culture
sustains in reinforcing the rules of gender.
Political
frameworks that explain sexual violence as a
naturalized
aspect of the totality that is patriarchy cannot take

advantage of the complex and contradictory quality of the

practices that enforce "proper" gender identity in the
context of sexual politics.

How might we avoid organizing our thinking around the

impermeable reality of sexual violence as
experience of gendered life?

I

a

defining

will suggest that the

various practices of sexual violence against women indicate
the mutability of gendered identity and can be understood as

moments of non- identity in an otherwise apparently stable
system.

Rather than arguing that sexual violence defines

and proscribes women's possibilities, we ought to shift our
emphasis to show how sexual violence indicates the

instability of patriarchal dominance generally. At the
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particular and strategic level,
we can then understand
feminist opposition to sexual
violence not only as a defense
against systemic aggression, but
also as a means to expose

the fissures and contradictions
of gendered norms.
I will
argue that sexual violence demonstrates
the historical

mutability of patriarchal desires and
heterosexualist
dominance; it thus represents a moment
of non-identity in
gender even as it acts to enforce its
rules.
In the last chapter

I

discussed how the desire for the

real or the natural as a referent for
a stable sense of

gendered identity can provoke extraordinary
violence.
Judith Butler argues that drag as a performance is
not a
misogynist attack on or appropriation of women's true
identity but instead is parodying the concept of the real
dualities of gender.

Instead of participating in the

reification of the dualisms of gender by attacking drag as a

violation of a true identity, feminism might reconsider its
effect as a deconstructive act parodying the naturalized

assumptions of gender upon which patriarchy relies.

More

generally, post -structuralist feminism and queer theory have

argued that punitive measures against sexual deviance and
the moral outcry against homosexuality indicate the

historically unstable quality of heterosexualist norms --that
they are not natural or immutable, but actually in need of
enforcement.

Similarly, sexual violence against women,

its many variations, may indicate the historically
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in

unpredictable and unstable
quality of gender identity.
Ho „
might the movement against
sexual violence against women
take advantage of this shift
in emphasis from theorizing
the
immutable qualities of gender
to exposing the historical
instability of gender identity?
in what follows,

I

consider the relationship between

violence and power in order to
better understand how sexual
violence as a practice serves a
political rather than a
private purpose.
control,

Sexual violence is a means of social

it enforces the norms of
gender determined by

variable historical contexts.

Elaine Scarry's study of the

relationship between subjective pain and
objective social
power informs my thinking about how sexual
violence produces
its social effects.
In light of those considerations,
I

discuss whether some trends in the movement against
sexual
violence, and the theory that inspires it, reinscribe

normative assumptions about gender identity which make
sexual violence possible in the first place and limit the

potential range of political responses.
The political imperative to give a voice to the silence
of suffering drives the movement against violence against

women.

This process of naming and describing the experience

of sexual violence from women's perspective has forced the

acknowledgment of their suffering, but it also has the

negative effect of further identifying women as victims who
need protection and services.

I
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agree that sexual violence

serves to enforce the
dominative rules of gender
identity;
yet, I will argue that,
as an experience, it
does not off er
a common reality or
foundation for feminist identity.
Feminism must experiment with
taking the presumed realiti es
of sexual violence apart in
order to interrupt
its

apparently seamless effects on women's
lives.
Otherwi.se we
risk reinscribing typical conceptions
of femininity always
already imposed on women's lives,
rather than challenging
and changing the various hegemonic
narratives about gender
which create the terrain on which
sexual violence
works.

To

be gendered female becomes a form
defined by its imminent
vulnerability; important variations in
representations of

masculine and feminine sexuality that inform
the different
practices of sexual violence go unmarked. Sexual
violence
has historically differentiated effects even as
it serves to

enforce masculinist dominance.

Beginning our analysis

cognizant of these effects, as illuminated by women's actual

experiences of both victimization and resistance, may help
us better envision the demobilization of masculinist

dominance, rather than proceeding from an assumption of its

universal effectiveness.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND MALE POWER
For the last ten years the arguments of Catharine

MacKinnon have provoked intense debate about sexuality and
sexual violence within feminist circles and beyond.

particular feminism is

a

necessary referent for any
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Her

discussion of sexual violence,
because for MacKinnon, as for
other radical feminists, the
struggle
against sexual

violence is at the heart of
feminist politics.
work attacks gender inequality

MacKinnon'

s

under the terms of the

liberal state and argues the
significance of sexual viol.ence
in upholding that inequality.
However, because she argues
sexual violence to be both a cause
and a symptom of women's
sexual powerlessness her theory
cannot account for the
contradictory sexual messages that inform
sexual behavior
and desires.
"As marxist method is dialectical
materialism,

method is consciousness raising:

the collective,

feminist

critical

reconstitution of the meaning of women's social experience,
as women live through it."

MacKinnon introduces
(CR)

a

a

(MacKinnon,

198 7:83)

Thus,

discussion of consciousness-raising

as the origin of feminist theory.

For MacKinnon,

CR is

practice that creates theory through interpreting women's

experience.

As a method it emphasizes discussion of the

intricate patterns of the dominative social relations that

women negotiate daily as gendered subjects.

MacKinnon

follows in the Marxist epistemological tradition of arguing
that women were uncovering or revealing a reality that is

otherwise distorted by the ideological forms and
institutional structures created by and for the interests of
men.

However,

the reality MacKinnon concludes women

discover has not inspired an unencumbered sisterhood as it
187

developed social currency.

The experiences that count
for

feminism are of suffering, of
exclusion and oppression.
There is scarce mention of how
diverse women live their
daily lives or how they negotiate
sexuality and find
pleasure through their sexual lives.
For

MacKinnon, these

questions are not meaningful for
feminism; in fact, she
argues that the very language of
negotiation is a telling
sign that women are in bondage
.

(MacKinnon,

1987:135)

MacKinnon maintains that the realities of
women's sexual
suffering prove that any indication of
power in their

lives

is created by and for men who are invested
with the choice

to give or take away power.

As a consequence,

unnecessarily limits feminist strategies to

her feminism

a narrow,

reactive terrain populated by generic and fearful women.

MacKinnon argues that the totality of sexuality is

defined by male dominance in patriarchy.

The violences

perpetrated by men against women govern sexual politics.
For MacKinnon, under patriarchy (gender hierarchy with men
on top)

sex is violence and women's agency in sexual

relationships goes only so far as the need for survival in
the face of potential rape or coercion dictates.

Sexual

violence defines the possibilities of women's lives and
holds male power in place.

Sexual suffering will therefore

create the grounds from which feminism emerges as

simultaneously a collective and a collectivizing critique of
the social order
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Thus,

in MacKinnon's analysis,

feminism is what we kno.

when we bear witness to the
sexualized powerlessness of
women.
"The substantive principle
governing the authentic
politics of women's personal lives
is pervasive

powerlessness to men, expressed and
reconstituted daily as
sexuality."
(MacKinnon, 1987:120)
Women's sexual

powerlessness identifies her as woman.
desire, never the objectifier.

she is the object of

she is literally the prey of

the forces of objectif ication.
For MacKinnon, then, sexual experiences
are something
given to women at the hands of men.
if projected into the
world by women, sexual politics reflect a
singular reality
or truth, which is that women are powerless
in relationship
to men and are always potentially victims of male
power.

MacKinnon's version

of'

consciousness-raising as a feminist

method does not reconfigure self -other relations through the
philosophical or analytical examination of experience.
Rather,
%

it engages in that project in the service of

discovering' the truth of women's powerlessness, which is

always already there in spite of

who might be in the room

and in spite of power relations that may in fact be

determining the shape of discourse as it emerges in the
group.

Thus,

consciousness-raising groups, or feminist

methods as theorized by MacKinnon, do not hold potential as

counter-hegemonic sources of knowledge about the world or
power; they are, rather, merely places from which to
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discover women's lack of power,

she does not take power

relations within the group into
account as a central concern
of feminism.
The truth of sexual suffering
is waiting to be
revealed as common to all women.

How is sexual suffering the reality
of female
sexuality? MacKinnon argues that
sexuality is not presocial or pre-political
it is in the world at the behest
of the patriarchal order.
Thus, feminists who argue
.

that

women must experiment or rediscover the
sex that has been
denied them by a repressive society, or who
argue
that

pornography and rape is ^violence' but not necessarily
sex,
are wrongly assuming that there is something called
female
sexuality in the world, even if it is alienated or
repressed.
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For MacKinnon, that phrase expresses an

impossibility.

Sexuality is what masculinist culture wants

and has the power to unilaterally create, therefore,

sexuality is what men want.

x

female

The violence that is rape and

pornography is female sexuality.

To argue otherwise is to

not see the reality that confronts women everyday as victims
of the pervasive threat of sexual violence.

made,

Sexuality is

not given, but it is made through masculinist

violence,

(cf.

Brownmiller, 1976)

Sexuality, in feminist light, is not a discrete sphere
of interaction or feeling or sensation or behavior in
which preexisting social divisions may or may not be
It is a pervasive dimension of social
played out.
Dominance
life, one that permeates the whole.
imperative
of
its
masculinity,
eroticized defines the
femininity.
sexual
submission eroticized defines its
.

.

.
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.

^t

TenCe iS a function of sexual
dominance
wuuuouce.
(MacKinnon, 1987:130)

in this analysis,

sexuality

(as a

practice but also as

constitutive difference among women)
as a realm of
possibility is obscured by its reduction
to male desire.
Sex is gendered dominance, and race
and class relations are
insignificant in the context of feminist
politics.
None of
these historical moments of experience
and difference matter
for MacKinnon's ^unmodified' feminism.
a

While she places women's experience at
the center of
what feminist theory should be, MacKinnon
argues it

is in

the world only at the whim of all-powerful men.

In her

feminism, women become the objects of male desire.

MacKinnon's feminism hands reality over to male power,

placing feminism in the outsider position of bearing witness
to a male standard.
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reconstitution of this

How feminism is to engage in the
x

reality' witnessed through critique

is never made clear but confused by the leap from the

particularity of women's experience to the universality of
women's lives, as defined by a monolithic male power.

MacKinnon thus presents us with the paradox that, on
the one hand,

feminism as a political theory should be

immanent to women's experience, while on the other hand,

feminism only emerges when the qualities of the monolithic
reality that is gender dominance have been established and
fundamentally agreed upon.

MacKinnon assumes that women's
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lives are only perceived
as different until they
engage im
consciousness-raising, when the
similarities will become
apparent.
she assumes a pre-discursive
reality which women
must discover, that of sexual
suffering, but fails t o
acknowledge the meaning of that
sentient experience as
contested- -even among women.
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argue that we should not displace
the quality of
sexuality in itself, including
sexual suffering, from the
contested space it occupies among
women.
Deciding once and
for all what the 'reality' of sex
is turns it inward
I

as a

site of

»

truth'

rather than projecting its claims outward
to

be contested and politically significant.

The social

significance of female sexuality is thus rendered
through
its vulnerability and dependence on male power
rather than

through its potential for constitutive public power.

in

MacKinnon's epistemological framework, we have to 'know'
sexuality in a form determined by patriarchy in order to
'be'

feminist.

most her

(a

She describes sexuality as "that which is

woman's)

own," comparing it to the creative

practice of work in Marxian theory as that which is most
essential to the being of the worker.
"

[w]

omen's sexuality

is,

For MacKinnon

socially, a thing to be stolen,

sold, bought, bartered, or exchanged by others.

The moment

women 'have' it-- 'have sex' in the dual gender/sexuality
sense- -it is lost as theirs.

To have it is to have it taken

away."

In other words, MacKinnon

(MacKinnon,

1987:172)

makes sexuality the defining moment
of woman's life then
tells her she never had it.
She says men respond to women'
sexual pain only to eroticize it.
Putting women in pain
defines the terms on which male sexuality
thrives.

s

MacKinnon then 'proves' her point by pointing
to the
empirical reality that is the prevalence of
sexual violence
against women.
in other words, violence is sex
for men

because sexual violence is so prevalent.
not violent in sex,

herself through

'

And,

when men are

it is only because the woman is saving

consenting'

in MacKinnon's world.

.

That consent cannot be 'real'

The barrier that is gender dominance

is unidimensional and impermeable.

Sexual violence is both

a cause and a symptom of women's sexual powerlessness

To effectively confront sexual violence,

feminism

requires a less systemic theory that can take differences

among women into account as it argues the logic of sexual
violence.

We should theorize sexual violence in such a way

that encourages us to see in it the particularities of a

constellation of concrete effects, none of which should be

placed as the determinant moment, but each of which is
critical to understanding the experience.
I

In what follows,

outline an approach that contributes to an oppositional

sexual politics but does not rely on the universal agreement

among women about the social meaning of their common

victimization at the hands of men as
feminist politics.
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a

pre-condition of

Setting up the pain of sexual
violence as the reality
of women's lives renders
MacKinnon's feminism complicit in
the reification 62 of that
undc reality.
rpal-ihv
t«it offers patriarchy
the status of reality; it sacrifices
the significance of
womens' experience as it collapses
their differences into
sameness for theoretical and political
efficiency.
Maleness
also has no differences in MacKinnon's
theory.
Maleness

becomes the undifferentiated

feminism can be.
4

(Tong,

*

reality' against which

This logic thrives as the

1991)

truth' of sexuality rendering irrelevant any
possibility of

difference.

This theory conflates sexual dominance with

gender and the resulting totality with the impossibility
of
female sexuality. This causes feminism to abandon strategic

thinking about experience in favor of identity politics.

It

implies an eventual withdrawal into a politics of

protectionism

(of

the feminized body)

when the social world

does not adequately respond to the articulations of

suffering
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Setting up the fact of sexual violence and the

experience of sexual suffering as essential limits on
women's possibilities for being in the world participates in
the reification of an undifferentiated masculinist

dominance.

Empathic responses to women's suffering and

insistence on the solidarity generated by the claim that 'it
could happen to any of us' participate in conferring a

monolithic reality onto what

I

will argue is better
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understood as

a contested,

f rag il e ,

edifice of masculinist
dominance.

even phantasmatic

Patriarchy is not

univocal or monolithic in its
project of dominance as
MacKinnon implies.
it reinvents itself and
the
(contradictory) terms of its
legitimating cultural scripts
in the face of historical
shifts in gender relations.
Can we rethink the relationship
between violence and
power in such a way that recognizes
the immanent

contradictions and differentiated forms
of masculinist
dominance without abstracting from
the actual experience and
pain of sexual violence? Elaine Scarry's
discussion of the
underlying structures of torture inspired my
exploration of
this possibility. 64 Her analysis of the
relationship

between the infliction of physical pain and the
substantive
reality of political power suggests a critical
perspective
on the practices of sexual violence.

I

conceptualize sexual

violence as a practice deployed in the name of stabilizing
the otherwise fragile edifice of masculinist power- -creating
its fictions but also perpetuating its material effects in

the world.

Scarry offers

a

materialist perspective on

the matter of physical pain and power.

Materialist

philosophy has taken many different forms often indebted to
but not necessarily identical with Marxist versions.

Some

materialist thinking invokes determinist theories that say
consciousness is determined by our situatedness vis-a-vis

production in the social world.
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It often disallows thinking

about consciousness separately

production.

f rom

m

historical conditions of

feminism, materialist theory
has moved far
beyond these limits. Previously,
i discussed the

materialist grounding of 'standpoint
feminisms.'
That area
of feminism has sustained a
link between theory and the
material conditions of everyday life
as necessary to
politics.
For example, Donna Haraway negotiates
a complex
theoretical path between determinist
theory that says our
material circumstance forms our potential
for consciousness
and post-modern rejections of any
correspondence between
social conditions of production and radical
subjectivity.
Her

*

Cyborg feminist' suggests the possibility of a
feminism

in spite of the contradictory and substantively
material

effects of modern epistemic demands on subjectivity.
(Haraway,

1991)

Rosemarie Hennessey's work describes the

potential for understanding feminism as a concrete
intervention into the

*

interdiscourses

'

that weave the

material lives of women into particular forms in the service
of patriarchal desire.

(Hennessey,

1993)

Other contemporary

materialist theories have invoked the materiality of
cultural forms in arguing for the 'concrete effects' of

discursive and semiotic constructions on social life.
(DeLauretis,

1987)

Scarry is a materialist in that she argues the social

world is constituted through objects. 65

She reads the

social world through reading its relationship to material

objects.

Her discussions of those
moments we take f:or
granted on a daily basis
(the reliance on a chair
to hold us
upright and our responses
when it bails' in its task)
bring
the object world to life
as it signifies the creativity
immanent in social relations.
(Scarry, 1985:296)
she does
not argue that objects
structures and conditions form
consciousness but discusses in a
more limited fashion how
they signify the necessary
sociality of the human conditi on
She argues that assuming a shared
object world allows us t o
*work on' the shared problem of
sentience and human
experience, (ibid. 291)
For Scarry, human beings require the
object world as a

space of mediation in order to share experience.

if a

feeling (an experience) has no object that is
other to
itself,

it is intrinsically non-social.

It cannot simply

emerge into the social world through language but
will
resist linguistic representation.

Pain is such a feeling.

Thus it is implicated in her work for its potential to
y

unmake'

the human world.

We tend to think of pain as

something inward and subjective; as apolitical in-itself but
perhaps useful for obtaining political ends.

Putting others

in pain or enduring pain is sometimes used as a means to a

political end.

But the pain in itself rarely sustains

scrutiny except as a means to an end such as a confession in
torture sessions, a victory in warfare, or getting another

person to do what you want them to do.

Scarry, however,

through considering the quality
of pain in itself, shows how
it is in_itself related to the
sustenance
of power.

it

is

not only a means to an end but
through its intrinsic

qualities can be translated into power
when put to political
purposes.
Scarry's discussions of the structure of
torture
and of war offer insight into why the
infliction of injury
has not withered as a tool of political
dominance
even as

modern forms of power become more sophisticated.
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Scarry argues that pain has a unique relationship
to
power.
The infliction of pain is not the result
of the

x

failure' of politics or of negotiations between or
among

parties; while not necessary to power, pain has a logic
unto

itself which may be useful to power.

experience we associate with feeling
distaste
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Unlike every other
desire,

love,

pain has no object to which it refers.

It

therefore resists obj ectif ication in description or in
explanation.

Scarry asserts that pain may be the one

instance where one person, she who is in pain, experiences

something like absolute certainty and another, she who
listens and even tries to empathize, experiences something
like absolute doubt.

Sentient beings may all experience

pain, but it resists representation because it has no object

external to the self. 68
Physical pain not only resists representation but

actively works to destroy language.

It exists in a

destructive tension with our ability to communicate.
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In

spite of countless historical
examples to the contrary, we
often assume that if we tell
the world of pain it will
respond to the truth or the fact
of the experience and
progressively eliminate pain. Scarry
argues that the
resistance of pain to representation
in language renders
that representation all the more
significant for politics.
Specifically, Scarry discusses torture
as a ritualized,
political use of pain in light of her
thesis about the
radical subjectivity and inwardness of
the experience of
pain

Scarry asserts the radical subjectivity of
pain and
hence its absolute incompatibility with the
object world.
Pain destroys the object world as it has existed in
its

normal social forms for the victim.

In torture,

when

objects are transformed as instruments to inflict pain, the

prisoner's world is systematically and ritualistically
destroyed; she is separated from the objects in the world,

material and ideological, as their comforting normalcy is

subverted through the use of them as torture weapons.

Her

contact with objects and ideas is no longer sure or safe.

Her inner world of pain removes her from them.

The prisoner

not only loses her sense of place and/or identity, but as
she speaks the words of the torturer in confession as an

effect of her pain, the world sees her as split off from
what made her real outside the torture chamber.

confess are identified as betrayors, as weak.
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Those who
Even those

with a strong sense of empathy
may not avoid having a sense
of disappointment in the
prisoner
for speaking.

This

tendency conspires to enlarge
the world of the torturer and
thus the power of the regime
he
represents.

(Scarry,

1985 29-32)
:

There is a different kind of
politics attached to the
body in Scarry's work. with the
body as
referent,

suggests a humanistic thesis.

she

The body comes to matter in

its complex sentient relationship to
the world, not as an

object of pity (as victim) nor as an object
of pure
sentience, but as an object of political
inscription

as we

confront what she calls *the problems of sentience.'

The

body is a potential site of creativity and pleasure in
relation to the object world, or of unmaking and suffering
as that relationship is distorted through the infliction
of

injury.

Torture distorts the bodily relationship to the

object world, dissolving the boundary between inside and

outside the body through using the victim's body against

them as a weapon.

It becomes a weapon,

separate from the

self:

Each source of strength and delight, each means of
moving out into the world or moving the world in to
oneself, becomes a means of turning the body back in on
itself, forcing the body to feed on the body:
the eyes
are only access points for scorching light, the ears
for brutal noises; eating, the act at once so
incredible and so simple in which the world is
literally taken into the body, is replaced by rituals
of starvation ...The prisoner's body- -in its physical
strengths, in its sensory powers, in its needs and
wants, in its ways of self -delight and finally even,
as here, in its small and moving gestures of friendship
,
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toward itself--iq
P r "oner; s voice, made a
weapon against nim ™h p
hlm ° n behalf of the
enemy, made to be the
Lne enemv
enemy.

^

(Scarry,

1985:48)

The victim's pain defines
her in relationship to the
torturer.
She is intensely alone
without the safety of
solitude.
She is simultaneously intensely
exposed, but
denied the comraderie associated
with being in public. «
It is through the falsifiation
and denial of the victim's
pain that torturers work to translate
pain into an emblem of
a regime's strength.
The enlarged map of human suffering
(the extension through objects of
torture and proclaimed
motivations for torture) becomes the insignia
of power.
The
totalizing pain inflicted by a torturer
resists

representation, destroying the victim's language
and

radically altering their relationship to the object
world,
or their former reality.
x

reality of pain as

Thus Scarry acknowledges the

it works to defeat language and

therefore the terms on which objective social power can be

sustained
Scarry's immediate moral and political concern is with

pain as it is deployed to reinforce the reality of otherwise
illegitimate and even phantasmatic power.

She describes how

torturers use ritualized practices to inflict pain that in

destroying the world of the prisoner virtually create the
world of the state.

The quality of an 'incontestable

reality' of the physical pain inflicted upon the victim is

conferred upon the regime as an incontestable proof of its
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stability and reality.

m

addition,

the fear of others

about the threat of real
pain confers a reality onto
state
power.
if we think of states
and SQcieties as existing r
a relationship of
negotiated power, torture becomes a
weapon
of the state with very
specific and rationalized effects.
Torture engages in "the conversion
of absolute pain into the
fiction of absolute power..."
(Scarry 1985 27)
That is,
torture may be understood to signify
the weakness of the
regime while, at the same time, it
is used as a means to
confer reality on the power of the
regime.
.

,

:

Torture is thus simultaneously at the extreme
edges of
the negotiation that is politics and central
to state power
in modernity.
Rather than talking about torture only
as an

arbitrary instrument of barbaric or irrational regimes,
Scarry talks about it as a ritualized process by which
regimes confer an incontestable 'reality' onto their

presence in people's lives.
In the very processes it uses to produce pain within
the body of the prisoner, it bestows visibility on the
structure and enormity of what is usually private and
incommuniccable, contained within the boundaries of the
sufferer's body.
It then goes on to deny, to falsify,
the reality of the very thing it has itself objectified
by a perceptual shift which converts the visions of
suffering into the wholly illusory but, to the
torturers and the regime they represent, wholly
convincing spectacle of power. The physical pain is so
incontestably real that it seems to confer its quality
of 'incontestable reality' on that power that has
brought it into being.
It is, of course, precisely
because the reality of that power is so highly
contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is
being used.
(Scarry, 1985:27)
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The argument that pain resists
and even destroys the
normalcy of expressing feeling to
the world is important
to feminist arguments and
struggles around sexual violence.
Scarry's discussion of torture
resonates in women's
testimonies of life with male batterers
where every object
in the home becomes a potential
weapon and the home spaces
that should offer safety become
associated with danger and
prolonged punishment.
It also speaks to the stories rape
victims tell of alienation from their
own bodies after their
bodies are turned into objects as sexual
weapons against

themselves.

For Scarry,

the underlying structure of the

infliction of injury, which renders a victim's pain as
a

perpetrator's power, illuminates the solipsistic
relationship between sexual violence and masculinist power.

Scarry's discussion of the silence of pain faintly
echoes Adorno's critique of representation.

For Adorno,

suffering in-itself resists representation.

As we struggle

to represent it, we risk reducing its specificity to prior

social understandings, thereby normalizing suffering or even

rendering it falsely heroic as
to be a victim.

a signifier of what it means

The impulse to impose externally derived

meaning on the radically subjective experience of suffering
reduces the memory of experience by controlling it for

purposes of collective representation.

The non-identity of

the event, the moment of suffering that resists
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representation, the irrational
otherness of experience, is
repressed, forgotten or actively
ignored.
in other words,
we rrsk the rationalization
of suffering as we objectify
experience.
Scarry does not condemn this
impulse to
represent suffering as does Adorno;
instead she makes the
connection between the silence of
pain and the

institutionalization of torture in modernity
and tries to
capture the politics embedded in efforts
to represent pain.
The absence of language for pain allows
pain
to be

transferred from its originary site in the
body and

reappropriated to substantiate fictions of power.
Scarry's analysis suggests that we might understand
the
practices of sexual violence as a systemic response
to the

limits of patriarchy and to the fact that it can never

establish its power once and for all.

Its constitutive

limits require the violent disciplining of women's bodies.

Sexual violence thus signifies the limits of patriarchal
power,

rather than its real authority or totalizing power

over women as a system.

Its prevalence shows just how much

is invested by masculinist culture in sustaining the reality

of sexual violence as a threat against women and in

constituting its devastating effects on women's bodies as
absolute.

70

It has been argued that sexual violence is the

means by which men can control the sexual 'otherness' and

potentially threatening powers of women; that men live in
fear of the feminine principle as something that undermines
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their sense of place in the
world and use sexual violence
to
undermine the power of the
feminine.
But my discussion does
not assume in advance the
immanent or essential power of
women as women.
it is limited to arguing
the relationship
between the infliction of sexual
suffering and the social
power wielded by men.
As

I

discussed above, the expectation that
the

experience of sexual suffering is
transparently accessible
to representation and that there
are gains to be had in the
articulation of that experience has been
central to the

politics of radical feminist struggles against
sexual
violence.
This runs the very real risk of undermining the
efforts of feminism to reinvent women as differentiated
sexual subjects through setting them up as sexual sufferers
in the public contest over sexual practices.

Radical

feminist assertions about the univocal truth of sexual

violence focuses our attention on arguing about the truth of
radically subjective experience which in itself resists
representation, while ignoring the historically specific

qualities of the practice itself.

This argument does not

elide men's responsibility for hearing and responding to

women's experiences; rather, it suggests that there are

cognitive limits embedded in the (political) process of

representing experience, particularly the experience of

other-inflicted pain, even when that pain is related to or
contrasted to sexual pleasure and desire.
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If,

as we

struggle to give voice to
the otherwise invisible
pain of
sexual violence, we identify
the inarticulable specificity
of sexual pain with male
power, we risk collusion with
that
power.
Radical feminists rightly argue
that sexual

violence is systemic and political
and must be named as
such.

However,

they take the further step of
arguing that

sexual violence represents the
totality of male power.
move is offered to counter
liberal/individualist

This

perspectives that say sexual violence is
an aberration from
the norm and who place the burden of
proof on the individual
victim to show that she did not ^want it.'
The importance
of Scarry's discussion of the structure
of torture and the
relationship between pain and power is to show that
we do
not have to reverse the terms of the dominant
understanding
(sexual violence is not a sign of an aberrant sexuality
but
a totalizing condition of sexuality)

it is political.

in order to argue that

For Scarry, the experience of pain

undermines a victim's objective social power; similarly, the
experience of sexual violence has undermined women's

objective social power.

I

have imported Scarry's ideas

about the relationship between pain and power to argue that
sexual violence simultaneously indicates and disguises the
limits of masculinist power.

However,

I

push her analysis

beyond its original framework to argue that sexual violence
can become a politicized site of potential reversal and

subversion of patriarchal fictions about power rather than
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an inevitability' which
signifies

^

powerlessness Qf
women as objects of male
desire and violence.REFLECTION ON OPPOSITIONAL
STRATEGIES

Movements against sexual
violence have become visible
and, to a limited extent,
legitimate in the United States.
The pervasiveness of sexual
violence, and its status as a
public rather than a private
problem, has been recognized
through the feminist struggle
to place women's perspectives
on, and concrete claims
about sexual violence
in front of

the public by litigation, academic
research and grassroots
education.
However, the present character of
the

increasingly institutionalized anti -violence
movement offers
a complex field on which to continue
to struggle against
sexual violence.
Women are still put in the position of
proving on individual grounds that they are indeed
^proper'
victims
the

'

(Estrich,

1982)

and of proving themselves worthy of

justice' and related services the state has to offer.

Legal, pyschological and therapeutic discourses have

displaced feminist critique as general frameworks through

which sexual violence is understood. (Fraser, 1989)

The

particular social and political logic of sexual violence is
underestimated even while legal and psychological remedies
proliferate.

This is in part due to the emphasis of these

social scientific strategies which tends to be on

understanding the victim's responses.

This,

in itself,

wou Id not be a problem, but for the fact that it focuses
207

attention on establishing the
truth of the victim's
subjective experience of suffering
at the expense of
studying and arguing about
the history and politics of
sexual violence as a social
phenomenon.
in other words,

society has figured out different
ways

to treat women as victims-to
react to sexual violence-but
there has not been an adequate
focus on meaningful

strategies of prevention.

Andrea Benton Rushing supports

this insight in her personal
account of her survival
strategies in the aftermath of rape.
she describes tactful
doctors, helpful rape counsellors and
non- judgemental

police.

She reports that in the South, in a
case of a black

man raping a black woman, the police and
doctors were all
quite sensitive and treated her as a 'proper'
victim rather
than as a participant in the act. She comes to
the

conclusion, however, that while this may indicate
systematic

improvement in the institutionalized treatment of victims,
it does not indicate any ideas about how to stop rape.

(Rushing, 1994 130)
:

Rushing also speaks to the contradictory

ways the experience of rape continued to define her life in

the aftermath.

The experience was something she could

neither heal from through

x

rationally' reconstructing her

daily life nor something she could transcend through drawing
on the significant resources her community had to offer.

While her narrative is inconclusive, her story is not of a

woman who becomes a victim, but of an event that sets in
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motion

process that inexorably and
unpredictably changres
the terms on which she can
live her life.
a

(

Matters are further complicated
by the fact that sexual
violence as a practice is subject
to historical and
contextual shifts in meaning. As
I discussed above,
it is
not an experience to which feminism
can safely refer as a
common reality binding women into
a politicized group across
or in spite of time, race, class
and other differences.
We
should approach theorizing about sexual
violence with the
same suspicions about ontology and
identity thinking as we
have other questions about women's lives.

This will further

theory that starts feminist critique from
differences among
women rather than including' difference as relevant

but not

»

fundamentally constitutive of feminism.

I

have argued that

feminists should remain consistently aware of the costs of
any struggle organized around the singularity of 'woman' as
an identity.

In the context of sexual violence,

it ignores

the ways race and class relations change the stakes and

outcomes of speaking out about experience.

The politics of

struggle against sexual violence are not self-contained in

gender but intersected by race, class and sexual

relationships and meanings, which must be taken into account
at the start.
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Thinking about the practices of sexual

violence as signifying the limits of an internally

contradictory and historically differentiated patriarchal
system moves us in this direction.
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For example,

the

totalizing theory of gender
dominance suggested by MacKinnon
as an explanation for
sexual violence does not
adequately
account for the multiple
'realities' of women lives
as they

negotiate sexual politics.
Further,

the politics of representation
persistently

interferes with any effort to
comprehend the experiential
truth' of sexual violence.
Feminists have often assumed
the courtroom to be a conflictual
but nonetheless effective
place to communicate and educate the
social world about
sexual violence. However, as Kristen
Bumiller shows in her
analysis of the trial of several men who
committed a gang
rape in a public bar, legal discourse tends
to have the
*

contradictory effect of rendering the experience of
sexual
assault as an individual tragedy without illuminating
the

social truths about power embedded in the particular

experience of sexual violence.

(Bumiller,

1989)

Therapeutic

discourse focuses on the response of the victims rather than
shifting our attention to the social pathologies of sexual
violence.

It focuses on patterns in women's responses and

while valuable in helping society recognize the posttraumatic stress associated with sexual assault, renders it
an illness that must be healed rather than an injustice that

must be prevented.

Psychological and legal discourses about domestic

violence represent women's responses to violence as
irrational.
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The woman herself is therefore not
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considered an authoritative
source for the interpretation of
her own experience. (Schneider,
1986) The meaning of her
experience is left to experts as
they dissect her responses.
This tends to further mystify
the Realities' of the
violence perpetrated against her.

Expert testimony' in the

trials of battered women who kill
or attack their abusers
may help to educate the public as
to the prevalence and
patterns of sexual violence. However,
the terms of its

admissibility in court have been shown to
be organized
around the imperative to prove the woman
psychologically
incapable of 'normal' actions and therefore
less
than

rational in her response to violence.

(Schneider,

1986)

Historically, rape had been assumed, legally, to be

intercourse until the woman successfully could prove she
resisted.

Similarly, domestic violence is assumed to be a

private and gender neutral affair until it is successfully
proven that women are made (temporarily) crazy by abuse.
In a strange twist,
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the woman's illness is necessary to

prove the prolonged character of the violence.
These discourses obscure women's experiences as they
limit political strategies to the terms offered by the

liberal state.
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The struggle over whose experience counts

in the legal and psychological discussions has brought

women's experience of sexual violence into the public sphere
as a recognizable phenomenon.

Women now have an expanded

language to describe what has happened to them, which the
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police, courts and social
service system must respond
to
Mandatory arrest statutes
for batterers, the general

admissability of 'expert
testimony- and increased shelter
space for women escaping
violence are all significant
changes. As Andrea Benton-Rushing
describes,

rape victims,

particularly in the context of
stranger rape, are often
treated with more respect and
have a language with which to
demand attention
to i-h*=
n LO
tne r^n
ra P e as a crime.
However, as

I

have

pointed out, these changes do not
necessarily shift the
assumptions about gendered identity
that organize the terms
on which men continue to commit
77
sexual
violence.

The

research assumes a binary model of gender
identity without
taking into account differences in cultural
and historical
contexts
I

would argue that feminists need to look more

carefully at the particulars of gender identity in
the
context of race, class and sexual differences and make

connections through those considerations to the phenomenon
of sexual violence.

Otherwise, as the social scripts of

gender relations are rewritten in efforts against sexual
violence, the actual women who are raped and battered will

continue to be excluded as interpretive subjects of their
own experience.
Elaine Scarry's argument about the relationship between

physical violence and social power suggests that we
conceptualize the practice of sexual violence as signifying

the limits rather than
the source of male power.
Can we
then take this shift in
emphasis to suggest strategies
that

demobilize rather than

respond to the social forces
that
engender sexual violence?
Asserting the reality* of
suffering does not make the
representations of it any less
problematic in a social world
organized through abstract
systems of identity and exchange.
fact, as I argued
above, it risks collusion with
masculinist power.
Shifting our focus away from the
totalizing logic of
*

m

patriarchy means paying attention to
women's varied means of
resisting, negotiating and finding
pleasure in sexual
politics as well as to her victimization.

Women are never

only passive objects of sexualized
violence.

How might we

begin to break down the forms of gender
identity which
create the terms on which sexual violence does

its damage?

How might we avoid the therapeutic inscription of
women as
less than rational actors, or the legal inscription
of women
as victims,

in fighting sexual violence?

although not sufficient, to

'

It is necessary,

include' women in the courtroom

battles and the social service systems as authoritative
sources of the truth about their experiences.

We have to

take a step away from our focus on remedying the effects of

violence and look at strategies of prevention.

*

It is important to note here that the discussion
that follows is specifically about rape, not about intimate
violence or about sexual harrassment in the workplace. Some
of the insights about the discursive constructions of
women's bodies may be helpful to developing a similar
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Scarry's argument about the
relationship between pain
and power suggests the
risks feminism takes in identifying
women's pain with male power.
How might we take advantage
of the insight that sexual
violence simultaneously enf orces
and indicates the limits of
male dominance? I argue
thi s

suggests a feminist strategy that
incJudes the creation of
counter-hegemonic modes of representation
for the experience
of sexual violence.
The relationship between gendered
identity (masculinity and femininity)
and sexual violence
changes.
Even if we do not reveal a truth
about gender
identity through the critique of sexual
violence we do

participate in shifting the socially constructed
terms of
gender identity that inform how sexual violence
does its
damage.

I

have criticized the tendency of feminist

strategies to focus on understanding and articulating
the

pain of sexual violence.

borrowed some ideas from Elaine

I

Scarry to suggest why that approach has not stopped men from
raping and beating women.

I

have not addressed specifically

those feminists who strategize to prevent sexual violence.
I

am not going to review the extensive feminist literature

on separatist strategies or the 'pro-woman' theories which

argue an essential difference between women and men vis-avis violence.

Instead,

I

will discuss this question from a

post-structuralist perspective because

I

think it

discussion about those kinds of violence. But, as I will
discuss, the strategic implications for action do not apply
in the same way.
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contributes to a non-identitarian
approach which I suggested
Scarry's warnings about
reinvesting women's pain in male
power imply.
Posu-structuralist feminist theory
contends that gender
dominance is enacted through
language and discursive
strategies.
As a response, it seeks
to identify the
political efficacy of challenging
the discursively
constitutive habits of gendered
life. « How might this
approach contribute to strategic
opposition to the systemic
logic and particular realities
of sexual violence?
Does it
further the project of demobilizing
male dominance?
In an

essay about how feminism might rethink
the politics of rape
prevention, Sharon Marcus argues from a post
-structuralist
perspective that the experience of rape should be
understood
as culturally scripted or encoded.
She argues that
the

^success'

of rape is dependent upon a sequence of events,

not on the biological or historically determined powers
of

men to possess women at their will.
Marcus appropriates insights from post-structuralist

theory to argue that the linguistic habits through which

masculine and feminine identities are enacted create the
terrain on which sexual violence takes place.

From this

perspective, she goes on to argue that rape as an engendered

practice might be understood as

a

culturally scripted

interaction, rather than an inevitable reality.

Her

approach treats sexual violence as a variable practice of
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dominance rather than as an
immutable reality of gendered
identity.
she argues that feminist
strategies focus too
much on the experience of a
rape that has already happened
and its effects on women's lives
and too little on how to
strategically demobilize masculinist
cultural processes that
enable rape.
Feminist theorists have named the
experience of rape as
the 'reality' which disproves
post-structuralist arguments
about the discursive production of subjects
and experience.

Marcus argues that this insistence reflects
a general

tendency to name rape as an irreducible reality
in-itself.
She argues that this guarantees that the rape will
always
have already happened before the social world is held
to

account
To treat rape simply as one of [quoting Mary
Hawkesworth] ... 'the realities that circumscribe
women's lives' can mean to consider rape as
terrifyingly unameable and unrepresentable, a reality
that lies beyond our grasp and which we can only
experience as grasping and encircling us.
In its
efforts to convey the horror and iniquity of rape, such
a view often concurs with masculinist culture in its
designation of rape as a fate worse than or tantamount
to, death; the apocalyptic tone which it adopts implies
that rape can only be feared or legally repaired, not
fought. (Marcus, 1993:387)

Marcus goes on to discuss feminist anti-rape literature that
advises caution in avoiding sites where rape might happen
and against resistance in the event that it does happen. 80
If women took the advice of most rape-prevention manuals to

heart,

they would live lives of utter caution and
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defensiveness in the interest
of protecting their bodies
from violation.
think the most profound
insight in Marcus' discussion
is how easily talk of the
'reality* of rape slides into an
assumption of the inevitability
of rape.
Feminist
insistence on the 'reality of
rape as a foundation for
political action serves only to
reify the inevitability of
the physical act by eliding
its socially constructed nature
(i.e, Marcus' "script").
Marcus tells us that men's bodies
become weapons and tools of violence
and women's bodies
become objects of violence; there is
nothing intrinsic or
ahistorical or natural about the differential
in male/female
recourse to or capacity for violence. She
advises women to
I

understand themselves as subjects of violence, not
just in
practicing reactive self-defense techniques, but through
aggressively intervening in any cultural and linguistic
inscription of their bodies as always already rapable.

She

also argues against collapsing all offensive sex talk,

including harrassment, into the category of 'rape.

'

This

implies that there is no space for intervention in male

defined sexual politics; feminist strategies are thus left
to focus on proving the violence of the event after the

fact.

(Marcus,

1993:389)

Marcus argues that thinking of rape as a cultural

production expands the opportunities for intervention before
and during the act which can actually prevent rape rather
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than assuming the rape to
already have happened upon the
entrance of a rapist. Disrupting
rapists' assumptions of
their own omnipotence and
their victims' passivity is a
key,
argues Marcus, to preventing
rape.
Her argument is
supported by the empirical work
of Pauline Bart and Patricia
O'Brien who studied rape prevention
strategies and conclude
that women who fight back
immediately and use the widest
range of strategies, defensive
and offensive, are most
likely to avoid rape.
(Bart and O'Brien, 1985:33-57)
Marcus' discussion argues for the
denaturing of the
sexual aspect of sexual violence so
that it might be >read'
as a script and thereby interrupted.
MacKinnon's

construction of female sexuality as a thing of male
desire
inhibits this kind of interruption because, in her
understanding, sexuality is violence.
woman,

the

*

In other words,

for a

success' of rape in its outcome as sexual

satisfaction for the man is as inevitable as the punch in
the nose during a male bar brawl.

The vulnerability of the

sexual does not enter into MacKinnon's theoretical
framework.

However, the research by Bart and O'Bien shows

how women who respond in aggressive ways not traditionally

associated with feminine behavior are more likely to avoid
rape.

This implies rapists have particular expectations

which can be interrupted as feminism successfully exposes
them.

Women who subvert what Marcus calls "the gendered

218

grammars of violence"

(Marcus
uiarcus,

qq-i
1993:393)
i

are more likely to

escape or fend off aggression.
Relevant to the question
about the sexual in sexual
violence is the debate that
has gone on within feminism
about the relationship between
sex and violence in rape.
in
the 1970' s in order to
emphasize the criminality of rape,
feminists argued that rape is an
act of violence, not of
sex.
This was in response to sexist
assumptions about how
rape is really just rough sex,
or that women >enjoy' being
forced and say >no' to communicate
<yes.'
Feminists argued
that what may feel sexual to men is
in reality
,

an act of

violence against women.

in 1977 Michel Foucault added a

twist to arguments about the criminal
violence of rape,

suggesting that rape should be decriminalized and,
thereby,
juridically "desexualized" so that civil penalties could

be

levied commensurate with other acts of civil harm.
Foucault'

s

motivating concern was that the surveillance of

sex and the investments of the state in regulating sex are

encouraged through the criminalization of rape as
crime.

81

a sexual

Feminists responded that his strategy ignored the

fundamentally gendered quality of rape and that they were
not interested in protecting sexuality, ie. male-defined
sexuality, from the regulating mechanisms of the state.

They argued rape is

a

fundamentally different kind of crime,

one that places women or any femininized subject in the

subordinate position, unlike being punched in the
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nose. (Plaza,

Their discussion shifted the
terms of
debate once again to argue
that rape is violence against
women even as it is sexual
for men.
Desexualizing rape
would leave its utility for
enforcing gender dominance in
place; women may receive financial
conpensation for their
injuries, but society would not
recognize the specificity
and difference of the crime of
rape as an act that enforces
masculinist dominance.
1978)

agree that rape is different because it
functions to
differentiate masculinity from the feminine;
but another
reason to recognize rape as sexual is that
it renders it all
the more fragile. 82 Sexuality has a complex,
and, even if
I

deeply embedded, nonetheless permeable script
attached which
is quite different than the scripts of generalized
violences
people commit outside of the terms of gender and sex.
sexuality is not monolithic or self-assured.

Male

The drive to

rape ought to be shown to be a signifier of the

contradictions immanent in masculinist conceptions of

sexuality and not only significant in demonstrating their
dominance over women as gendered beings.
In a survey conducted by MS Magazine in the 1980'

s,

men

and women were asked what they feared the most from the

opposite sex.

Women responded that what they feared most

was being killed.

Men responded that what they feared most

was being laughed at.

If we can get beyond our horror at

what this tells us about the different fears men and women
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live with, we can take
advantage of the insight it
offers
into gender relations.
Emphasizing the fragility of the
male erection in the context
of sexual violence may or
may
not lead to an escalation
of violence. «
But if women are
thinking about the collapse
of the penis as a possibility
rather than assuming the
inevitability of penetration, the
possibilities for subverting the
rapist's script internal tc
the event itself are multiplied.
Thus,

the strategic implications of
Marcus'

of feminist insistence on the

<

criticism

reality' of rape as it

proscribes women's live are important
to consider.
However,
there are limits to her argument.
She assumes sexual

violence is like a confrontation between
autonomous subjects
rather than an event more often embedded in
a relationship.
It is common knowledge now that the vast
majority of rapes

are committed by men the victims know or are
acquainted with

and that women who are battered are not only forced to
have
sex but are subjected to a very complex environment of

intimidation, threat and physical violence.
Walker,

1984)

(Brown,

1984;

Even Bart and O'Brien note that women have a

difficult time differentiating between

'

consensual' sex and

aggression during the relationship- -which is not the same as
saying that women do not know if they have been raped.

The

point is that given the complexities of sexual politics,
sexual violence is not only confrontational but relational.

Generalizing about sexual violence through the image of
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stranger rape again reduces the
complexity of the phenomenon
and the difficulties in
representing it to the social world.
Feminists have shown the tension
immanent
to the

relationship between the experiences
of sexual violence and
the conflicting representations
of it which then produce
hegemonic narratives that conceptually
organize our
experiences.
The question of how sexual violence is
to be
re-presented in the political process of
educating the
social world (including women) as to
its prevalence and to
its terms of existence is not resolved
by breaking
it into

its component parts as a linguistic event.
In addition,

we experience our bodies through social

relationships in ways unavailable to discourse.

The sum of

linguistic strategies will not add up to the truth about
those experiences,

though we can shift perceptions and

common interpretations of them over time.

Marcus' argument

to deconstruct the rape script implies a prior analysis of

the whole in which that script is embedded.

84

Theorizing sexual violence with an eye towards the non-

representability of sexual pain shifts our focus to the

naturalized social truths embedded in the event itself.
Radical feminists have argued that sexual violence is

systemic and political.

They then take another step of

arguing that it represents the totality of male power.

As

have said, this is to counter liberal perspectives that say
it is an aberration from the norm and place the burden of
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I

proof on the victim to show
that she did not >want it.'
But
we don't have to reverse
the terms of dominant
understandings (sexual violence
is not a sign of an aberrant
sexuality but a totalizing condition
of sexuality) in order
to argue the prevalence of
sexual violence.

Representing sexuality requires a certain
level of
objectification, which is not necessarily
anathema to
feminist theorizing about sex.
Sexuality may thus become a
terrain for renewed discussion in feminism
about self-other
relationships that do not rely on a presumed
identity

between or among women as suffering, gendered
or sexed
subjects.

We can build alternative modes of representation

for understanding sexual violences in their specificity

without assuming dualist models for gender identity.

We can

create counter-hegemonic modes of representation which will
not be static and enclose women in the identity of potential

victim.

Essentializing sex as the 'being' of woman colludes

with identity discourses that obscure differences among

women vis-a-vis sexuality and the history of sexual
politics.

Arguing sexuality to be the

*

essence' of women's

identity and the violation of it to be the 'worst' thing
that can happen conspires with narratives that place women
in the role of passive victim.

Rather than participating

in normalizing the idea of sexual violence by arguing it is
a potential experience for all women- -a theory that implies
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that women must construct
their lives and feminist theory
around that potential, we
should struggle to make sexual
violence appear to be as
strange as possible in the moment
and in general. « B this
I do not mean to
y
participate in
the liberal assumption that
formal' men do not rape or that
intimate violences- are an
aberration in an otherwise

peaceful private sphere.

violence is normal.

'Normal' men do rape.

Intimate

Public speak-outs and support for

victims are crucial to building a
society where sexual
violence does not successfully stigmatize
victims.
However,

building upon the thesis of the
non-representability of
pain,

we can render sexual violence strange
through being

less systemic in our theorizing and taking
the exposures of
each incident as an event in itself. The
dearth of public

stories about women who successfully resist sexual
violence
shows how our attention, while needing to remain
focussed in

part on healing and justice for survivors, must be diffused
to take victories into account.

They can tell us as much

about the logic of sexual violence as stories of

victimization.

They offer the material to build alternative

modes of representation for understanding women and men in

relationship to the potential for violence.

This may help

women, who carry all their particularity and differences

with them, take down the fragile edifices of male power
through the exposure of sexual violence as a practice rather
than working politically only in spite of or with the

purpose of overcoming the
effects of sexual violences that
have always already happened.
CONCLUSION
The historicity of the
identities of >women' challenge
feminism to take its own
performative and experientially
driven constructions of >women'
and 'gendered experience'
seriously as such rather than
assuming these categories to
be lying in wait of discovery.
Feminism does not bear
immediate witness to a truth beyond the
terms of available
conceptual forms as MacKinnon argues.
Experience is always
being interpreted as it is represented to
the world.
Those
interpretations carry crucial historical differences
within
them.
The effort to politicize sexual violence should
not

displace the differences among women about sex and
sexuality.

The appearance/reality dichotomy understood by

radical feminists to organize women's experiences of sexual

suffering inhibits and limits strategic interventions.
Interpretation exposes unintentional truths in the
details of everyday life in organized society.

Feminism

offers a way of politicizing interpretations of the world

without forgetting the vagaries of experience.

The socially

constructed quality of truths about experiences previously
taken for granted as part of
exposed.

The

v

x

the nature of things' are

realities' of experience are not the

background to a foreground of ideological untruths, but
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something to be interpreted
as potentially telling truths
about the social world.
The project of disarticulating
patriarchal power does
not require feminism to express
a univocal truth about
women's experiences of suffering.
Experience is a sentient
relationship to the object world
which becomes intelligible
as we engage in a process of
political contestation and
interpretation.
Through interpreting and interrupting
the
phenomenon of sexual violence feminism
intervenes in

distinct and critical ways with dominant
discourses and
assumptions about gender and sexuality that
unjustly shore
up male power; it does not ^discover' a
previously hidden or

underlying truth about the totality of women's lives
within
an undifferentiated patriarchy.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
in a recent essay called
"Experience"

makes an argument about the
question

I

(1992)

Joan Scott

raise in this

dissertation about the relationship
between experience and
identity politics. Her discussion
criticizes the deployment
of experience' as an authorizing
moment
of feminist and

other critical histories.

she argues that experience slides

into static identity forms when it
becomes a moment in
historical inquiry assumed to be transparent
to interested
knowers.
Scott looks at how "experience" is invoked
in

historical inquiry to authorize discussions
of previously
invisible histories such as those of gay men,
lesbian women
and women of color.
Scott argues that the invocation
of

experience as a source of authority discourages and even
obscures inquiry into the political and social conditions
that render those particular historical experiences

invisible in the first place.

I

agree with her argument

against invoking experience as an authorizing strategy.

it

renders it static, as if it is something one can have in the
sense of exclusive ownership.
shown,

However, as

I

think

I

have

the politics of experience are not exhausted by

rejecting its authorizing force in favor of explanations of
its historicity.

Scott's essay defers commitment to the

politics of experience.

She is essentially arguing for a

better explanation of historical silences and exclusions.
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She does not tell us how this is a transformative
project
for social relations of domination, only that it
can expose
the terms of those relations more effectively.

Through exploring the contributions of Theodor Adorno
to philosophizing identity and experience,

this dissertation

takes up the politics of experience as a non- identical

dialectical moment that sustains a politics potentially

transformative of presently dominative and oppositional
self -other relations.

This work engages the debates about identity and

experience in contemporary feminism.

It considers the

arguments about identity that have taken shape within

various discursive\theoretical frameworks of feminism.
Responses to the "problem" of identity within feminism have

proliferated in the last ten years.
feminist theory

I

But

I

look at areas of

think most clearly profile the dilemmas of

identity itself as a social and historical effect in
modernity:

materialist and post-structuralist feminisms.

came to this project with my critical perspective on

identity politics informed by Theodor Adorno'

s

philosophy.

Reflecting on issues raised by feminism and Adorno'
critique of identity leads me to argue for a politics of

experience that is non-identitarian but driven by an
imperative to understand and change the material effects of

dominative self -other relations in the object world.
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I

Feminist identity thinking is not only
present in
theory that would posit an immutable essence
of womanness
(the sexual,

maternal or sisterly self) as prior to all

social inscription.

Materialist feminist epistemologies

concern themselves with the historicity of women's
identity
and the potential therein for collective politics.

I

examine feminist epistemologies which take a different path
from feminists who make ontological arguments about identity
and politics.

Developments in feminist standpoint theory

have elaborated a complex lineage between Marxist

epistemology and feminism.

Standpoint feminism develops a

materialist epistemology that will offer legitimacy to
women's particular situatedness as a site of struggle.

Standpoint feminists can be understood to be responding to
the falsely

universalizing claims that plague some Radical

feminist versions of what it means to be woman in the world.
As

I

explain in my final chapter, Radical feminists assume

an unencumbered sisterhood present beyond the differences

apparent within patriarchal structures.

Standpoint

feminists also try to get at the process of politicizing

experience in such a way that feminism becomes possible in
spite of perceived differences.

But they do it through

examining the social and historical relationship between
being and knowledge.

They pay attention to questions of

epistemic privilege and material privilege vis-a-vis the

production of knowledge, thereby avoiding the leveling
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discourses of some Radical feminisms.

At their best,

standpoint feminists work within the
tension between the
particular and the universal in trying to
weave a moment

of

solidarity out of the material differences
in women's lives.
I've explored some of the questions
raised by these

attempts to found feminist interpretation and
political

solidarity in women's material conditions of life.
Standpoint feminisms consider how feminist identity
emerges
out of the material conditions of being gendered "women"
in

the world and explore the political potential in assuming

the necessary partiality of "objective" knowledge.

They

argue this partiality is what makes women's knowledges
critical.

Standpoint theory is an effort to legitimate the

distinct forms of knowledge available if one attends to the
lived experiences of women as specifically gendered
subj ects

Standpoint feminism thus approaches the kind of non-

identitarian materialist knowledge

I

want to develop; it

attends to and politicizes experiential knowledge as a

founding moment for the critique of systems of dominance.

Standpoint theory thus contains important potential to

collectivize women as an identity without imputing an
essence to "woman,
tend to do.

"

as less historically oriented feminisms

However, as

I

have pointed out, each standpoint

theorist eventually relies on an ahistorical quality of

women's experience in order to found and/or legitimate
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feminism as a distinct form of knowledge
production.
Standpoint feminists assume an identity between

the subject

of feminism and the object-world of
women's lives;

they

depoliticize experience in an attempt to legitimate
feminist
identity as possible in spite of differences among
women.

While

acknowledge the political insights into the

I

relationship between material being and objective knowledge,
I

critique the moments of identity thinking in standpoint

feminism.

Feminist epistemological attempts to reconcile the

contradictions between being and knowledge into a unified,
feminist subject of modernity ultimately rely on static

notions of experience and social identity.

Their attention

to experience slides into a reliance on identitarian forms.
I

discuss how the efforts of standpoint theorists to

identify the subject of history for feminism do not

adequately address the challenges differences among women
pose for feminism as a transformative project.

The politics

of difference are more relevant to the future of feminism

than the location of a singular feminist perspective.
Standpoint theorists argue for establishing a stable

political identity for feminism.
1988)

I

(see especially,

Hartsock,

argue the critical potential of experiential

knowledge is obscured within this organizing logic of
feminist epistemology

.

The politics of representing,

identifying or conceptualizing otherness interrupts projects
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that construct the feminist
subject out of the material

condition of women's lives.

Because standpoint theorists

depend upon a particular meaning of
gender identity as the
constitutive common denominator among women
they rely on the
modern notion that the conditions of
different women's lives
in the world are ultimately the
material politics works on

rather than that which provokes politics.

In effect,

the

closer feminist methods come to identifying the
terms of

gendered life, the more differences emerge to defeat the
solidarity presumed to be the desired goal of feminism.
Thus,

as

I

point out above, even "experience" has become a

contested political concept in feminism rather than the
foundational material upon which feminism as a movement
works.

(see Grant,

1993; Scott,

1992)

I

critique the

identity politics of standpoint theory because it asserts a
correspondence between the positions subjects assume or are

historically placed within and the kinds of political
knowledge they will develop as feminists.
The politics of representation and the power\knowledge

relationship are central to the creation of a collective

identity among women.

Feminism works through the

particularity of the self in relation to the organized

generality of the collective.

This process is critical to

successful intervention in systems of abstract exchange

which govern modernity.

Standpoint feminism does not
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adequately recognize the risks of collectivity
in modernity
but strives to affirm the possibilities
of
collectivity.

In the next chapter,
a

I

have turned to Theodor Adorno as

philosopher who is unrelentingly suspicious of

collectivizing forms, political and philosophical, in
modernity.

While some have argued his suspicions are

historically appropriate only to the era of Facism,

I

think

his concerns should inform our critiques of contemporary

politics of collective movements.

Adorno'

s

theory of non-

identity takes us toward political self-other relationships
in modernity that challenge the identitarian forms that

obscure or deny difference.

For Adorno, persistent

attention to non-identity in philosophical and political
inquiry offers critical and liberatory potential.

Adorno argues that the continual search for closure,
for a politics based in the construction of collective

identity or the subj ect \obj ect of history,

(the "German

nation" for Hegel, the proletariat for Marx, and the "new
social movements" for post -Marxist theory) enforces

conditions of abstract unity under concrete condition of
dominance.

Adorno moves away from that search in both his

philosophy and his interpretative work about social
phenomenon
Adorno argues the disappearing subject to be both an
effect and a necessary condition of abstract relations of

exchange in modernity.

He develops his argument for the
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critical politics of non-identity in
Negative DialPrM^
For Adorno, no subject of knowledge
"escapes" the
ideological forms which constitute the social
whole.
The
politics of identity through which subjective
life is

articulated reflects the contradictions of the
system of
exchange enforced by capitalist social relations.
Adorno warns us against asserting an identity between

subjective knowledge and the object world.

He does not give

up on philosophical inquiry into the subj ect\obj ect relation
as inspired by the Marxian tradition of materialist

knowledge.

But he sustains a commitment to theorizing the

mediated quality of inter-subjective life and the
possibility that truths may be found in the particulars of
the object world while the whole remains false to its own

immanent promises of freedom.
The rest of this work takes up the question of whether

political movement becomes paralyzed as the non-identical
self is silenced or stilled by the awareness of the

incoherence of its own history and agency.

Are the

possibilities for active intervention in relations of
dominance shut down or multiplied through the critique of

materialist

f oundationalism

in feminism?

Adorno contributes to understanding the contradictory

quality of feminist commitments to gender as a form of
identity.

But

I

turn to Judith Butler's work in order to

elaborate more fully how representations of gender work to
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condition the terms on which we can
"be" as gendered
subjects in the world.
Post-modern feminists reject even
limited gestures toward materialism as
a grounds for
politics.
in particular I consider the implications
of
Butler's theory of "perf ormativity " and her implicit

displacement of experience from interpretation and politics.
She critiques commitment to ontology in feminist theorizing
as constraints on political action.

Her theory of

performativity detaches her vision of feminism from "women"
as subjects prefigured for politics by material conditions
of life.

Relying on Lacan, she argues that gender identity

is a habit performed within the naturalized constraints of a

historical but intrinsically punitive process of exclusion.
Butler reminds us that even materialist approaches like
that adopted by standpoint theorists can reify the "reality"
of gender if they do not call into question the founding

moments of their own inquiry.

In standpoint theory,

one of

those founding moments is the material relations of sex and
reproduction.

For Butler, however, the sexed body is

political through and through.

If theory reproduces as the

grounds for its possibility the reality it professes to
challenge,

material

for example,

(and maternal)

the condition or existence of
bodies,

it will obscure

possibilities for subversion immanent to the terms of the
historical emergence of that reality.
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Feminist post -structuralism organizes politics
around
the terms of representation.
Identities emerge through

practices of exclusion and abjection.

Those exclusions are

never finally accomplished but remain in process.
Butler,

For

subverting the multiple processes of gendering

subjects means deferring commitment to the priorly gendered
subject as a condition of feminist politics.

If gender is

habituated, feminism must learn to work on the "groundless

grounds" of representations that are political all the way
down.

"For the subject to be a pregiven point of departure

for politics is to defer the question of the political

construction and regulation of the subject itself;

for it

is important to remember that subjects are constituted

through exclusion, that is, through the creation of a domain
of deauthorized subjects, presubjects,

populations erased from view."

figures of abjection,

(Butler,

1993:13)

The political differences between Adorno's and Butler's

critique of the modern subject and identity can be

summarized as follows.

They both critique identity as it

enforces particular exclusions, but Adorno theorizes

identity as an historical effect and material condition of
cognition.

In his work,

this does not imply the dialectical

"overcoming" of identity into a synthesis of freedom.
Rather,

he argues forms of identity thinking to be

historically specific to the condition of abstract exchange
relations andd commodity culture in capitalism.

Butler's

critique of identity tends to be
ahistorical because she
never quite explains what is at
stake in the material
conditions that sustain the exclusionary
habits of identity.
Her claim for the normative value
of detaching politics from
identity does not take the quality
of historical experience
into account.
I argue this material
quality of experience
makes political argument intelligible.
Women of color do
not critique the exclusions of feminist
theory
as

constructed by white women because of an abstract claim
about the injustice of exclusion.

They critique the

exclusions practiced by white feminists because they

prohibit or defer attention to what women of color do and
how they interpret their conditions of life as significant
for a transformative politics.

The material suffering

caused by exclusions demands the reconfiguring of self -other
relations in their immanent and historical sociality.

Adorno's theory, we are necessarily social.

In

Our

"performances" fulfill historical conditions of necessity

which are riven with inequality and dominance, yet

ideologically proclaimed to be acted out in freedom.

Adorno

reminds us of the somatic moment that will drive critical

inquiry into these performances.

Butler worries that any

reference to the subject or to the "reality" of women's
lives will reinscribe the terrain on which dominance does
its work.

My reading of Adorno argues that it is through
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the object world,

the world of experience,

that we expose

the suffering caused by dominance.
In the final chapter

I

look at sexuality as part of the

world of experience feminists have exposed as
a site of
suffering but also of possibility.
Feminists have referred to the sexualized violences

committed against women's bodies as one of the "realities"
of gender that post-structuralist theory ignores.

My

engagement here with the politics of sexual violence was

motivated by the challenge of thinking about the suffering
caused by sexual violence as a discursively constructed
experience.

We may argue that sexual violence is a result

of discursive constructions of sexuality,

masculinity.

of women or of

But how do we politicize the phenomenon as a

practice in itself without reducing it to the terms of
socially constructed narrative?

a

How might we problematize

the way feminism has developed the political terrain around
the event of sexual violence without denying its urgency as
a constitutive limit on how women can be in the world?

Sexual violence is an experience of subjects engendered
as feminine,

or as women, obscured through the ideological

commitment to keep sexuality in the realm of the private and
of the individual.

Taking a critique of identity thinking

into account while attending to the interpretation of

material experience,

I

suggest a shift in our focus to the

process of politicizing sexual violence.
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Feminist

interpretation should not rely on women
identifying as
potential victims in order to assert that
there is a
political problem.
I argue we should pay more
attention to
what sexual violence as a practice does
in the world.

Theorizing it as a result of gendered dominance
collapses it
into one limited framework for understanding
its effects.

Instead, we should interpret sexual violence as
an event

that potentially expresses truths about multiple
systems of

dominance in the world.

The reality and the potential of

being a victim of sexual violence telescopes women's
possibilities for being the world.

But the political

strategies we develop for combatting it do not have to
reflect that narrow space.

Multiple strategies for resisting apparently
intractable phenomenon can emerge through interpreting the

many-sidedness of experience.

Feminist commitments to

interpreting experience encourage expanded possibilities of
oppositional practices.

I

try to show the limits of

feminist theoretical frameworks without using them as a foil

against which to create yet another framework.

Feminism has

emerged as a political discourse through differences among
women, not in spite of differences among women.

Present

debates about identity and difference in modernity are well-

served by focussing attention on feminist history and theory
as a place where the questions are about the survival of a

historically necessary movement rather than abstracted,
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disembodied considerations of democratic
practices or the
politics of representation.
My discussions about identity and
experience culminate
in a chapter about sexual violence
because- -in spite of the
currency of popular suspicions about feminisms
that deploy
sexual violence as a signifier of women's
ultimate victim
status- -I continue to think it is a defining issue
for

feminist struggle.

In discussing the embodied experience of

sexual violence as a political practice,

I

argue that as we

critique identity discourses in feminist theory, we do not

necessarily give up political argument and strategizing over
improving the actual, material conditions of women's lives.

My final chapter looks at how the questions raised
earlier about the politics of identity are related to the
social or collective capacity to bear witness and to offer

meaning to suffering.

Adorno's specific historical concern

was with how the Holocaust gathers meanings which bear false

witness to that which cannot be rationalized or finally

explained on the terms modern cognition offers.

My

discussion of how sexual violence is politicized reflects
this concern.

The focus on whether feminism defeats its

transformative potential through its emphasis on women's
suffering, or as Wendy Brown has put it, their "wounded

identities," draws attention to the implications of imputing

historical meaning to experiential suffering as the
inaugural moment for political action.
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draw on a number of resources to
consider the
contentious debates about sexuality and
sexual violence in
feminism.
My discussion is partially driven by a
concern
with how the political/discursive terrain
on which the
I

struggle against sexual violence takes place
precludes

consideration of race as

a

structuring principle of the

phenomena of sexual violence and of the possibilities
for
collective movement among women.

Many feminists have

pointed out how racism constructs a wholly different set of
images and demands women of color (for example) are expected
to live up to within the mainstream of sexual culture in the

United States.

In addition,

an anti-racist feminism must

take into consideration the differential treatment of

victims and perpetrators in cases of inter-racial rape.

All

rape is not the same in the eyes of the law nor in the eyes
of a racist social order.
1974)

(Estrich,

1987; Hall,

1983; Davis,

It therefore must not be treated as essentially the

same by feminists in the struggle to stop it.

Through the

dialectic of experience and the representation of that

experience within the various institutions women go to for
justice and protection, racism structures and restructures
the image of the proper victim.

In combatting this it is

not enough to say that the reality of rape is the same once

racist constructions are exposed, but to develop a

constellation of fields of recognition for women's different
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experiences and histories that will
render them intelligible
to the public world in their
particularity.
In light of these concerns,

my final chapter explores

the possibility that feminism
may participate in

constructing spectacles for consumption
rather than
deconstructive narratives of resistance
through the struggle
against sexual violence.
it suggests how feminism may be
complicit in rendering women's particular
suffering

available for consumption in

world organized through

a

abstract systems of exchange which level experience
into

manageable categories for mass consumption.

Without

pretending to find an answer to the problems embedded in
representing suffering or rejecting out of hand the

priorities of the movement,

I

draw upon the philosophical

work of Adorno and Elaine Scarry to consider how they might
intervene in arguments about the effects of imbuing

otherwise privatized suffering with political or historical

meaning as a justice-seeking strategy.
I've concluded through this work that feminism should

not understand the project of representing the experience of

sexual violence as expressing a settled reality but as a

means to disrupt and transform the social terrain on which
sexual violence thrives and does its damage.

The political

terrain on which feminism works never holds still.

A non-

identitarian approach encourages practices that demobilize
ma sculinist power through exposing its fictions rather than
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insisting that we can overturn the

»

reality.'

It moves

feminist struggles against sexual
violence forward through
differences among women.
it responds to the articulation of
concrete experiences without constraining
feminism to the
grounds of prior assumptions about the
sexual identity of
women as vulnerable.

Antagonism and conflict is inherent in feminism.
necessarily

it is

a part of feminist struggle because of the

feminist respect for the particular, for experience and
the
sentient qualities of everyday life.

Conflicts over the

definition of the personal and of the political, and over
how the relationship between them works have driven feminist

politics as have conflicts over whose voices and experiences
count in feminist interpretations of the political world.
In the course of this struggle,

however, the critical

politics of experience are too often subdued by the politics
of identity in a search for affirmative or 'positive'

collective knowledge and action.

My dissertation argues

that a non-identitarian feminism will reside in the tension

created by the pressure to rationalize commitments to one
another in the name of conceptual order and the imperative
to listen to women's voices and interpretations of their

experiences with an attitude of radical receptivity to what

may be at the margins or even outside of the given terms of
the rational.

Because he reconfigures the dialectic to take

account of this tension, Adorno contributes to this project.
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ENDNOTES

atharine MacKinnon argues that
"difference" and even
"differences" among women are the "velvet
glove" on the iron
fist of patriarchy.
This does not recognize different
experiences as significant moments for
politics, but reduces
them to representative symptoms.
Ha

Ck
criti ^es feminist theoretical
M
J^ 987)
Michel
Foucault on the grounds that he is a
male who exercises the privilege of
disclaiming identity and subjectivity. She
finds it
suspicious that just as women and people of
color and postcolonial subjects are finding their voices,
poststructuralist theory begins to argue that the subject
is
irrelevant and indeed a ruse of history.
in a similar vein,
Seyla Benhabib (1991) argues "Given how fragile
and tenuous
women s selfhood is in many cases, how much of a
hit and
miss affair their struggles for autonomy are, this
reduction
of female agency to a 'doing without the doer'
[reference is
to Judith Butler's critique of the female subject] at
best
appears to me to be making a virtue out of necessity "
(Benhabib, 1991:142)
In other words, women are not yet
ready to give up on subjectivity and notions of self. The
implication is that formerly subjugated subjects, the
invisible others to dominant forces, must move through the
power of subjecthood to achieve whatever emancipated state
lies in the future.
This of course begs the question of the
politics of the subject which I will address specifically in
my chapter on Theodor Adorno.

al*l^n™
^
wJ f Western
w«?
white,

S

Foucault 's work contradicts this claim. He argues that
3.
power relations produce what is accepted as knowledge; that
we are never transparent to ourselves as autonomous subjects
who know the world through reason.
(see esp. Foucault,
1984)

Kirstie McClure (1992) critiques Sandra Harding from a
somewhat different position than I do.
She argues that
Harding, in her efforts to delineate how the 'science
question' works within feminist thinking, effectively shuts
down much of what makes feminism such a vital political
discourse for late modernity. The overriding concern with
causality and a properly scientific form for feminism, ie.
objectivity and explanatory breadth, scientizes politics
rather than politicizing science through feminist critique.
McClure follows in the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe (1986)
in arguing for a feminism that encourages the proliferation
of politicized sites of contest rather than trying to
organize feminism into a 'proper' theory of causality vis-avis women's oppression.
4.
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feminism

1988
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limited
to

13

identity crisis' in
t0 P lacin ^ essentialist

of £he
thP ^h
sublet? up against post-structuralist
c^itiSue
.^is would imply that the
"crisis" only hit with
tht
1C
f
7
among women in the
°
""l^P^ity
Jate i980's
Thirr"
does not reflect the complex history
of
?
feminism **L n ? 7
The SUb ^ ect of feminism has beenunder
!
scrutiny
° f radical feminist activism in
the late llTn%
n™***™*
13 n0 " crisi s" in the temporal sense
bur
n ongoing
'in
out an
argument.

not^ns
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This term reappears in Adorno's work
6.
in several
contexts.
it refers to the world governed
epistemologically, economically and politically
by svstems
or exchange.
it is similar to Weber's metaphor of the
'iron
cage in that it does not imply a closed system,
but one
which appears' out of reach of the individual
as agent.
7. Angela Harris (1990) argues that on the
one hand,
exists within feminism the tyranny of particularity there
or selfreferentiality which, because all experience must be equally
valued, makes everything eventually the same.
This is akin
to an extreme and simplistic form of relativism.
On the
other hand, there exists the tyranny of abstraction or the
universalizing 'we' which removes the power to identify from
the individual.
Neither pole furthers a critique of
identity as a necessarily relational political concept.
Abstraction posits an identity beyond the reach of
particular individuals, and has been shown to be contingent
upon the power to silence while particularity posits a fully
self -referential identity.
Both result in privileging
sameness, or equivalence, over difference as the key to
political understanding and movement.
If everything is
self -referential or contingent upon the subjectivity of the
knower, then everything eventually is the same.
If
everything fits under the abstract concept then those who
would otherwise declare difference are necessarily silenced.

8. "Positivity" is in quotes because for Adorno, the
potential for an affirmative moment only rests in the
negativity necessary for any moment of reflection on
cognition or knowledge production.

As I will discuss Adorno did believe a certain distance
9.
from lived experience, a kind of alienation from the given
world around the subject, was necessary for critical
knowledge
10. see Robert Hullot-Kentnor (1989); Andrew Hewitt (1992);
Peter Uwe Hohendahl (1993)
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11.

Mimesis signifies

a relation to the object prior
to rh P
U liZat
n ° f that ° b ^ ect
j°
*
subject
suSie?t° In Dial
Di^ ectic of EnUghtenment the concept
of
3
relationship
o^
ma^to
nature"
"
-LS mythical in that
there s not
hlp
S ratlonal individual as one
who names; it is
orior to the emergence of knowledge
prior
through naming
it is a
relationship of non-identity.

r

m

n

,^"^^^^^1
^

see Jay (1993)
strategies
12.

^ ^„g°

%

.

for a discussion of Habermas'

rhetorical

Susan Buck-Morss discusses the methodological
importance of the concept of ^natural history'
(1977-52-62)
However, she does not discuss the concrete
relevance 'of the'
domination of nature to Adorno and Horkheimer's
argument
about identity.
Patricia J. Mills argues that the attempt
to resuscitate nature as an independent moment
in the
dialectic of history is central to the critique of Marxian
theories that celebrate ^productive man' as engaged in
a
liberatory project (1989:86-88). The domination of internal
and external nature by the repressive forces of modernity
remained central to Adorno' s philosophy beyond The Dialectic
of Enlightenment.
However, taking the two above mentioned
dicussions into account, we can see that reason and desire,
identity and nature always remain in a relationship, the
former is never finally successful in eliminating the
latter
13.

14. As Patricia J. Mills has argued in a critique of Isaac
Balbus and Ynestra King, nature is not benign in Adorno'
work (1991)
Rather, it is also known as what is repressed,
dangerous, other.
.

As I will discuss later, Lysaker and Sullivan, in an
15.
article about Adorno' s attention to critical practices,
argue that he remained committed to figuring out the
implications of the inherent tension between the subject and
object of knowledge rather than succombing to the collapse
into identity or the reified separation.
In addition to the connection between the exchange
16.
principle and justice, we learn from Nietzsche that the
right to determine these equivalencies is contingent upon
relations of power. Adorno does not theorize power. To
supplement his critique of identity with a theory of power
we can turn to Foucault

Participants in the Critical Legal Studies movement,
17.
the Critical Race Theory movement and Feminist legal
theorists have been arguing for years that the law, as
constituted in liberal doctrine, cannot take differences in
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Dersonaf;^
P

^jSs^ce'

biol °9Y (women's versus men's bodies),
in
nCSS GtC int consideration as it
°
seeks
'

-

ar in 9. that feminist identity thinking
is
akin
thinkin 9 on the level of thl state,
international L^
insitutions or patriarchy.
However it is
* nt
n
° te h ° W identi ty thinking has
1°
emerged in
*7f°fl
,
lstor cal for ms and with different, usually
^
tragic S
historical consequences.
I disagree with the
pragmatic response that women 'do what they
need to do to
survive and thrive,' including ignoring
difference
in favor
of expediency.
I also disagree, as I will
discuss later,
with the alternative response, ie. that
identity thinking
among women is somehow different than for men
or
participants in patriarchy because of women's relatively
powerless position.

LTh^ ^

t^

^-

in an extrememly lucid account of the exposure
19.
of the
imperialist, bourgeois self that Adorno and Horkheimer
engage in throughout their exegesis of the Odyssey Michael
Clark points out how the double movement of creating the
enemy other and the conquest of that enemy other is never
quite complete. Those who are different never succomb
totally to conquest so the process of othering' must be
carried on as if it has no history even while its
historicity is continually being exposed by the resistance
of the object of conquest (Clark, 1989)
,

x

20.
Socialist feminists have worked out sophisticated
epistemological arguments for subjugated knowledges that in
themselves are objective perspectives on the world because
they confess' to their partiality and interest.
Traditional, disembodied knowledges disguise or mask their
interest and therefore are not objective but ideological.
The potentiality for social change is more likely to reside,
therefore, with marginalized peoples who have an interest in
overturning the status quo. (see Haraway, 1990 and Harding,
x

1993)

See Ernst Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1986) for one of
the most complete theorizations of "new social movements."
21.

22
Two of the best statements about the necessity and
politics of this 'discomfort' come from Minnie Bruce Pratt
(1984) and Bernice Johnson Reagon (1992)
.

In "The Storyteller" Benjamin differentiates between
storytelling and information:
Every moning brings us the news of the globe, and yet
This is because no
we are poor in noteworthy stories
already being shot
without
comes
to
us
event any longer
23.

.
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through with explanation.
in other
almost nothing that happens benefits words, by now
storytelling;
everything benefit s information.
Actually, it
is half the art of storytelling
to keep a story free
trom explanation as one reproduces it.
Leskov is a
master at this... The most extraordinary
things,
marvelous things, are related with the greatest
accuracy, but the psychological connection of
the
events is not forced on the reader.
It is left up to
him to interpret things the way he understands
them,
and thus the narrative achieves an amplitude that
information lacks. (Benjamin, 1968:89)
When I use the term "other" I mean anything outside
of
the self that is potentially knowable but still strange
or
unfamiliar. This could, of course, apply to anything, a
desk or a chair in the room with us. Here, however, because
I am concerned with the political world,
I am concerned with
the generalized others that the political world constructs.
Currently, within and without feminism, these include
racialized, gendered, ethnic, and sexual others.
To
confront oppressive systems of power we must be explicit
about how contemporary relations of domination work in their
historical contexts and be specific about who and what we
mean by "otherness."
24.

See Susan Buck-Morss

25.

(1977:96-110).

See Judith Grant (1994) for a critique and a rejection
experience' as a necessary concept for feminist
analysis
26.

of

N

By object, I do not mean something necessarily
exogenous to or fully separate from the subject, I mean the
object world to be the external and internal means by which
we sustain ourselves as social, conscious beings.
27.

This is what Wendy Brown is arguing as she says
feminists must "assume responsibility ." (Brown, 1991)

28.

It is now common among feminists to cite to Sojourner
Truth's speech at the Akron convention (1851) as emblematic

29.

of the contradictions racial differences present to the
unity of 'woman' as a concept. Truth took the truth out
from under white feminists whose presumptions about what
'woman' was a reflection upon who they were expected to be
Feminists of
as white, middle-class, keepers of the hearth.
color have continued in her tradition of supporting feminist
struggle but also persistently making trouble for any
feminism that relies only on gender for its political terms
of reference.
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Too often, difference is invoked in
30
order to "include
others but not to recognize them or
cede
privilege
P
Peoole
?
are never merely "different",
politically signiIicant
differences play a role in the construction
of
rent ated sub ^ct positions.
Depending
on how one is
;
positioned,
participation will be more or less ^yicimaiea
legitimatedmore or less recognized.

^^

^

D
TenCe "
° ften conceiv ed in feminism as refering
to the difference I*
between men and women or between
masculinity and femininity. Debates about social
policy
have been particularly myopic in conceiving
of the
difference ys equality" problem between men and
women only
in relationship to gender and sex difference.

ln\C

.

While the scope and intelligence of her discussions
of
feminist theory, French and American, are impressive,
Rosi
Braidotti fails
her discussion of the future of feminism
to take into account that it is contingent upon
reconfiguring relations among women vis-a-vis systems of
domination that render them participants in and" not just
victims of relations of dominance.
For her, figuring out
how to write sexual difference without repeating the sins of
the father is the future of feminism.
But women's lives are
not only defined by their sexual difference from men or even
from one another.
(Braidotti, 1991) Alice Jardine's text,
Gynesis published six years earlier is just as guilty of
this myopia with respect to the imperative that feminism
become anti-racist, anti-classist and post-colonialist in
its very self definition.
(Jardine, 1985)
32.

m

,

This is a paraphrase of Rosi Braidotti (1991) and Alice
33.
Jardine's (1986) arguments about feminism and feminist
theory.
Each places the conditions of emergence for
feminist theory and politics in the late 1960 's within the
fissures of Western civilization. This privileges Western
systems of thought and practice beyond the scope of their
actual effectivity in creating the terms on which people
live.
In addition, it places all feminisms in the context
of resistance against that particular paradigmatic history,
though historically, the social messages addressed to and
the demands on women of color and colonized women have been
significantly different.

Foucault did not accept the label of 'post-modern', and
in fact understood his project as an exploration of the
"attitude" that is modernity. (Foucault, 1984/39, 1983/34)
His conceptualization of modernity as an attitude precludes
thinking of it as a period of time that has come and
Nonetheless, his historical positioning
(perhaps) gone.
and particular Althusser's Marxism, and
Marxism
vis-a-vis
paradigms as they existed in France
those
of
his critique
34.
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" What
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Much ° f the anxiety aroused by the
feminist theory relates to the seeminq post-modern turn in
unwillingness
post-modern theorists to assert, or render explicit, of
their
political agendas. Nancy Fraser has shown how
Foucault's
work, particularly that of Discipline and
Punish relies on
a humanist impulse in order to make
its argument about the
individuating internalization of social discipline
and
surveillance in modern society. (Fraser, 1984)
Seyla
Benhabib_ argues that critical social theory must assume
a
subject
the world to whose immanent self -understanding it
addresses its claims. Otherwise it will remain in an
aporetic state of static self -ref erentiality (Benhabib,
I think these commentaries miss the
1982)
point made by
Adorno, that critical theoretical practice in late modernity
exists in a necessary tension with the colonizing and
absorbing tendencies of identity logic. To proceed in a
space "between a rock and nowhere" (Lysaker and
Sullivan, 1992) in a time when it is not possible to claim we
know how the relationship between theory and practice- -or
between consciousness and revolutionary agency- -works is
the task of critique.
For Foucault the imperative to
historicize or theorize the present through the conditions
of the past- -to render the familiar strange and the normal
bizarre- -meant theory had to be locally oriented and
attentive to the tasks various concepts, like humanism or
the revolutionary subject /object have been put to in
stablizing given forms of domination. This approach may
have implicitly humanist grounds in some sense, but I am not
sure why that undermines the critical possibility in
unearthing how humanisms have been deployed in the context
of various humanly constructed catastrophes of modernity.
,

m

.

,

37.
This point is best made Foucault's essay "What is
Enlightenment" (1984)
In it he displays a certain
ambivalence about the project of Enlightenment and modernity
and disabusing any notion that he was simply opposed to
Enlightenment or to modernity. This essay reflects on
project of interrogating the nature of Enlightenment
illustrated by Kant's letter to a newspaper in the 18th
Foucault shows how explanations of Enlightenment
century.
often claim it is about finding the exit from the present,
or
finding a way out' of bondage to necessity (the body)
constructing a limit to what the possibilities are for an
.

x

,
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This is the argument with which
Butler opens her
discussion of "Paris is Burning"
(1993) in order to show
that the queens as depicted in that
film disrupt and subvert
ass ™Ptions about sexuality and
community even
5gf2°?;S 7 r resent
" the abject"
in
heterosexualist
fP
?rt^-£
identity
39.

systems.

T i
3 common the me in contemporary attempts
to
? ? the
ti:
articulate
sublet of feminism. Teresa de Lauretis
draws on many theorists who use a similar
theoretical
strategy vis-a-vis totality to argue that feminist
positioning is a positioning from the outside that
offers a
radically new vantage point. Feminists like Marilyn
Frye
Adrienne Rich, Gloria Anzaldua, Barbara Smith and Monique'
Wit tig are all said to create figures of 'otherness'
that
take on the task of unsettling every definition arrived
at
through dominant, patriarchal conceptual systems. For
deLauretis, feminist consciousness "can only exist
historically, in the here and now, as the consciousness of a
'something else. " (DeLauretis, 1990:145)
'

Mary Hawkesworth* (1989) critiques both feminist
standpoint theory (for simplistically arguing that women
have superior access to truths) and post-modernist theory
(for privileging text and fiction over world and realities)
It is not clear what she is arguing for except, perhaps, a
more 'rigorously' rationalist epistemology that takes
women's lives into account in asserting truth claims. Her
argument about cognition as a human practice seems to
welcome a sprinkling of standpoint and postmodern insights.
But she adamantly dismisses these latter theoretical
approaches once she has distilled them into "intuitive" vs
"relativist" epistemologies
For Hawkesworth, 'Reality'
gets in the way of both these approaches to feminism and any
epistemology must 'recognize' that. Post-modern feminisms
do not displace or disavow reality in favor of fiction.
Hawkesworth' s use of the terms 'fact' and 'fiction' already
sets up a dichotomy between them that post-modern theory
rejects.
In addition, Hawkesworth says post-modernism is an
epistemology.
It is not an epistemology, it is anti epistemology because it refuses the subj ect\obj ect basis on
which all epistemological theory must rest.
41.

.
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e
in femi
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ln lesbian sex practices that
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heterosexual?
,
0n the ° nS hand ifc is ar ued that
women wiS natura
n have sex grounded in a higher 3 emotion
turally
than h^i d
SSX betWGen WOmen should be more
P^e
and equally
eauallv a^f;
about giving rather than only about
takinq
r
m
ThS prOCSSS of
shou?d somehow be absent from lesbian object^ficatiSn
should
desire.
On the other
side women argue that when lesbians
engage in saSo
° th r Violent
objectifying practices, they
SS°?riSfiS9 ?E
themsel? es and
association, the social world
?h
from the
puritanical7 constraints of heterosexualist
constructions of ^proper' sex practices. Each
side thus
argues that they are escaping.

^

"

™

^
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Foucault similarly focusses on those practices
considered marginal to or derivative of political life
ie
the construction of madness, of illness, and of crime,
'to
see what he could learn about the construction of sanity
or
wellness or good citizenship. He did not assume in advance
a binary opposition between the categories.
44.

Bonnie Honig similarly takes up the thesis of
45.
performativity in her critical readings of modern political
theory.
She argues, "The feminism I have in mind does not
embrace and repeat the constations of gendered
subjectivities, it does not organize itself around them.
It
announces their indeterminacy, celebrates their perpetual
failure to achieve the closures they assume, and seeks their
subversion through as series of performative appropriations
and negotiations." The thesis of performativity, in other
words, takes the constations of gender into account but
refuses the political position that settles itself within
their terms.
(Honig, 1991: 209)
See Joan Nestle (1987) for a personal history
describing this unearthing of the codes of lesbian
communication in literature.
46.

47.
In Adrienne Rich's essay "Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence" (1976) she argues that lesbianism
should not be reduced to sexuality or to having sex with
women.
She shows how lesbianism exists on a continuum of
women's relating to one another on the margins of
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See above discussion of Monique Wittiq's
conceptualization of lesbian identity.

48.

49.

Shane Phelan (1991) makes a similar argument.

This is most apparent in the sex debates' where
the
articulated are those of the pro-sex factions and
the vanilla sex factions.
The former argue for the
freedom' to experiment with violence and dominance (sadomasochism) against the latter claim that those practices of
sex further represent the terms of heterosexualist desire.
(Vance, ed. 1984; Ferguson, 1984) Butler would not argue that
there exists any freedom' to experiment but that all
practices will reflect cultural and social constraints. The
question for Butler is not what kind of sex is
permissible?' but why do we produce such a panic when we
talk about or do sex in particular ways (eg. with women) and
how can we further produce such panic in order to expose the
vulnerabilities of heterosexualism? The other ways of
thinking about sex reproduce the assumption that
heterosexualist desire is complete in itself instead of
dependent upon its other (homosexuality) to affirm its
normality.
50.

4

^sides'

x

v

x

N

'

51. In the following chapter, I address how thinking through
the tensions of the forms and substances of this
participation is precisely where a reading of Adorno can
intervene in the debates about perf ormativity
52.
This is how bell hooks reads the film (1992). I think
she takes too much away from the wo\men in the film with
hooks
this assessment of their actions and desires.
exploitative
act
of
an
film
the
as
further interprets
who
essentially
filmmaker
white
of
a
voyeurism on the part
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a WhitS audience

to see
of Black
Black'an^r
and Latino social life for their into the depths
own edification
and entertainment without having
to accept any

of

^d^uts

th * ° thSr
a much
more
morfaffirmative
affirmative spin on the relationship
between the
13 lGSbian) and her object-which
I think
stretches IT° argument about the immanent
subversions
of
pyn
sexualized
symbolisms too far.
she says Livingstone as a
S
n
DeCtS h
Glf int ° the fil
throug? Se camera
as the en^b?
, ?f
ha
ll^. This allows ™
P
the
queens access to
2
?Slf??iSn?
fulfillment iand implicates Livingstone
directly as a
UveS
In ° ther words Livingstone is
nnf only
nniST
not
a voyeur but is participating
affirmatively in the
lives of the subjects of the film through
the apparatus of
the camera.
I think hooks'
critique is more to the point.

?1

^

'

'

The classic title, of an anthology of black feminist
53.
writings, All the Women are W hite. All the Blacks
are Men.
but Some of us are Brave (Hull and Smith, eds
1984)
expresses this.
See for example, an exchange between Linda Gordon and
54.
Joan Scott (1990)
.

55.
Christine Distefano (1991) makes a similar argument.
agree with her discussion of the historically political
critiques of gender but disagree that post-modern critiques
of gender theory are "merely" playful and too theoreticized
Deconstructing gender as a discursive effect may shift our
attention to otherwise obscure sites of resistance, like
performance

:

See Martha Albertson Fineman and Roxanne Mykitiuk,
for recent discussions and critiques of feminist
strategies for bringing sexual violence to the surface of
public consciousness. See also Vicki Bell (1993) for an
excellent discussion of feminist projects as they relate to
sexuality and violence.
56.

eds. (1994)

Susan Brownmiller (1975) makes a biologically
57.
deterministic argument that when men discovered they had the
capacity to rape they proceeded to do so, finding ways
around women's resistance and setting up an unquestionable
regime of patriarchal power buttressed by the threat of
rape
Just a brief list of the most comprehensive critiques
(focussing on her theory of sexuality, not on her arguments
about pornography and its harms to women) includes:
Angela
Marianna Valverde (1989)
Drucilla Cornell (1991)
Harris (1990); Carole Vance (1992); Judith Grant (1993:7458

.

;

;
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Pa etiC reading ° f MacKinnon's project
see
see''esDeciaT?v
especially Tfr
Teresa DeLauretis (1990;
1984)

^

in the

sex-debates that took shape in the 1980'
aCt vists organized in opposition
to radical
feminiLT
j Si
9 thS radiGal Possibilities of womens'
x
sexuality
v
p
n
:
For
MacKinnon
the ^appearance/reality arid lav
n
rela ^° nS ° f d0m?nance disguising women's^
plight
PUaht as
Is ob^^
objects.
For sex-radicals, the
appearance/reality' grid lay across sexuality, ie
the
appearance is that women are asexual or
passive,
the
reality
is that women's sexuality has yet
to be discovered.
One
might interpret MacKinnon as claiming women
engage in
alienated sex, but she so adamantly rejects the
notion that
women have agency as sexual subjects that
gender dominance,
not sexual repression remains her determinant
reality.
59^

'

'

?S

'

60. MacKinnon argues: "My suggestion is that what
we have in
common is not that our conditions have no particularity
in
ways that matter.
But we are all measured by a male
standard for women, a standard that is not ours »

(MacKinnon,

1983:70)

In a critique of MacKinnon's essentialism, Angela
61.
Harris argues that "...feminist essentialism repesents not
just an insult to Black women, but a broken promise to
listen to women's stories, the promise of feminist method.
(Harris, 1990:601)
She argues that MacKinnon's feminism
identifies the condition of Black women as essentially the
same as White women, only worse.
62
I use reif ication deliberately here to argue that the
conceptual framework constructed by Radical feminism ignores
its own historicity and limiting exclusions as a cognitive
appraoch to exuality and sexual suffering. This is how
Adorno understands reif ication in sociology and philosophyas that process of cognition which renders the object
ahistorical or part of second nature through the hypostasis
of its conceptualization.
See Rose (1978) for a discussion
of Adorno' s theory of reif ication.
.

This is what I think Alice Echols and Ellen Willis are
63
talking about when they critique the "decline" of Radical
feminism into what they have labeled "cultural" feminism.
(Echols, 1987; Willis, 1984)
Also, many observers have
noted the change in the movement against domestic violence
from a collective project organized around the assumption
that women who are beaten are potential feminists to a
movement organized around service and therapeutic "helping."
(Fraser, 1991:177-181)
.

255

0

n0

rg ment for the P rimac of the
°5
y
^^f
'f/ ^
self-other
understanding which he
offpr^ ?n ~
1
t0 epistemologies that rlly either
on
a
c Son ° J°?,
f the sub ect or the
centrality of the
li^t^

objects

the

^
subject in creating knowledge
of otherness.

Foucault argues in Disciolinp and Punish
(1979) that as
invisible
f ective
The
morTinvT^
more
invisible power is in its operations
on
the
subject
r
SUCC SSfUlly ifc ±S «»»ta±n«d.
Thus force is other
n nn
c
ent is ^ite different.
She
araup?Th^
argues that the physical effects of
force exist in
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66.
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This reminds me of recent claims that sexual
67.
harrassment and date rape and even domestic violence
against
women are the result of failed communication
between
otherwise potentially compatible partners. This renders
the
violence derivative of desire, implicitly forgiving
the
perpetrator and obscuring the intent to use violence in
order to assert power.
Again, by the language of sharing I do not mean a
68.
harmonious site of mutual giving but a place where even in
conflict we should remember the essentially social quality
of our own participation.

This description of the literal deconstruction of the
69.
boundaries of the body reflects themes in narratives about
sexual violence, especially those about domestic violence.
Women's bodies become objects which are then used against
themselves as torture victims bodies becomes objects used
against themselves
70.
In my discussion of Butler's work in the previous
chapter I showed how the construction of the 'real,'
particularly with regard to stabilizing gender/sex
identities can become a life and death enterprise.

In the

sex wars' of the I980's,(see Snitow, Stansell
and Thompson, 1983; Vance, 1984; Ferguson, 1984) much of the
disagreement focussed not just on questions about power and
inequality in sexuality. Protagonists argued about whether
violence and pain could be part of consensual pleasure or
whether they were just manifestations of sexist attitudes
71.

x
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between embodiment and transcendence through
the
object world that creates the terms of
civilization for
Scarry
I appreciate the relevance
of that aspect of her
work but cannot develop the implications
in the context of
this discussion of violence.
Kimberle Crenshaw discusses the role of identity
73.
politics and differences among women as they impact
the
politics and policies of battered women's shelters in
different communities. She shows how many women are
excluded from services because of an emphasis on the
psychological effects of battering, she argues we need an
approach that takes into account individual women's
structural places in the intersecting systems of race,
class, sexuality and gender.
For her, effective strategies
for serving the complex needs of women would entail
understanding any identity-based group as always already a
coalitional gathering. (Crenshaw, 1994)

An example of the problematic politics of
74.
representation in the context of sexual violence is how use
of
the battered woman syndrome' has evolved as centerpiece
of feminist strategy in litigating cases about domestic
violence.
This descriptive phrase was developed by Lenore
Walker through extensive research on women who are battered.
As a feminist and as a clinical psychologist, Walker
x
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Elizabeth Schneider interprets the contradictory
75_
effects of feminist jurisprudence through reading
court
opinions regarding the admissability of expert testimony
in
the defense of women who kill their abusers.
She argues
that the 'battered woman syndrome' has been interpreted
by
the courts as an explanatory rather than a descriptive
framework for women's behavior thereby rendering their
responses to violence as symptoms of an illness rather than
actions taken in the interest of their survival. (Schneider
1986)

in response to Schneider's article, Lenore Walker
76.
correctly points out that until the rules of evidence which
are sex-biased in favor of typically masculine rules of
behavior in cases of self-defense are changed, the expert
testimony she has to offer about battered women will
continue to be heard by courts as proof that women are
different from men in the sense that they are lesser beings
than men.
(Walker, 1986)
77.
In spite of the popular attention to the issue, studies
have shown that the numbers of rapes, and the frequency of
wife and partner abuse has not shifted even with city-wide,
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See Hawkesworth (1991).
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that ^ores
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the
complexities of its own discussions.

It haS been ^iFically shown
that men who rape think
fKA
.
about
it- and
experience as a sexual act. Twenty years
aao
Diana Russell interviewed rape victims
and
rapists
in
order
to show that, while from the victim's
perspective rape is
traumatic and stigmatizing from the rapists'
perspective is
a relatively predictable response
to »Snccmtr5u3lS' desire
for sex
Rapists often speak of themselves as loving
women
or merely wanting to show women *what they
have.' (Russell
1975; Scully, 1990)
However, men also use rape specifically
as an act of violence against a particular
woman,
particularly in the context of intimate or *dom-stic'
violence.
in these testimonies of torture-like situations
men use sex as a weapon among others against women.
11 r-

1

Bart and O'Brien's research on rape prevention shows
83.
that there is no necessary increase in violence when
women
resist.
in fact, they show the absurdity of telling women
telling women not to resist in the interest of avoiding
injury as if the rape itself is not an injurious act. (Bart
and O'Brien, 1985)
'

For example, in a survey of research on family
violence, Linda Gordon and Wini Breines (1987) point out how
recently family violence has been named and that and the
exposure of the ideological terms on which it is discussed
84.
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